Germany’s security strategy in the making

John Kampfner

Good evening, ladies and gentlemen, whether you’re here in Chatham House or whether you are ensconced at home watching, or from your office watching this. And for those of you who have made it in the wind and the rain to here tonight, thank you very much for coming. We’re here to talk about Germany’s security, the new security strategy that will shortly be unveiled. This will be an on the record event lasting one hour. If you want to go onto Twitter or social media, please feel free to do so. It’ll be published afterwards, the event, on the Chatham House website. That, in terms of the housekeeping, is what you need to know. We will do 20 minutes/half an hour of discussion and then, we will hand it over to you for your questions. Please think about them, get them ready now, whether you’re here in the hall, or whether you are online.

I’m absolutely delighted to have the panel that we do have today. We have Dominik Mutter, the Director for Security Policy at the German Foreign Office, the Auswärtiges Amt, who has been the curator, the maker of the security strategy. So, absolutely delighted he’s come to us today in order to discuss with us the policy. We have John Bew, who is written here as “Professor of History and Foreign Policy,” but otherwise an – who is otherwise known as Foreign Policy Advisor to the Prime Minister. And John, thank you so much for coming tonight. And we have Stefanie Bolzen, a fabulously well connected, well regarded German Foreign Correspondent in London for Die WELT, who I’ve had the pleasure of knowing for some time.

It’s a particular pleasure to welcome the German Ambassador, to give him his formal title, to the Court of St James, the Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Miguel Berger. Miguel is going to set out – just for a few minutes, he’s going to come up to the lectern and set out the overview of where we are with German Security Strategy. And then, I’m going to hand over to Dominik, who’s going to speak to five or ten minutes, or for as long as you – give a short presentation, more specifically of where we are with the strategy paper and what we are to expect in coming months. So, Miguel, do come onto the stage and a very warm welcome to you [pause].

Ambassador Miguel Berger

Yeah, and John, ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much. Real pleasure that – to be here, that we have the opportunity to discuss Germany’s National Security Strategy, but also how it is linked to the discussion in other countries and, obviously, mainly to the discussion in the United Kingdom. So, it’s a fantastic opportunity. Let me maybe only say a few words as introduction.

So, the German National Security Strategy, it’s the first time that we do something like that. We had, since the 1970s, what we call white papers on defence, on the German Armed Forces, but we never undertook, really, the work to lay out a National Security Strategy. And you might think now that this was a decision that was the result of Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, but no, this is an exercise, which was decided earlier. I think it was – but Dominik Mutter can explain that much better than me, we had obviously, for the NATO Summit, the Strategic Concept, we had the Strategic Compass for the European Union. So, we had a lot of work, which went into strategy papers for NATO and for the European Union.

And for us in Germany, it was important to say we need to work out a strategy, which does not only focus on defence and foreign policy. We wanted to have a broad debate in Germany, a debate led by the Federal Foreign Ministry, but a debate, which also reaches out to society. And I think, especially now, in the situation we are in, China, the challenges posed by developments in China, but especially Russia’s war, progression and what it means for the future of European security policy, the European security architecture, this is a challenge, which needs to be reflected in a policy, which touches all ministries. But beyond the ministries, also I would say the whole of society.

So, the German Foreign Minister, Miss Baerbock, decided, and I think Dominik Mutter was part of that exercise during summer, to make a trip through Germany and to have town hall meetings, with public opinion, in order to engage people to make them understand that in order to strengthen our security, we need to think about that in a very broad sense, in a broad sense, as I said, which goes beyond defence. It is about climate change, it is about cybersecurity, but it is also about democracy, the strength of democracy, the co-operation among democratic countries. So, we want to have a strategy, a broad strategy, where everybody in the German society feels part of the discussion and then, obviously, also, of the outcome.

Let me very briefly say about China, because they are – I would say that, you know, in 2019, I think in the European Union, we had the foresight to say we need a new China Strategy, which is based on the understanding that we have areas where China is needed as a partner, especially if we speak about global issues, climate change, biodiversity. We have areas where China is a competitor, especially if you look at the economy, but there are more and more areas where we have to see China as a systemic rival. And I think since we did that in 2019, we undertook a number of very important steps already in Germany, together with our business community, to start a process of diversification of our economic relations, to strengthen our instruments, our defensive instruments, like investment control and other things.

So, this is not new, the China debate is not new. It has had quite an impact, I would say, in the last three years and I think all of us who followed the latest Party Congress in Beijing have seen that this path towards a more autocratic Chinese Government, a more aggressive foreign policy, requires fundamental changes. And I think if there is – and I would like to end with that if there is one lesson we can take out of Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, then it is that we need to strengthen our resilience. Resilience in the broad sense, resilience if we speak about economy, resilience if we speak about diversification, resilience if we speak about democratic values.

And I think that here, we have a fantastic opportunity, not only because the United Kingdom is updating the Integrated Review, and that’s why I’m especially glad that we have John Bew here, as one – I don’t know how to call it, the leading Author of the Integrated Review, and – among many, and also the fact that Germany is going to work on a new China Strategy and we have the same discussion in the United Kingdom. Though I think there is a fantastic opportunity to bring together our thinking in the United Kingdom, in Germany and in Europe, and I’m really looking forward to an interesting panel. Thank you, John.

John Kampfner

Thank you very much.

Ambassador Miguel Berger

Hmmm hmm.

John Kampfner

[Pause] Thank you very much, indeed, Miguel. We’re already starting to get our first questions in online, but we will have – they will have to wait their turn. Dominik, over to you, without any further ado. It’s a delight to have you here. If you would like to set out in more detail where the current thinking is.

Dominik Mutter

Thank you, John, and thank you and to Chatham House for hosting us, for having me here and for giving us a chance to talk about this. You said I’m the curator. That implies there, there’s of work art coming, and I’m sure we’ll get there and it’s certainly a team effort to draft this. And as the Ambassador said, the strategy – the intent to have an national strategy predates, actually, the – Russia’s war of aggression on Ukraine. It was something that the new government, when they came in last year, decided to do as a, sort of, stocktaking, but also looking forward. Then, of course, the war gave this a new urgency, a new impetus and, also, a bit of a new direction.

So, in a way, what we are doing with the strategy is also explaining what the Zeitenwende actually means in detail and in concrete policy. That’s what we were trying to flesh out and so, Russia’s war of aggression is certainly one aspect that drives us, but not the only one. So, clearly, there will be a renewed and invigorated emphasis on the hard security, on deterrence and defence, sort of, the classical security policy, that we need to beef up. And there, of course, the 100 billion special fund already provided the budgetary means to that, but it really goes beyond that. Because what we’re also seeing, I said, we have entered an era of systemic rivalry, competition, challenges, that we in Germany, we in Europe, we in the Euro-Atlantic community, need to face and need to live up to. And, at the same time, we’re seeing that our rivals are employing means of power across the spectrum of power, of – the spectrum of civil-military aggression, in a way.

