Sir Peter Westmacott
Alright, well, welcome everybody. Thanks very much for coming. My name is Peter Westmacott. I’m an Associate Fellow here, and if you wonder why on earth I should be chairing this session on what to do about Getting a New Deal with Iran, it’s because I did begin my diplomatic career in Iran, 100 years ago, and I subsequently, have remained involved in international affairs. And I was quite closely involved with the Obama administration during the time when the JCPOA was negotiated, and then we had to work together, with other members of the P5+1, to try to ensure that the deal was not voted down by the United States Congress. So, that was, if you like, part of the background, and I have remained interested in that part of the world, as a professional and since I left government three-and-a-half years ago, in other capacities. So, I’m honoured to be asked to Chair this, and hope we’re going to have an interesting hour or so.
We have got two brilliant people to talk about this subject. We’ve got Neil Quilliam over there, who is the Associate Fellow for the Middle East and North Africa Programme here at Chatham House, and Sanam Vakil, who is the Senior Research Fellow in the same programme here at Chatham House. So, lots to talk about. I would just give a couple of sentences of context, if I may, which is to say that I think what’s going on in the Gulf, the whole business between the Southern Gulf States, the Arab world, Northern Gulf States, Iran, its associates, Shia, Sunni and regional security issues, hugely important, more important perhaps now than it has been for a very long time. Personally, as somebody who worked closely on it, I regret the demise of the JCPOA. We can talk about that later on, but the more important question now is, well, where do we go from here? Is there scope for progress? Is there scope for some sort of a new deal? Our experts are going to talk about that and what can one do to try to help lower tensions, deal with regional security concerns, but also deal with a number of other issues, including some humanitarian ones, which I know we will touch on in a moment.
So, without further ado, we’ll crack on. My instructions are to say to you all, a) please make your telephones on silent, b) this session is going to be livestreamed and so the Chatham House Rule will not apply. It’s going to be on the record. c) if you’d like to comment on Twitter, please use the #CHEvents, it’s up there on the wall there, which tells you how to get involved, and after we’ve had a little conversation here, the three of us, we’ll have microphones going around the room, so that people can comment and ask questions, and we’ll see where we get to. So, that’s – those are the rules of the game. Before we get into a discussion, I think I’ll just say to these two, first of all, tell us what is this project and how did you get involved with it? Why did you start?
Dr Sanam Vakil
Okay. Thank you, Sir Peter, it’s a pleasure to be here. Neil and I have been working on this paper for almost a year, and we came up with the idea really because there was a lot of confusion about President Trump’s Iran policy, and specifically, there was a debate if the US administration really sought negotiations with Tehran, or if in fact, Washington was seeking a regime change, as many people suspected. I was in a camp that actually the Trump administration was pursuing the former pathway, and I think that has been proven to be relatively true, because the President, the Secretary of State have repeatedly stressed, over the past few months, that negotiations are indeed their endgame. But we wanted to test out President Trump’s assumptions about getting to a deal with Iran, and we thought it was a good opportunity to speak with policymakers and Analysts in ten countries, which include the signatories of the JCPOA. So, the members of the UN Security Council, plus Iran, and we also added interviews with Israeli Analysts and experts, and also, experts from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
It’s important to say upfront that the interviews were off the record, first of all, and second of all, they do not reflect national government positions. These are the personal opinions of individuals, some of whom were involved in previous administrations or current administrations, or experts that have been working on the JCPOA or Iran for a number of years. So, just to establish that upfront. Do you have anything to add? Why, what else?
Dr Neil Quilliam
I think I’m going to – at the time, I mean, there was so much talk about a grand bargain, and I think we just really wanted to test what that might look like, and I think by, sort of, interviewing our 75 interviewees, we thought we could conceivably, sort of, map out or map across, from the ten different countries that we were looking at, and tried try to, sort of, see where those vectors might touch and what – where – number one, whether a grand bargain is a feasible proposition. And we came with this with no real assumption on that, and it’s not what is feasible, what is possible when you, sort of, map those 75 pieces. But I think what’s absolutely key is that – I mean, Sanam has said this, but just to reiterate, in the report we, sort of, talk about the country position, but the country position is not the official position. These are the representations from our interviewees and how they perceive the country’s position as well. So, we’re not speaking on behalf of and these are not the official positions. So, I think that’s really important to just, sort of, keep in mind.