So, we also needed to respond to that across the spectrum and, sort of, the strategy we’re trying to craft here is trying to formulate something that we are calling, with thanks to John and his team for the inspiration, a “policy of integrated security.” And by that we mean that it needs to integrate all the policy areas of government, all the actors in government and beyond. As the Ambassador said, it’s really a not only all of government approach, but an all of society approach to change how we look at security, how we look at our responsibility for our own security and to address those efforts.

And while we speak of an era of systemic rivalry or competition, we do not want to create this rivalry and create another bipolar confrontation between, you know, the Free World and the autocratic world, or anything – any of these labels. What we are seeing is an increasingly multipolar world, where we, in Europe and the Euro-Atlantic community, need to find out place and to defined our place and need to defend our values and promote them and promote them actively. And the Ambassador also mentioned one of the key aspects to defending those values will be increased ‘resilience’ and that, again, goes across the whole spectrum. So, we are talking about more deterrence in defence, at least in military resilience, but also economic resilience.

And what Russia’s war and all that followed showed us, that we, in Germany, had entered into a strategically problematic dependency on Russian fossil fuels. We phased that out very quickly and at some expense, but we also see other dependencies and other interlinkages with other partners that we need to revisit and, you know, critically check if they are really in our best interests still and whether we need to reduce them, at least. And I think it will be impossible to completely eliminate them, but at least look at them critically and reduce them where we can.

John Kampfner

Which ones are you referring to?

Dominik Mutter

There’s a dragon in the room and you want me to say. No, I mean, the Ambassador already mentioned China and clearly, you know, Germany is very closely interlinked economically with China. That can create an exposure that might be problematic in some circumstances. At the same time, just to reiterate what the Ambassador said, we need, and want, China as a partner and we think there is scope for that partnership. Climate change is the most obvious example, but by far not the only one.

And so, that ties in with another aspect of our strategy. We are trying to explain, as I said, if we want to shape the world around us, then we need to shape it through partnerships. And so, our most immediate partnerships, obviously, are within the European Union, within NATO, with our close friends and partners that we have already, but we also need to form new partnerships and that could also be with partners that don’t share all of our values yet, but where we have some convergence of interests and that we can explore and use.

And then, one other very broad strand running through our thinking is, of course, the challenge of climate change, which is affecting German directly and we had pretty terrible flooding last summer that really heightened our sensitivity to that. But it’s also affecting security in the broader sense and indirectly, so – because it’s creating destabilisation in some countries, it’s creating migratory pressures on some countries. And we just had the COP27 and Germany’s role in that, and so, we’re trying to make climate change a piece of our overall foreign policy, but also a piece of our security policy because it has security implications.

And then, finally, and that’s why it was so important to engage with our public very early on in the process, I mean, actually before we had, you know, written the first word of the draft, we were engaging with the public to hear what they were interested in, what they wanted from government about this. And of course, there was a heightened sensitivity to that, a heightened interest because of the war, but actually, going beyond that and climate change figured pretty prominently in those public responses. So, then, engagement we want to continue, because what is clear to us is that once we’ve finished the document and once it’s published – right now, it’s still in drafts and also classified and so far, no leaks, but that could happen any time. But once it’s published, it will be a public document.

John Kampfner

Is there a timescale for that, yeah? Do we know when it will be published?

Dominik Mutter

Yeah, I mean, the government, when they came in, said, “Within the first year,” and I think we’ve given ourselves, because of what happened, a bit of flexibility there, but – so we’re looking at the end of this year/beginning of next year. And then, we really want to engage on it in a discussion of that strategy and thereby, also talk about Germany’s strategic culture and how we look at security and our responsibility for our own security, the public’s role in that, the government’s role in that, the role of economic actors in that. And have this to be a continuing process that doesn’t have an endpoint, but is where there’s something that we continually work on together.

John Kampfner

Thank you very much, indeed. I have a whole host of questions and thoughts to come back to you on. But let me ask you, Stefanie, you have a fantastically interesting perspective in that you’re based in London, you’ve been here for quite some years and you’re integrated into the British political scene, very much, and yet, you are, you know, very plugged into the German scene, as well. And you see Germany one step removed, but as a German. So, I’m just fascinated, Dominik’s last description, talking about the strategic culture, I find fascinating. Sitting where you do in London, how do you explain where Germany’s strategic culture was before February 24, or before this coalition arrived, and where is it now, or where does it want to be and it’s not quite there yet?

Stefanie Bolzen

I mean, this is a pretty complex question, John, but thank you very much for it. I mean, I was – before I was in London, I was a Brussels Correspondent, so I also covered NATO and I – but I always went back and forth between Brussels and London. And I always thought one of the things I found really fascinating was how little German public wanted to know about Bundeswehr, because that was the plan of Afghanistan, and how engaged the British public, for obvious reasons, because of history and all that. How present the military and the military engagement and the action in Afghanistan was here and how much – I mean, starting from the p0ppies and war veterans and everything that the public actually does.

And thinking about this event today brought back the memories of a Defence Secretary, he was called Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, who was a rather colourful figure in German politics. But he made the biggest headline when, back in 2009, in an interview with Bundeswehr, he dared saying, “We are in a war-like event in Afghanistan.” It caused an outcry. I mean, the fact that he used the word ‘war’ and later on, he even dared to use the word ‘war’ for what was called before, I think, a stabilisation mission in Afghanistan. So, this is only 12 years ago, so it tells you a lot about the German culture and I think there is a real need of a – there’s a lot of strategy needed, but mainly, I think, there’s a need by – for the German Government to strategically bring the public onboard. And I think this is a – it’s a very good exercise to start with.

But if you look at the numbers, and I mean, I’ll – me, personally, I’m not – I mean, I’m turning 50 now, I have had quite a lot of events, as we all had in our lives, like 9/11 and the wall coming down, all that. For me, as a German, 24th of February is the biggest date, because everything is to – put into question. And I – when I tell this to my British friends, they’re always a bit surprised, because here in Britain the 24th of February is not, I think, perceived as such a big – it is, of course, significant, but it’s – in Germany I think it is putting everything into question.

And it’s interesting to see how the public opinion is turning. So, since February, I’ve picked out some numbers and I don’t want to give too many…

John Kampfner

[Inaudible – 22:52], yeah.

Stefanie Bolzen

…numbers now, so I’m looking at the clock. But there was a poll by the Bundeswehr Center for Military History and Social Sciences just last month, which is saying that the support for more funding for the Bundeswehr has gone up from 39% a year ago to 58% now. Also, Germany helping to defend NATO’s eastern flank has increased, although interestingly, it’s hovering around 50%, which I think is really low. And then there was one number, which I found very telling, and it tells you a lot about the cultural process Germans are going through. 60% say they do not wish for Germany to take on military leadership in Europe, and we are the economically biggest country in Europe and the European Union and still, the population doesn’t want Eur – Germany to be a leader.

John Kampfner

Thank you. We’ll come back to all of those points. John, let me ask you two things. First of all, how you see the German Security Strategy dovetailing with the Integrated Review, with NATO’s review, with the American Strategic Review published a month or two back. The French are doing their own. Could you just, sort of, describe how they all work among them, both separately and collectively?

John Bew

Well, thank you, John, and thank you for the invitation and thank you, also, Ambassador, for your remarks. So, well, our, first of all, sympathies to Dominik, as I’ve said before, ‘cause these exercises are necessarily painful and necessarily imperfect and that, you know, and it’s hard to get these things right and you have to strike a balance between building internal coalitions with public legitimacy and support and then, seeking to drive change. And I think the, sort of, headline remark I’d make, John, is that in the Euro-Atlantic area, and we can perhaps talk a little bit about the Indo-Pacific, you know, what we are seeing, and I’m very leery and wary of, sort of, Cold War, you know, regurgitated concepts, but we are seeing the, sort of, gradual end to the post-45 settlement. And which, I mean, that the overarching security provided by a combination of the Marshall Plan and the formation of NATO. So, it’s – you know, you – geopolitics is back and it’s back in a specifically European and Euro-Atlantic context, the first thing to say.

The second thing to say is, and this is why I think these exercises are particularly important for the wonks among us, so Dominik’s described the, sort of, town hall process. You know, first and foremost, these exercises must justify to publics and populations and parliaments why resource is being spent in this area, in this way, and why that resource, for example, is being taken away from other key critical areas where citizens might want to see it. That’s a necessary exercise in legitimacy. But from a kind of – well, secondly, they’re also important, in terms of steering bureaucracies, and perhaps we can get into where you might implement some of this. And it’s a question in 2019/2020 I was less interested, as someone coming from academia, but having spent three and a half/almost four years in government, I can see just how important that is, that implementation side of things.

But the third reason and the reason that it appeals most to me, these exercises, as painful as they are and necessary as they, they are fantastic exercises in consultation and alignment with allies and partners. And we’ve already engaged, Dominik, on a number of occasions. We’ve had extensive engagement in and around the original Integrated Review and we’re doing very targeted engagement with allies and partners, and I can – basically, you can see across a lot of these documents a lot of shared strategic concepts, resilience up in lights. You can see a lot of shared identification of challenges and assessments. I think what you saw, prior to the 24th of Feb, was a bit of a divergence of various threat assessments across the Euro-Atlantic area and you would have these conversations in NATO. I think there’s a sharper, more acute, sense of shared assessments.

And the alignment is quite profound, because on the other side of things, the concern we have, and we can debate the extent of it, is the coalescence of circumstances, but also the coalescence of states and other actors who might want to threaten the things that we hold dear, in terms of national security. So, I share Dominik’s concern about creating a, kind of, ‘bipolar’ world and speaking in a way and acting in a way that encourages that simple – simplistic extent. But the reality is that we are responding, finding shared languages and approaches, partly because we perceive this challenge to exist.

So, I think it is necessary, important exercise and, you know, we find our own – a lot of convergence of our own National Security Strategy with the most recently published US National Security Strategy at team VERSO in Paris at the start of the week, talking through the, sort of, staging – next staging process in the French National Security Strategy. Each conversation, by the way, is saying something else, which is – in the previous era, I know this is a relatively new thing in the German system, but you know, we have to break away from this, sort of, four/five-year cycle when it comes to these exercises, because the world’s moving too fast for them. You know, we are actively updating our own review. We think the headlines conclusions stand, but the circumstances have unquestionably changed over the course of that period.

So, you know, the – I say, the – much as we all wear the, sort of, blood, sweat and tears of these painful bureaucratic processes, they are necessary exercises, as I say, in alignment and convergence. And it’s striking, you know, just the concepts, again, that Dominik mentioned, are all headlined and headline – and put in for the – put in, sort of, lights in the NATO Strategic Concept, as well. So, we’re all, sort of, speaking to a very similar strategic strip and I think that can only be a good thing, actually, across the piece. So, I hope that answers your…

John Kampfner

Yeah.

John Bew

…question, John.

John Kampfner

And just – and so, a follow to you, which is when you were watching, or following up on, Scholz’s Zeitenwende speech, what did you instinctively think? Did you have the same impression as Stefanie was describing, that this is, as it, you know, as it was – the name on the tin, this was an epoch defining change and it was immediate and it was irrevocable?

John Bew

Yes, actually, and we said that in quite a few – I’ve had the pleasure of serving three Prime Ministers in a – quite a short period of time, and each of…

John Kampfner

I was going to say I…

John Bew

…those Prime Ministers has adverted to it and pointed to the fact of that shift, particularly in Germany’s role in it, as hugely significant and hugely welcome in a long-term – you know, explicit goal of UK policy was to encourage Germany, in terms of, you know, defence spending, NATO, you know, that, sort of, broader commitment. So, absolutely, we’ve spoken to it.

I just have one – I agree with everything Stefanie said. Just one, sort of, note of caveat, which is it is quite striking to me that with no encouragement and no, sort of, you know, encouragement by government, assistance by government, I think 24th of Feb is quite significant, actually, in the, sort of – in the broader policies of United Kingdom, as well, to be frank. I mean, you only need to go up and down this country, in small towns in the countryside and the different four constituent nations of it, to see Ukrainian flags everywhere. No-one told people to put up Ukrainian flags.

No – there’s a kind of – there’s an encouraging simple value to democracy and all of it has been awakened by 24th of Feb. It enables alignment, it enables these franker, more mature, conversations across the piece. It clarifies the importance of our various objectives and those sometimes get foggy, and they’ve got foggy in the, kind of, post-Brexit era, as well, as to what really matters. So, I think the, sort of, scales lifted from all our eyes, in that sense, and with a significant degree of consensus across the political aisle. I think you see it in the coalition, and, also, a significant degree of alignment across, you know, key partners and allies. So, however difficult and challenging the situation is, there’s quite a lot of reason to be encouraged and have confidence in the resilience of democracy.