Dr Sanam Vakil
We did ask interviewees about these 12 demands, effectively, and this has been the Trump Administration, sort of, opening negotiating position, to quote a few of the interviewees. This is – they’re called the 12 demands, but let’s just think of them as the ideal list of what the Trump Administration would like to see from Iran. And I think the reason why it’s also urgent to be looking at this issue particularly now is, and we are, sort of, at a fork in the road, with regards to the JCPOA. Iran is gradually reducing its compliance in the nuclear deal, in response to the US maximum pressure campaign, and next week, they will announce further reductions in their compliance. So, we are in a, kind of, slow-motion crisis moment, and everyone, practically every country has tried to invest in managing this crisis, Japan, Pakistan, France, the E3, the EU, everybody is very invested. But we have yet to arrive at the negotiating table, and you can see, from the sunset provisions, starting next year, these provisions are going to start expiring. So, we are in a challenging moment right now.
Sir Peter Westmacott
So, 75 interviews, ten different countries, here’s the result. Here’s your excellent report. Do you want to tell us a little bit what your findings are?
Dr Neil Quilliam
Sure, yeah. I mean, there’s a lot of detail in the report, and I was reading it again yesterday, just thinking, “Wow, we did some really hard work on this.” So, I – a bit of a self-promotion. So, I would suggest that you really do, sort of, dig into that, and I was hoping to really, sort of, come up with a synopsis from some of those findings, but there’s just too much in there. So, the key takeaway is, I mean, none of this is rocket science, apart from the ballistic missiles section, but, I mean, it’s all relatively self-explanatory. Grand bargain is not viable. We, you know, we looked at that in some detail. That is just something that is just simply not going to fly. We, sort of, list the reasons for that. There are issues around the US’s unilateral approach, that’s not going to help get to a grand bargain. There’s a severe lack of trust, there’s a break of trust because of the US withdrawal from the JCPOA, so this makes it even harder. Another factor would be that there’s a limited pool, or there’s a limited capacity, particularly, I think, within the US, but elsewhere too, or there’s an absence of key interlocuters now that could make a grand bargain possible. So, it’s okay to come to the table and talk about it, but actually operationalising that and actually backfilling that I think is just way beyond the capacity and capability. That would be my first one.
Then, maybe Sanam, you want to talk about the, sort of, JCPOA+, which I guess is the more positive story.
Dr Sanam Vakil
Yes. I would just add to that, also, that part of the Trump administration’s approach has been about sanctions pressure. It’s a zero-sum approach vis-à-vis Iran, and our respondents overwhelmingly found that that tactic was not assisting Washington in reaching its endgame of negotiations. But we are seeing that instead of any, sort of, reassessment in Washington, the administration continues to double down. They announced new sanctions yesterday, and they really have a, sort of, calculation in Washington that Tehran is going to alter its position, based on the economic pressure that it is under, and that might be part of Tehran’s calculation in coming back to the negotiating table. But our respondents actually found and pointed to the past negotiation round, between 2012 and 2015, as being really instrumental to understand why Tehran negotiated then. It was a shift in the US position, away from zero enrichment that helped to facilitate negotiations with the Islamic Republic in that moment. So, we really concluded that for President Trump to achieve his goal of negotiations with Tehran, he will have to – or maybe he won’t, but he should provide some form of sanctions relief. It doesn’t have to be lifting the whole gamut of sanctions, but providing some faith-saving solution to give Iran some breathing room to justify coming back to the negotiating table. So, I think that’s an important reason why the grand bargain isn’t working.
Sir Peter Westmacott
So, Sanam, are you really saying that maximum pressure, more sanctions, keep it going on the basis that it was only sanctions pressure that brought Iran to the negotiating table last time isn’t going to work, because it wasn’t just that, it was also, as you say, a change in the western position, particularly on the issue of enrichment?