John Kampfner

Stefanie, I was going to ask you, this is a – the most needling question I – so far, but I have to ask it of you, ‘cause you’re the only one who, I think, can answer it in this way. What is the – how great is the difference between the reality of Germany’s new hard power and the perception, which is more begrudging, perhaps? Several German Diplomats and others, experts, talk about how Germany is not given the credit for what it’s done. And go back to the Steinmeier visit that was cancelled and the bad blood, which is partly to do, perhaps, with the Ukrainian Ambassador in Berlin. But just generally, Germans being criticised, the French, who have actually given fewer weapons to Ukraine, welcomed in Kyiv with much more open arms. Is there a gap, seen in London, do you think, in British public opinion and other public opinion, between what Germany has done and what Germany is given credit for, and if so, why is that?

Stefanie Bolzen

I think I would distinguish a little bit how Germany is seen in the wider British population and how Germany is seen in certain British media. So, certain British media, there is almost not a day where you don’t have Germany bashing. But when it comes to Germany and the Zeitenwende, and if you talk to people in Berlin, how quickly, now that Zeitenwende is implemented, of course there’s a lot of criticism. So, just, I think, yesterday there was in Frankfurter Allgemeine a report that the body that should implement all the experts will be in charge of the, how do you say, the shuffle, the…?

John Kampfner

Procurement.

Stefanie Bolzen

Procurement. It was only constituted two weeks ago, and it will only start really working – you will know better, but this is what – so, there is a real gap between what the Zeitenwende is and how quickly it will be implemented. So, that’s the German view.

When it comes to weapons, I think yes, of course, Germany was much slower and now, do we want to start counting how many weapons and how much ammunition who has delivered? I think the important thing is really, that everybody’s on the same page at the end of the day. And, well, the big issue, of course, in Germany is the tanks and I think I’m almost a bit tired of the headline, “Germany is still not sending tanks to Ukraine.” But Brits don’t send these…

John Kampfner

So, why are you tired of the headline, because the headline is inaccurate or…?

Stefanie Bolzen

No, but I think the German approach is that there – it has to be a common approach and Germany is not doing it alone, and I think that gets, sometimes, a bit forgotten.

John Kampfner

Dominik, you were talking in your remarks about Foreign Minister Baerbock’s journey around the country talking to public opinion. Stefanie outlined some of the opinion poll numbers, and there are several and they are both in Germany and in other countries, you look at Italy and elsewhere. Interesting discussion in the United States, in the Republican Party. And there’s very much a sense of if Putin can bog everybody down in a frozen war over the next four or five months, through the winter, that European and Western public opinion will begin to question more and to falter.

How confident are you that that won’t happen in Germany, or how worried are you, and how is that being addressed by Politicians in this document? Because, you know, it’s not just a one-liner. It’s a fundamental reappraisal of the priorities of public spending, hugely, and in a related debate in Britain about can we – you know, a commitment to 3%, or a political commitment to 3%, can we afford it in a very difficult economy at the moment? How is that playing out in policymaking, this requirement, this urgent requirement to keep the public onboard?

Dominik Mutter

Well, we certainly see that, because as John said, it is also about legitimacy, that you need to explain why we spent all that money on weapons and why we are engaged in a way we are engaged when there are other – when there are also other pressing issues? The economy is holding up, but who knows where it will be next year? There is certainly a lot of economic pressure and social pressure on many people in Germany, saying, you know, “Where’s the government helping me?” So, it’s obviously something we need to be very much aware of, but I think it would be a false dichotomy to say it’s either that or that. It’s either spending money on keeping Germany safe or on spending it on schools. It needs to be both, and we need to find a way of balancing that and in a way that serves both needs.

And as far as support for our efforts to help Ukraine, there’s about a million Ukrainians living in Germany right now as refugees and they’re integrated in the sense that their kids go to school in Germany, they are keeping that alive, people seeing that. Like John said, there’s Ukrainian flags in – all over Germany. They’re still – and in the evening news you get, you know, constant reminders of what is going on in Ukraine and whenever Ukraine liberates another part of its country, like in Kherson now, you find mass graves and torture chambers and, you know, reports of atrocities. So, that is keeping it alive. The government is doing its own part to ensure that people understand why this is important and will continue doing that. But it certainly will remain an – a task we have to face.

John Kampfner

And just switching the subject briefly, before coming to questions. We’ve already got half a dozen questions online, but I’ll come to the audience first, so do think of your questions in a second. Coming to China, just a quick assessment of Chancellor Scholz’s recent trip to Beijing. There were misgivings in a number of international capitals before he went. There were misgivings within the coalition, among – within different government ministries there. He ga – he wrote an Op-Ed that was well regarded for explaining the situation and he came back with quite an interesting and praised joint statement with Xi Jinping on the folly of nuclear threats.

However, the key question was, why does every German Chancellor visit to a major capital, partic – or particularly to Beijing, and I remember all Merkel’s ones, does the fact that it always includes a posse of Chief Executives of companies – how does that playout? Does it not reinforce a sense of mercantilism at the heart of foreign policy? And it’s probably hard for you to address, but I just had…

Dominik Mutter

Easy question, thank you.

John Kampfner

I just had to ask you.

Dominik Mutter

Just comment on your question.

John Kampfner

I mean, is it – exactly. I just had to – I mean, so, how do you marry – but I mean, it’s a question that I’m sure John and colleagues talk about the Integrated Review. China is an economic partner and there are a lot of companies that are lobbying hard, not necessarily in areas where it’s more contentious, in terms of specific supply chains and high-value minerals, but in normal business, a lot of lobbying for that. So, it’s a different calibration, but there seems to be a particular characterisation of German foreign policy as being in that regard.

Dominik Mutter

Well, I can’t speak to how others characterise our foreign policy, but for us, our foreign policy is not driven by mercantilist impulses, but we have to be aware of the fact that the backbone to our national strength lies in our economy, and that’s true for every county. But it’s like – I mean, the wealth that is being created to procure all those weapons, to provide security for our nation and for our allies, that wealth needs to be generated somewhere and that’s what our economy is doing. And our economy, being a very export-oriented economy, needs global trading partners and China is one of the most important global trading partners for Germany and like I said before, we need, and want, China as a partner in other fields, too. So, of course, we want to engage with them, and while I wouldn’t characterise these people as a posse of…

John Kampfner

I was thinking of…

Dominik Mutter

I mean…

John Kampfner

…the collective noun for Chief Executives. I…

Dominik Mutter

Yeah.

John Kampfner

…couldn’t think of it.

Dominik Mutter

Pick the wonderful one.

John Kampfner

Challenge.

Dominik Mutter

But no, but it’s certainly, you know, taking economic leaders with you as a Head of State or government is something Head – you know, many governments do and not just the German one.

John Kampfner

And John, on that point, I sup – the question for Britain is around, again, this marrying of economic priorities with security priorities and China, as well, is reflected in that. There was a news story this week from Wales and the refusal to allow a particular Chinese dominated takeover. Germany’s been involved in several areas like that. In the Integrated Review and in the German review, how are those being calibrated?

John Bew

Just a first point on the, sort of, lively debates on German foreign policy and you also mentioned strategic culture.

John Kampfner

Yeah.

John Bew

I mean, it is a quid pro quo of a strategic culture that you have lively political debates about your foreign policy and the complexities of it. So, you know, there’s – I mean, there’s ferocious debates here, often saying – I said to you, John, before the – you know, “The further you get away from London, the more people like the Integrated Review,” and I’m sure the same will happen when you publish, as well. So, I think this is like, you know, we should all reconcile ourselves to the, sort of, you know, the challenges of difficult questions.

Secondly, I think what we’re all going through is an expansion of our understanding of national security in a certain direction. I think that’s something that’s come quite profoundly through energy, through areas of technology, through our economic openness and we have, you know, a different version of the same dilemma in the UK, because we have an open economy that depends on a degree of access to, you know, international trade services, etc., etc. So, you know, we’re, kind of, living through that.

That’s not the same thing as the securitisation of everything, I think, and that’s an important aspect of it. So, at that, sort of, headline level the proposition is not, and this is the false dichotomy sometimes we’ve slipped into the past, that you have your security concerns over here and your prosperity needs over there. It’s that in a world in which the people that we are contesting, you know, the global space with, whether they’re an adversary or they’re a competitor and we all use these phrases like ‘systemic rival’ or ‘challenger’, whatever it is, those states or those groups of state think long-term and think about resource and think about their long-term economic health over a period of time.

They may make decisions we think are bad or good, but what the – what is incumbent upon us, therefore, is to have a – to think in a longer period of time, and that’s part of the lesson of Russia-Ukraine. You know, Dominik’s gone through, sort of, Germany’s agonies around Nord Stream 2 and gas and there’s no point, sort of, litigating any of that here. But that’s the other, kind of, penny that drops, that we’ve got to take a longer term approach to things like energy security, things like our ability to develop and create new technologies in a way that is preserved and protected. For countries like the UK, the answer is not all talky and can’t be all talky. You know, well, it’s a version of, possibly, ‘friendshoring’, to quote Janet Yellen, as well.

So I think what matters there is, and Dominik, again, talked about partnerships and alliances and the importance of them, you know, we all recognise – you take the G7. G7 has less global share of GDP and military power than it did ten years ago/20 years ago, etc. So, therefore, what you need, you need alliances and partnerships, including in complicated parts of the world, with a broader group of countries. But what really matters is the quality and depth of those partnerships, whether they be in, sort of, defence/industrial sense or in terms of the depth of the sustainability, the reciprocity that comes with trading relations. That’s the, kind of, essence of it, so that’s what we’re all working on, in terms of the dep – that, sort of, depth and quality.

And then, there’s a fin – sort of, final phase, as well, which is that, you know, the G7 and other bodies have, sort of, stumbled upon certain instruments in reaction to the events of the 24th of Feb and thereafter, you know, vis-à-vis sanctions, etc. And there’s probably a bit of work to be done that’s slightly systematises those things and make them less ad hoc, less reactive, as well. So, we’re all, as I say, we’re all grafting for the same thing, but there’s still quite a lot of technical work to be done on top of that.

John Kampfner

One quick question I wanted to ask both of you, if I may, before turning it to the audience, is this – you mentioned the term ‘multipolar’, Dominik. I was struck, when I was last in Berlin a few weeks ago, a news item being Baerbock’s trip, I think it was to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, certainly it was across Central Asia. James Cleverly did quite a sweep through South East Asia, this whole question of diversifying, not just economic links, but political links, as well. Because one of the things that struck me about the March 2 UN General Assembly vote wasn’t the five countries that supported Russia, it was the 35 that abstained, including some strong Commonwealth countries: India, Pakistan and South Africa and elsewhere.

I’m just fascinated by this question of pivot states, or of, sort of, medium power, if not completely non-aligned, then semi-aligned, or hedging their bets states. And Turkey not a paragon of democracy, but playing a really interesting role across the piece, but many other countries, beside Indonesia’s pretty deft, it sounded – seemed like, chairing of the G20. Is there more of a role for Germany, for Britain, to play in longer term investment in diplomacy with those countries, slightly moving away from these two big blocs, in terms of the amount of physical time that Prime Ministers, Foreign Ministers, Foreign Secretaries, need to spend in them?

Dominik Mutter

I would certainly say so and actually, one of the reasons why the Foreign Minister went to Central Asia was that these are countries who we still need to engage more with. And some of the countries you mentioned, with regards to the UN votes, are countries that we need to convince of our position. They have arrived at their abstentions for various reasons and we need to look at these and take them seriously and come up with good responses to them. And yes, definitely more and more engagement by Germany, by Britain, by other European partners, and not to force them into an either/or choice, but to engage them on different issues. And there, again, climate change comes in as something that affects them very, very directly, very drastically, in some cases, and where we can engage, because also, it affects us, and we might be able to arrive at solutions together. So, yes, more engagement, definitely.

John Kampfner

Okay.

John Bew

Yeah, I mean, it’s happening, right, and it’s, sort of – you can see it in the pattern of various international relationships. You could see it in visible terms at the G20, which as you say, is very, very well hosted. You can see it in the inward and outward visits. We’ve had the South African state visit las – you know, last week. So, you know, it is an absolutely, sort of, essential piece of our diplomacy and what – you know, what it’s about is a kind of, a sort of, more plural conception of international order. And we tried – trialled, during our own G7 Presidency, you know, an invitation of a, sort of, broader set of countries, Germany has done the same as part of that. So, eve – I mean, everyone’s reaching for the same thing and we’re not – that’s exactly right and proper and, I say, it goes – yeah, you know, in a more challenging, complex world. It’s important, of course, to solidify and tighten, you know, the resilience of a, kind of – you know, the core group of go-to countries when things happen, and that does often happen when these challenges are – when these challenges occur.

That having been said, you know, and it – you’ve got to, kind of, reach beyond that narrow grouping, otherwise, you know, you’re in trouble. It’s a sort of, simple proposition. And again, you know, the other big vote at the UN, as you know, is 141. I mean, I – the, sort of, unanimity is actually – well, it’s not unanimity, but the, sort of, sense of, you know, that what has been violated in Russia-Ukraine is not – it’s not a simple European argument. It’s about the core principles of the UN Charter is actually one that’s pretty widely held, as well, notwithstanding the fact that have – people have different impacts, as well.