Dr Sanam Vakil
Yes.
Sir Peter Westmacott
Are you saying that maximum pressure on its own won’t work, and indeed, could be even counterproductive in the sense of making it more difficult for change to take place on the Iranian position?
Sir Peter Westmacott
I think absolutely, I think the events of the past summer have, sort of, solidified that argument, in that we have seen maximum pressure actually translating into Iran’s response, which is maximum instability, increasing its investments in the region and pushing back, for a variety of reasons in the Strait of Hormuz, downing a drone, potentially being behind some very, very shocking attacks in Saudi Arabia. All of this has, I think, clearly demonstrated that maximum pressure is not working, and I think again, we’re at this fork in the road, sort of, moment over the next few months, where without some sort of sanctions relief and an off ramp, we could see more instability coming our way, and are we prepared to handle that?
Sir Peter Westmacott
Neil, did you want to add something on the findings or are you happy with that?
Dr Neil Quilliam
No, I think – I mean, just to touch again on JCPOA+, I mean, and again, all the details are in the report, but we came away with a very, I think, clear message that there are areas on the JCPOA where negotiations can be opened and where that push can come, and that’s on the sunset clauses, that’s on monitoring and that’s on ICBMs. There was not a universal agreement on that, but certainly, and I would say in the key countries, there was space for negotiation on that specific issue, on the nuclear file. That doesn’t mean the regional issue and that doesn’t mean on the ballistic missiles programme, but certainly there’s scope for reopening and/or coming back to the table and, sort of, pushing that out. So, I think that’s – for me, that’s where the plus comes in. So, that’s a relatively positive story, but then you’ve got the other issues to deal with, of course.
Dr Sanam Vakil
I think securing the JCPOA and using the framework of the JCPOA is an important steppingstone. That was a principle finding as well, most respondents saw the joint commission as being potentially a vehicle to empower future negotiations, the past rounds of negotiations were, again, also a useful model of how to proceed going forward. And using a multilateral framework was repeatedly pointed to as being very important to get negotiations off the ground, to create an atmosphere of trust and one where it wouldn’t be specifically about issues between Tehran and Washington directly, but more multilateral issues bringing everybody together, and addressing the sunsets and monitoring and codification on ICBMs.
I’m not going to call them easy wins by any means, but were considered the easiest of games in the short run, but we did see a lot of our respondents suggest that as part of a JCPOA+ the parties could agree, should agree, actually, to commit to wider regional discussions. And the reason why the region shouldn’t or wouldn’t be able to be brought into an initial deal, I mean, Neil alluded to them at the beginning, limitations in Washington, limitations of attention also in the international community, but frankly, nobody is thinking ahead of what the regional discussion is going to look like.
The 12 demands basically seek to impose all sorts of changes in Iran’s policy, and nobody is thinking about what Iran is going to bring to that negotiating table. What is Iran going to start to ask of the region? If the international community expects Iran to dismantle its ballistic missile programme, rest assured, Tehran is going to ask some of its neighbours to do the same, and once you begin to roll – you know, go down that pathway, the discussions become much more complex, and we found our respondents pointing to many interconnected regional issues, such as the Qatar crisis, such as proxy wars in North Africa, such as ballistic missile proliferation of other countries in the region, as also being part of a wider regional discussion, so thereby it’s going to be difficult to unlock in a short-term negotiation. So, use it as a bigger steppingstone.
Sir Peter Westmacott
And did you conclude that even for movement in that kind of multilateral framework that you’re describing, to address those issues within the concept of a JCPO+, some sort of sanctions relief is necessary for that, or only for the improvement in the relationship between the United States and Iran? Go ahead.
Dr Sanam Vakil
Sanctions relief, without a doubt, has to be included in a JCPOA+, but again here, we’re in this grey territory where nobody is thinking about what sanctions relief is really going to look like. Clearly, Tehran would like to see changes to the JCPOA, because sanctions relief in the first JCPOA, wasn’t effective. So, they are going to ask for some increased access to the US financial system, greater banking access and the like, and the US administration, which has imposed the most comprehensive sanctions on Iran to date, has to think about how they’re going to unravel all of these sanctions. So, we’re quite far apart in thinking about that piece of the puzzle. We recommend, based on our findings, that sanctions relief is going to have to be incremental on a smaller deal, and the US Government can use a shortened timeframe to pressure and to incentivise progress on negotiations, for example.