So, I think, yeah, it’s a simple proposition that, you know, the – it is absolutely necessary to do what you describe, but the work is, kind of, ongoing and you can see it and there’s various patterns of relationships. The – President Macron flew on, after G20, to, you know, different parts of Asia, as well. We’re all doing it in a different way, where there are, you know, areas of equities and interests reflected.

John Kampfner

And is it all being co-ordinated and…?

John Bew

Well, it’s probably not all being co-ordinated in a – in – as, sort of, naturally as you might, you know, sort of, expect with some sort of grand strategic masterplan. But that’s also partly because within our group of allies and partners, we also have effectively managed competition for resource, trade deals, etc., etc., and that’s, sort of, part of the picture as well, and that’s okay. You know, it did strike me about the, you know, the US National Security Strategy talks about that ‘managed competition’.

Actually, now, I think that’s probably the best way, if, like, you know, Dominik, you’re concerned about, sort of, absolute bipolarity, one of the things we’re searching for is an ability to manage conflicting interests and that’s the, kind of, very essence of diplomacy. You know, and, you know, and manage competition for resources, which is something else that’s going on. Manage the way that the impact of things like climate changes are not, sort of, naturally spread around different parts of the world. So, that’s the, kind of, essential, kind of, core part of business. You’re not going to get unanimity in these circumstances and you never had at any stage in history.

John Kampfner

Let’s open to questions. Right, well, wow, we have a lot. Right…

Stefanie Bolzen

Let’s see…

John Kampfner

…who’s got the mics? Thank you. Lady there and then, lady there, and it’s the first row here and then second row, there and then, we’ll make our way back and I’ll take in a couple of questions online, ‘cause I got ticked off for not taking questions online on Tuesday. Go ahead, and if you please keep your questions incredibly short, questions rather than statements, and say who you are, if you’d like to.

Hatice Sultana

Hatice Sultana from Hakluyt. Thank you, first of all, for joining us today. Could you speak more about the role that cyber would play in the strategy that’s coming out? I see this is incredibly important, as NATO, for example, doesn’t have a particularly strong cyber power and it will look to individual nations to support any response to aggression. I’d also like to hear views from the UK, as well.

John Kampfner

If you just pass the mic there and then, you ask the question, we’ll do two at the same time, yeah.

Member

Hi, my name is [inaudible – 51:31] University of London. I’m from Ukraine, so my question is going to be about Ukraine. Your support is extremely important to us, thank you very much. But the Honourable Ambassador said that your strategy started planning before the invasion of Russia to Ukraine, so I’m curious, how it change, how it shape and what is your response, specifically to the challenge in the strategy, more according to the mood of your population now?

John Kampfner

Interesting. Right, let’s go on cyber first, who wants to go on cyber?

Dominik Mutter

I can quickly say that cyber will be a very important part of this, because we are seeing an increased prevalence of cyberattacks on German companies, on infrastructure. There are other attacks that – I mean, ransomware is becoming an increasing – an increased problem in Germany. So, that’s something we need to address. The details of this are still being worked out, but it’s clear that it’s almost a new demain – domain of warfare. So, yeah, the classical domains, but cyber and space, and cyber is becoming its own domain and we need to find ways of addressing these threats, countering them. Deterrence is a bit harder to do with cyber, because you have so many non-state actors that are not easily deterred, there’s just criminal actors, basically. But it’s definitely going to be an important part.

And with Ukraine – and, as I said, it did heighten our sense of urgency that we need the strategy and it certainly heightened our sense of hard security that was needed and that’s where the Zeitenwende came in and the 100 billion special fund. And it certainly, you know, increased our awareness of the importance of NATO and collective defence in Europe, our ethical responsibility to countries like yours, but other to vulnerable countries in that neighbourhood. However, still, we want this to be a holistic approach to security and not an anti-Russia strategy. I mean, there is the need to counter the Russian threat, but there’s also the need to put forward something positive that we can shape our future, or to engage with partners and so, not have a sole prison, but have – see this as part of the landscape that we need to address.

John Kampfner

John, did you want to come back on the cyber point, in terms of the update, the refresh on the IR?

John Bew

Yeah, I mean, it was a massive part of what we said in 2021, actually, as, kind of – so, the phrase we used is, like, “responsible democratic cyber power,” and as you know, we have these various, you know, provisions and, you know, the National Security Cyber Centre. So, it – so, the way we see it, also, it’s ingrained in all these different, you know, parts of government, as well, and that’s, kind of, fundamental part of integration.

But just on this – on the second question, it’s not a – it’s not really a question for me. I mean, so, we say, in our 2021 review, which is a, you know – sorry, 2020 review, so ahead of the, you know, Russia-Ukraine – Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, that the, sort of, “most acute threat,” as we understood at that time, was “the potential for,” you know, “Russian aggression in the European context.” And that’s why the Euro-Atlantic area was a – of the primary strategic importance for the UK on the back of it. So, in one sense it’s, sort of, the, sort of, threat assessment, you know, materialised at the very much worst end of that spectrum.

That having being said, there’s still an immense amount of lessons to be learned from, you know, the reality of what has happened already and then, there are major challenges, which Dominik adverted to, in terms of future security architecture, so you know, structure, rebalancing, restoring, you know, equilibrium and stability in a European context. Which I think were – you know, and it’s not the place for review to them, it’s a place for, sort of, you know, years and years of hard diplomatic work and a bit of foresight in ways that’ll take a longer time.

John Kampfner

And just following on from the first question, just a question online from Richard Whitman, an Associate Fellow, a technical question following on from that. Which is “Do you,” Dominik, “see the fact of the security strategy now, as set out – is it now going to be embedded in the system, in terms of one can see five-year cycles for the foreseeable?” And just to throw in a further instrumental question, which is, “Does this now give rise to a National Security Council?”

Dominik Mutter

There it is. I was waiting for that question. No, seriously, I mean, as I said before, we should see strategy as a process, rather than an end product. It’s something that we constantly need to work on, that we sometimes formulate in strategic documents, that we update them, sometimes more quickly than we had expected to, but that we’re constantly thinking about in government, and I think this will be – should be one of the main goals going forward. And then, any new government coming in, whether it’s the same coalition or a new one, will, of course, think about, do we need to revisit that document, do we need to update it, do we need to completely rewrite it? That will depend on the circumstances of the time.