Dr Neil Quilliam
I think one of the things that we found, and probably, that drove us to prepare this report in the first place, was too much focus was on the here and now, rather than, sort of, lifting the lens a little bit and, sort of, thinking further down the line, and when we were, sort of, conceiving of this research project, we were really – it was a time when we were all thinking, you know, “Is the JCPOA going to survive? Is it on life support? How are we going to get it through the next year or two?” And we just thought rather than just simply focusing on that, we need to look beyond that time of – timeframe, and that’s why we began this mapping exercise, and I think when one thinks about the timings, you know, is this deal going to survive between now and the next Presidential election? Maybe a year ago, we might’ve said yes, it’s going to, sort of, you know, we can muddle through, but given the shift in the region, given the dynamics you described it earlier, Sanam, when we were talking, it’s like a now or never moment. So actually, it’s much more pressing now than it was, say, a year ago.
Sir Peter Westmacott
So, those are the findings, and what are the policy recommendations that you’ve come up with for the governments that are wrestling with these issues?
Dr Neil Quilliam
So, we’ve got a…
Dr Sanam Vakil
Couple of pages, but we’ll give you the top line summaries. I think it’s important to start thinking about next steps before escalation becomes a reality, and I’m maybe really pessimistic in this moment. Maybe I’m always pessimistic, but I think that finding an off ramp and providing some form of sanctions relief is the best pathway to facilitating these first round of negotiations. So, that is, I think, the first recommendation and the most important one. Without that, I really see both Tehran and Washington, you know, in different corners of potentially the same room, and bringing them together is – there are two pathways to make that happen. One is the sanctions relief pathway. The second is, of course, greater escalation, which could have many knock-on effects that nobody would like to really see come to reality, and again, we’ve seen that take place over the summer, and I think that that is a really big possibility, over the coming months.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Establishment and back channels. I said earlier, I mean, there’s, sort of, the capacities, the capabilities, the personnel just simply don’t seem to be there to have that, or the interlocuters. I mean, that’s something that needs to be established urgently. I think that’s an area where all sides can – should be investing and utilising their contacts, that’s absolutely key.
Dr Sanam Vakil
I think additionally, and this is obviously a recommendation for governments, all of the signatories of the JCPOA and all of the parties that are heavily invested in the maximum pressure campaign. So this also applies very much to Israel and the Arab Gulf countries, perhaps it’s time to conceive of a new Iran strategy. One that is not solely predicated on containment of the Islamic Republic, but one that tries to nurture a more holistic change with Iran, and that might include engagement, that might include building confidence between countries that have not had positive diplomatic relations, and viewing each other in these binary lenses is proving to not be productive. It might be sustainable at the top level for internal propaganda of each country, but ultimately, for regional stability, there does need to be a shift in how the region engages with each other, and so that is ultimately, another big recommendation that we make, going forward.
Dr Neil Quilliam
And Tehran has to be careful not to miscalculate. It’s not clear where the redlines are anymore, and I think there’s a real risk, I mean, coming to your point of pessimism, I think that’s something a lot of us could probably share, and there is a grave risk of miscalculation, a now or never moment. I think that really, really, really captures it.
Dr Sanam Vakil
There could be overconfidence in Tehran seeing a lack of response over the summer, no deterrents having been established, and this, again, is very dangerous, and I would be very cautious in maybe the announcement next week on a nuclear breach could be too much for the E3. And that’s going to set in motion the joint commission process, and then the UN process, and that’s going to bring more sanctions back on Iran, or if there is another attack, even under the umbrella of plausible deniability, Tehran might miscalculate the level of the international community’s fatigue with this crisis. So, I think that’s really important to think about as well. And I think, finally, the issue of dual nationals is really something that is – should be elevated in all capitals around the world, and specifically in Tehran. This issue is just embarrassing and not becoming of a country that it prides itself on being independent and being a country of regional – a leader in the Middle East. So, resolving this dual national hostage taking and national hostage taking, once and for all, must be put on the table and removed as a policy for the Islamic Republic, because it’s not good for its reputation, it’s not good for the business environment, and, you know, it is just not a policy that we want to see emulated in any other contexts either.
Sir Peter Westmacott
I think, just a brief comment, I think that is right, I think for public opinion for the media, you know, what are the issues that are up there? It’s not so much ballistic missile testing, it is more about hostage taking and apparently, innocent dual nationals in jail, sometimes without trial, sometimes not in typical conditions, and, you know, why are they there? And some of them British, some of them Canadian, some American, some are French, all sorts, and I think you’re right, I think for public opinion to feel we really should be making an effort to have a more holistic and different approach, there needs to be change in that area.
Dr Sanam Vakil
Yeah, I would just add, you know, and everyone said that in the two-year period of the JCPOA, Iran didn’t change, and this dual national hostage taking, sort of, reinforces bad behaviour and doesn’t nurture the trust that I think a lot of countries in the international community would like to build with Iran.
Dr Neil Quilliam
I think that, at the moment, I think this is the moment that a JCPOA+ is possible, is conceivable, and we described, sort of, you know, how to get to that new Iran deal. But as part and parcel of that as well, it’s, you know, we have listened, we did interview colleagues elsewhere in the Gulf, and those regional issues that Sanam was talking about are absolutely critical, and we see that as being a corollary or then would need to be an absolute commitment to start looking at those issues. And that’s somewhere where we felt that the EU could really step in and build and develop a framework, maybe something along the lines of the Madrid peace process. That might be one way of, sort of, tying those issues, but you can’t package them all into a grand bargain, ‘cause that’s just simply not going to work.
Sir Peter Westmacott
Okay, shall we open the discussion up a bit more widely? Anybody who would like to speak, please raise your hand. A microphone will come and find you, like magic. If you’d like just to give us a word of who you are, where you’re from, please do, but if you don’t want to, that’s fine as well. So, I saw that hand first, over there on the left at the back, and then we’ll come over here.
Mark Briggs
I’m Mark Briggs and I’m from the South Korean Embassy. I was just wondering what lessons do you think we can learn from the events surrounding the JCPOA, for future nuclear negotiations?
Sir Peter Westmacott
Shall we take one or two more, and especially on the same theme? The gentleman at the back there, with his hand up.
Frank Gelli
My name is Frank Gelli. I’m a Member of Chatham House. A reference was made to the regime change earlier on. That was certainly the declared policy of John Bolton, Ambassador John Bolton, when he was a member of the administration. Do you think that the fact that Bolton has stepped down, or been kicked out, depending on how you look at it, does it make any difference to calm down the situation?
Sir Peter Westmacott
Any other questions specifically on the JCPOA before I ask the – our experts to comment on that? Well, let’s give it a go, let’s take those questions so far.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Sure, and lessons from the JCPOA? I mean, there are plenty of lessons we can learn. One is that it can’t just simply depend upon a US President to institute labours or just to have that authority. I mean, if we get to a JCPOA+, that’s going to somehow have to get through Congress. Now, that’s not an easy thing, obviously, that’s a massive commitment and an endeavour to actually push that through. But it can’t be whatever deal is reached, whatever next phase is reached, it can’t be dependent upon one individual coming into place. There has to be an institutional process that embeds it that can make sure that it can survive, whatever election cycles are coming. I mean, I’d say that was a big one there.
Dr Sanam Vakil
Yes, I think additionally, and looking at the JCPOA, a back channel was developed during the JCPOA process between Washington and Tehran. They developed a lot of the contours of the negotiation, which was important, but at the same time, the JCPOA was multilateral. So, I think that’s a very good model to continue, and in building consensus, that consensus doesn’t just have to be built with Congress. I think consensus has to be built, also, within Iran about the importance of a next agreement, but also, with regional actors in the Middle East. Maybe it’s time to reconsider whether withdrawing from the JCPOA was the right move, and perhaps a new deal could restore some balance to the situation and open the door to more holistic negotiations on regional issues.