And the structural issue, will there be something like that, will, in the end, be something to be decided by Cabinet and I prefer to let them have their say before I have mine. So…

John Kampfner

A classic official’s answer, but…

Dominik Mutter

Yes.

John Kampfner

Well, I had to ask it. Right, three or four questions, I’m going to collate them. Right, let’s take the two at the back, thank you. Yeah, sorry for being random, but I just want to do it that way, and then, we’ll take [inaudible – 57:33] from this side. Okay.

Member

Good evening. I wanted to understand why the relationship with France had been allowed to go to such lows and whether there were any moves to improve it.

John Kampfner

Sounds as if you’re French. Right, no, this person next, the guy next to you, please.

Member

Thank you to the panel and the Ambassador. So, my question is further to the comments that the Director made earlier, where you mentioned that Germany might potentially have to pursue compromises with potential partners who don’t share all the values yet. My question is, how do you see – how do you – can you speak to how you see Germany striking that balance between making necessary compromises for Germany’s national security and, potentially, replaying mistakes that the West has made with many partners where they thought that economic policy and partnership and security agreements could democratise otherwise still developing autocracies?

John Kampfner

Thank you, and then, we’ll take two questions here in the front row, or just one and then, we’ll take something here, and then, I’ll collate them all. Yeah.

Male Delegate

Thanks. It’s following on from John’s comment about reshoring or friendshoring some of the supply chains and energy security, in particular. We saw in February what happens when you become over-reliant on gas in that example. Now we, potentially, are going to end up over-reliant on solar PV supply chains, 80% of which are controlled by China. So, how much detailed thinking has actually been done about the cost and the implications, from a practical perspective, of reshoring all of that, because it’s a huge undertaking?

John Kampfner

Right, let’s take one more here. So, I’ll take the lady there, sorry, just – and then, I’m just going to have – and I’ll take one from online.

Member

Thank you. I think, very much following from the previous question, we’ll probably end up with high energy prices for the near future. What’s the, kind of, challenge Germany and Europe facing, in terms of the industrialisation and how do you bring in – how do you keep the industry in Europe? What’s the, kind of, Germany’s policy response and EU policy response for that? Thank you.

John Kampfner

Sorry, EU policy response to?

Member

Industries potentially leaving the continent.

John Kampfner

Right, okay.

Member

Because of high energy prices.

John Kampfner

And I’ll just throw in one quick question online, which is very short and simple, from Dina Mufti. “When will Germany have energy security?” And that enables you to define your terms, I suppose. Stefanie, you are the perfect person, ‘cause the other two won’t answer it, to answer the French question.

Stefanie Bolzen

The French question, to be honest, I was wondering, are you now asking the German panellist or the British panellist?

Member

[Inaudible – 60:25].

Stefanie Bolzen

So, I mean, I – as far as I know, the relationship between Emmanuel Macron and Olaf Scholz is not, let’s say, the best, but I think – well, it’s a very complex and difficult story, but I think – I don’t know how much you can say about that.

Dominik Mutter

Well, I would say we are at a low in the relationship. I mean, the Chancellor went to Paris, they had a very amicable meeting. There is most likely going to be another Council of Ministers very early on next year where we’ll talk about all kinds of issues. There are some issues where we don’t fully see eye-to-eye yet, but there has been, you know, the story of the Franco-German relationship for decades and we’ve always managed to overcome these differences and to move Europe further – move Europe onward. And sometimes they are a bit more explicit, sometimes less so, but they’ve always been productive in the sense that we’ve tried to understand the other side and that is still going on. And I think we will be in a good place, and we are in a good place now, and be in an even better place next year.

John Kampfner

John, do you want to helpfully wade into this space?

John Bew

I mean, I’m a Historian, I’ve just got to say, I mean, we talked just about the strategic culture and the, sort of, domestic political arguments. You know, the idea that at any stage during First/Second World War, or let’s say the Cold War, that we have unanimity and simple relations among friends, partners and allies is crazy to me, right? This the kind of – this is the rough and tumble of – that comes with friendships and partners, so, we, sort of, we get folks that are not into minute details. My, sort of, overall impression is that, as I say, the unity, the alignment, the coalescence, around, sort of, the – in defensive fundamental values is pretty remarkable, actually, overall. So, I’d be – always on the – err on the side of optimism on that.

And then, to the gentleman’s, just, question very briefly on energy security. I mean, yes, government’s doing and more work on that, but also, there’s a recognition that this can’t just simply be the provision of government, as well. So, there’s, sort of, two additional complexities. One is, you know, what private sector – what the markets do. The second is how you make this, sort of, interoperable with it – when it comes to friends, partners and allies, and we’ve seen that with, you know, identifying different sources of energy, we’ve seen that with the, kind of, need to expedite, you know, energy transition, as well. You know, if you think about how this is framed in COP last year to how the – the sort of, similar problems of frame right now. And what you’ve got now is urgency, you’ve got a, sort of, sharper sense of the national security provisions of this, but there’s obviously still vast amounts to be done. But yeah, government’s not naturally set up to do that and hasn’t been for many years, so it’s a learning curve, as well.

John Kampfner

I want to, at the end, just focus on the question of democratisation, or countries not sharing values, ‘cause I think that’ll be a good way to end, with some more reflective thoughts. But Dominik, on the, sort of, the triple questioning around the reshoring, around the industrialisation and around Germany achieving energy security, just a quick set of responses from you.

Dominik Mutter

Yeah, I mean, so, we’ve – we haven’t industrialised and worked on the climate, we haven’t and we’d like to keep a very strong industrial base in Germany. That industry has become much more energy efficient much more quickly than we expected it to, because that’s what industry does. I mean, they try to be as efficient as possible because it’s good business and the government can help them in a certain way, by providing infrastructure, but the incentive is already there, basically.

Will we ever achieve energy security? It’s hard to define that, because I mean, Germany is a resource depleted nation and so, we will always have to have some imports for [inaudible – 64:18] for energy. I mean, certainly going more in the way of renewables will be the way forward and more decentralised sources of – or more incentivised power grid, basically, is a way. I mean, I know that renewables create their own problems with some of the materials that go into them and own dependencies there, but still, there, more diversification is possible. It’s also, of course, imperative that we do this for climate reasons. But I think that can be a way forward without, again, chasing the elusive goal of having autarky, or, you know, full energy independence. That is not feasible. It’s diversification and increased efficiency, more renewables. I think that that’s the way to go.

John Kampfner

I think in the British public it’s underappreciated the extent to which Germany, from a fragile and unhealthily high dependency of 55% on Russian gas has, just since the early summer, come way, way down and it’s – I think is it – where is it now, it’s 10% or – on…?

Dominik Mutter

Yeah, Russian gas is even less, yeah.

John Kampfner

Right, which is extraordinary in five months and, also, it has secured 100% reserves storage, which is, in four or five months – and when you say that, I was at a dinner last night and said to that a British audience and they were really shocked and they hadn’t heard that. So, I think there may be more that can be done to talk about the extent to which Germany has diversified.

Let’s just finish on some reflections on that second question, or one of the questions, if I may, the second question on the question of working with countries that don’t share values. We’re seeing that now at the World Cup in Qatar, complicated relations that all countries – I mean, the Germans had to go to Qatar, Robert Habeck, to talk about gas and LNG, compromises all the time. The Brits making endless compromises with Saudi Arabia, as the Americans do, as well.

And just reflecting back to Stefanie was doing earlier about 9/11 and you didn’t mention the Iraq War, but, you know, it was instrumental in that. We feel like we’re in a very, very different era from the process of active democratisation around the world. Tony Blinken’s already made that clear as far as America is concerned, that. So, but – so, how do we navigate in, not so much in a philosophical sense, but in a security strategy document sense, how do we navigate this question of who our friends are, our allies are, who do not share our values? Who wants to start? And we’ll…

John Bew

John, I just think this is…

John Kampfner

…just do this for five minutes and then, we’ll let you all go.

John Bew

So, I mean, we did it in a document and I think there’s – there is a – I said already the Western democracies have less share of the world’s resources, global GDP, military power, etc. That’s the, sort of, first reality. The second reality is there’s plenty of countries in the world with whom we have a convergence of interest that may be on a different developmental path. And one of the things that the world’s taught us, you know, post-9/11, post-2003, is also humility and the guardrails against some of the challenges we faced when it came to democracy promotion, as well.

But there’s a whole category of countries, we call them – some call them ‘non-aligned’ or in other circumstances, ‘Global South,’ etc., who pose no threat to our own value systems and interests, who are important partners with whom we must engage. It’s, sort of – you know, there are, sort of – you know, the complexities are absolutely there, and on the flipside, if you have publics demanding legitimacy for – and we talked about legitimacy and importance of legitimacy for national security strategies, that is something that has to be kept under review. But it’s, you know, it’s up for Politicians to, you know, manage that complexity.

I mean, and what I really think that it was ever lost, and I can’t think of a period in history in which it was not. Clearly, the emphasis in the front footedness and the self-confidence, which was – those values were promoted and then, that has changed. But as I say, there’s many parts of the world which have op – you know, optionality and choices at state level that may make us feel uncomfortable, we’ve got to adapt to, and it’s not an easy thing to, sort of, scribe or put in a document.

But I think again, and going back to this point, what matters is the quality and the substance of the partnerships you have and, you know, in some respects, those can, you know, even in unintent – in intentional ways, actually encourage democratic openings, they can encourage, you know, better human rights records. And, you know, the way you do that will depend on the different country you deal with. I don’t want to name any or go into any great detail. So, it’s navigable, not easily in democracies, but that’s, sort of, part of the national security challenge we face, and I’d imagine, you know, Dominik’s been on the same page on that.

John Kampfner

Let me go to Stefanie next and then, Dominik.

Stefanie Bolzen

Yeah, I think, well, we are just, right now, seeing actually, yesterday, well, yesterday Germany played Japan…

John Kampfner

See, I wasn’t going to talk about that.

Stefanie Bolzen

Yeah, don’t want to talk about that match, but…

Dominik Mutter

It’s…

Stefanie Bolzen

…it’s not – don’t mention…

Dominik Mutter

…a bit of a flop system, lots of penalties.

Stefanie Bolzen

…football these days. But the, again, the gap between what you can achieve and the, kind of, almost moral high ground that the German team displayed by doing this photo. I think many have seen the photo when they covered their mouths, which is very controversial. And Annalena Baerbock with her – I think before the war, Russia’s war on Ukraine, she talked about a “human rights led foreign policy.” So, there is, of course, the idea that this should be, at the end of the day, the compass, but as John was saying, you have to encourage those countries and have a – have to have a very long-term strategy, how to convince them that, actually, our model of democracy and tolerance and rule of law is the better one. But you can’t just, as we say in German, “fall with the door into the house,” by dictating how they should act and behave.

John Kampfner

And Stefanie, just to follow-up, John used to the term ‘humility’. Do you get a sense that Britain, from – if you think of maybe the peak of interventionism, Tony Blair in Iraq and ‘might is’ – you know, and ‘might is right’ when it’s on behalf of human rights and democratisation around the world, that that’s completely gone from the – from British public opinion?

Stefanie Bolzen

No, I don’t think so, but definitely Britain, especially during the years of Brexit, has been far less engaged in international partnerships. It was quite detached from Europe for, also, like, very much domestic political reasons. But when it, for example, when it comes to Russia, British position was always much, much clearer than the German.

John Kampfner

Dominik, final word to you on this vexed question of being – of allies with countries that are not democratic, or not completely democratic.

Dominik Mutter

Well, I’ll probably more speak of partnerships, rather than allies. But certainly, I can go along with, you know, John’s and Stefanie’s words about humility and seeing the limits of what we can do. And I would add to that that, very often, we are best at – we are best, you know, served by convincing by example. So, the better we achieve our self-declared goals, the better we serve our own publics, the more convincing our example will be to others. And then, engage with them on the issues that matter to them and where we have a convergence of interests and then, find common ground. I think we’ve moved away from the somewhat, you know, rosy eyed view of, like, trade. We exchange…

John Kampfner

[German quote].

Dominik Mutter

Had a nice rhyme in German and that’s what’s maybe a bit misleading.

But – so, it’s not that, you know, we’re seeing this in a simplistically, sort of, mechanic way, but that, you know, by engaging with them on issues that matter to them and that matter to us, as well, by offering, you know, shared solutions and by showing a good example, then we might convince people. And, also, by putting out some principles that we believe most nations, and certainly most people, would agree to and human rights certainly belong among them. That – I mean, I don’t think there’s anybody that wants to be tortured. I don’t think there’s anybody that, you know, does not want to have a say in how their government is elected. So, while we don’t say, you know, democracy is the cure all and you should adapt it right away, adopt it right away, it’s clear that it’s something in human nature that we can speak to.

John Kampfner

That’s a good way to end. Good luck in the last couple of months, always the hardest bit, particularly when Politicians get involved, and good luck with your final work. John, good luck with the final part of the refresh, as well. Thank you all online for engaging, thank you very much in the hall, as well, and let’s give a round of applause to John, to Stefanie, to Dominik and to the Ambassador Miguel Berger.