Sir Peter Westmacott
And would one of you like to address the John Bolton question?
Dr Sanam Vakil
Sure, we do comment about factional tensions within both Tehran as – and Washington as being important to, sort of, internal perceptions in both capitals, with regards to the JCPOA. A lot of our interviewees did mention specifically, when looking at Washington, that the trust deficit that existed from Tehran’s side was because they didn’t understand or didn’t trust political appointees like John Bolton or even Mike Pompeo, to translate Iran’s objectives or pass policy messages on, and I think that that issue still lingers on today. There is concern about whether these people are representing the President’s interest or if they have their own ideological objectives.
Sir Peter Westmacott
Thank you. Let’s go over here, yeah.
Nicholas Pelham
Thank you. Nick Pelham from The Economist. Underlying, sort of, the – your analysis that there is a prospect for a JCPOA+ seems to be the assumption that that’s what Iran wants, and I just wonder if that is right, if Iran itself has changed significantly, since 2015, if the people in charge today are much more sceptical of the worst and of the look at the region in a more confrontational light? And if that’s correct, what do you think the policy recommendations should be, if we are actually dealing with an Iran which is less interested today in engagement than was the case in the past? And, sort of, perhaps a corollary to that, how do you think Iran is dealing with the mood swings amongst its own, kind of, Shia base in the region, particularly in Iraq, but perhaps, to some extent, in Lebanon as well?
Sir Peter Westmacott
Well, that’s quite a lot of questions there. Do you want to deal with those and then we’ll take some more?
Dr Sanam Vakil
Sure. I think that’s something that we definitely have to take in mind, if there has indeed been discussion in Iran about whether a new deal is worthwhile considering they were in compliance, and this is very much, of course, part of the Iranian argument. But at the same time, we have seen very clear signals from not just the President, but from Iran’s Supreme Leader, laying out what the parameters of what a new deal could be, or the kickstarting of negotiations could look like, and they’ve adjusted their parameters a little bit.
First, it was that the US has to return back into the JCPOA and then we can talk, and then – and provide sanctions relief, and they’ve sort of walked back away from the return to the JCPOA, as a kickstart of negotiations, but are sticking to the demand that sanctions relief has to be granted. I think there is appetite for it, and from my understanding, the debate in Iran is, I think negotiations are quite inevitable, it’s just a question of, again, what is going to be the scope and scale of those negotiations? What does Iran want to achieve? And does Iran now need more sanctions relief, and that would include having to deal with a broader range of issues, in order to remove even more, let’s say, the human rights sanctions, the terror sanctions? So, are we going back to, let’s say, the 2015 status quo, or does Iran want to go further than that? And if it went further than that, it would have to give more than that, in order to move forward. I think one thing we didn’t mention though, is the question of timing, and I think that it’s important to think about Iran’s timing, going forward. Is Iran going to do something before the 2020 elections or is it going to wait through the outcome of the elections? And I think that that’s going to be an important space to watch, to see if there’s going to be a concession in the coming months or if they’re going to gamble and hope for a different President in the White House.
Dr Neil Quilliam
But also, if I can just add into that, I mean, the question is also, you know, what does Iran want from JCPOA+? This is where we saw a, sort of, misalignment of interest, particularly from the US or from Trump’s, sort of, conception, you know, coming with a bigger, better deal, whatever that might be, whether that is JCPOA+ or not. His conception is that, you know, Iran wants to come back into the fold and wants to have this big, sort of, bear hug with the US, but clearly, that’s not the case. So, by re-engaging and taking – you know, going for JCPOA+, that’s not about the US-Iranian relationship, that’s much more about getting the sanctions relief and working on the economy, and then probably looking the other way.
Dr Sanam Vakil
I mean, I would just also add that Iran has the same economic issues that most Middle Eastern countries have to deal with. They need to create jobs, above everything, and that’s what the JCPOA was about, I think, from Tehran’s perspective. The question is, are you going to have investment and engagement with Russia and China and India and Asian countries, or are you going to have a more diversified portfolio? And I think, probably, as we know from, sort of, basic finance 101, diversification works better in your portfolio than solely relying on one area of the world over another.
Sir Peter Westmacott
Thank you.
Dr Sanam Vakil
A lot of mood swings, yes. Do you want to take the region?
Dr Neil Quilliam
Do you want to do Iran and I can do the region?
Dr Sanam Vakil
Yes, of course. I think this is a really important issue, because most people think that unlocking Iran’s role in the region is, again, a binary choice. Force Iran to leave Iraq or force Iran to leave Lebanon, and I think 20 or 30 years on, that demand is almost impossible because the ties are much more intrinsic. Iran has a, sort of, parallel infiltration, but also formal relationship that is very hard to unwind, and it’s economic and it’s soft-power oriented. So, just making those demands make it impossible, but making Iran and its allies in those countries, non-state actors in those countries accountable is the best way, and we’re seeing this play out in Iraq and Lebanon right now, is the best way to force – alter the balance of power of that relationship, because Iran is, I think, very successful at operating in opportunistic, weak moments where it can, sort of, enter in and develop, sort of, longstanding ties. It’s not very effective at doing what I say is the normal relationship. So, force it to be normal, force it to be accountable, and, you know, this is sort of the outcome that we’re seeing play out quite well.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Sure, and there are other mood swings in the region, of course, and as you were alluding to, I mean, Iran has been engaged in this game of brinkmanship and really, sort of, pushed it right to the edge, and we’ve seen, you know, a shift in policy from the UAE, and more recently, I think we’ve seen a shift or a softening in the Saudi position. So, there’s, sort of, maximalist pressure that the US have been pushing and it’s had the UAE and it’s had Saudi Arabia fully onboard and alongside. I think if – that is now starting to come apart, that’s starting to be picked apart, because Iran has demonstrated that it’s not playing. I mean, it’s really willing to push very, very hard. I mean, if they were behind, you know, targeting Khurais and Abqaiq, I mean, that was a significant escalation and demonstrated a tremendous capacity and capability to hit, you know, the crown jewels of Saudi Arabia, but also, their own inability to actually protect and defend their key assets.
Sir Peter Westmacott
Thank you. We had some more. Any ladies like to ask a question? How about one there, yes, and then we’ll come back to you, yeah.
Hebe Foster
Thank you. My name’s Hebe Foster. I’m an international relations student at [inaudible – 35:04] in Paris. My question is relating to the back channels you mentioned and the importance of that capacity. President Trump seems to have a bit of a tendency both to, obviously, intervene and – in foreign policy individually, on Twitter or elsewhere, and also, he seems to be reducing the number of experts, in general, across the board, and in terms of his diplomatic advices. Could you comment on how that might influence negotiations going forward?
Sir Peter Westmacott
Okay, let’s take another one, one in the middle, and then I’ll…
Casa Arabe
Hi, Casa Arabe, an Iran Analyst. On the question of sanctions relief, in the past – well, since May, the IRGC, Iran’s Revolutionary Guard has attacked six oil tankers, it’s seized three commercial ships, including a UK flag vessel, it’s hit a US drone, used proxies in Iraq to attack US interests and we, of course, had the Saudi oil field strike, which was the biggest oil disruption in history. So, given that context, if the US were to grant sanctions relief, what message would that be sending to Iran? Wouldn’t that be, in effect, rewarding Iran for its bad behaviour?
Sir Peter Westmacott
Okay, let’s take those two.
Dr Sanam Vakil
Alright, happy to talk about the back channel. There are very good people in the US Government, who really know their stuff, and in the same way that there are experts and Analysts and Researchers in all governments, the question is, are those resources being utilised? I think that they’re there and the administration is using them. So, I wouldn’t – I would like to, sort of, cast doubt on that. What I do think is important is that the administration does start to lay the terrain for what negotiations will look like, start discussing or preparing briefs on all of the issues. I’m sure they’re doing that. I think it’s also important to find the right interlocuters at the negotiating table, people that understand how to speak to each other and not make it so personal. What’s been so interesting, over the past two years is the personal nature of this conflict, where people feel that President Trump, as an individual is obstructing or Pres – or Foreign Minister Zarif is instructing, and actually, it’s not about the people. People matter, we know that, but take away that personalisation and let’s just focus on the issues. So, that is actually one of our recommendations going forward.
Dr Neil Quilliam
So, on the question about sanctions relief, is – would sanctions relief would be seen as rewarding bad behaviour? I mean, I would say, first of all, I think those actions that we’ve seen are – probably are definitely a consequence of maximalist pressure. So, this is a response to a policy of, actually, more than containment, and a policy that’s been supported by other regional actors. So, these are the pressure points, these are the consequences of putting that pressure in place. So, therefore, one has to think about the consequences of lifting some of that pressure and seeing whether that – you know, the behaviour improves. I mean, that’s – you know, these are, sort of, pressure points. So, if the goal, and our working assumption throughout this paper is that the US President does want to reach a deal of some form. So this is part of the brinkmanship, this is part of the policy, so if one continues just to simply punish, then you’re going to see more and more of these consequences, and that’s where the risk of escalation really takes place. So, I don’t think we need to think about, sort of, reward and punishment, but we do also need to think about, sort of, off ramps. How can this be de-escalated, and what are the measures there? I mean, it’s clear that, you know, Iran is just going to – you know, if you push down here, it’s coming to come up like whack-a-mole.
Sir Peter Westmacott
Thank you. There was a question here in the font. Can we have the microphone?
Miss Bansari
Thank you, and my name is Miss Bansari. I’m in charge of Legal and International Affairs at the Embassy of Iran in London. I have gone through many details into the 60-page, some 60-page report on the JCPOA and I’ve seen the four scenarios, and I’m hearing a lot about one of those scenarios been spelled out here, the JCPOA+. What amazed me, in the first place, was that I’ve not seen much about the amount of commitments that are shown by Iran – do you hear me? Okay. Was shown by Iran to the JCPOA, and – which was historic, and the importance of that historical momentum that 5+1 made a deal at the global level with Iran. That said, I’m going to move to my next point, and that is in a question format, and that is about the viability and also the reliability of a JCPOA+ in the future, if – you know, who knows what holds the future election, and if a Trump+ emerges, what would happen to the JCPOA+? So, that’s very important, and I would like also to praise the idea that maximum pressure is an exemplification of an imposition of the unilateral quest of measures to a nation and a clear violation of human rights of a nation, and how can a person request or offer a dialogue or a negotiation without pulling out a dagger from the back of the person to whom he’s going to negotiate with? So, I believe it’s important to highlight this important issue, regarding the human rights aspect of this issue. I might have some further comments on the other parts, but I’ll leave it to the future possibilities. Thank you.
Sir Peter Westmacott
Thank you. Do you want to pick up on the…?
Dr Sanam Vakil
There was another question over there. Do you want to take another question?
Sir Peter Westmacott
Yes, perhaps we’ll take one more. Just the one, anybody else at the moment?
Dr Sanam Vakil
There’s one.
Sir Peter Westmacott
Yeah.
Callum Payne
Hi, can anyone – oh, no. Hi, my name’s Callum Payne, and I’m a Journalist from The National newspaper. I was just wondering what your verdict was on INSTEX, the mechanism proposed by the European nations, and then, I guess, what your policy recommendations were for European nations, in this scenario?
Sir Peter Westmacott
I think that fits quite well with the question from the Embassy because it’s about did Iran get sufficient credit for the efforts that it made, in order to implement the JCPOA? So…
Dr Neil Quilliam
I think – I mean, I think it’s – in the report we do talk about Iran’s commitments to the JCPOA, and we’d say, you know, 14 verifications that Iran was certified and has been meetings its obligations. I think from a factual point of view, I think all those details are in there, and we’ve put them in factually. I think – I mean, your question about the viability or reliability and a Trump+ and the JCPOA, I mean, I think those are all very good questions, and I think we do address those, in our policy recommendations. And that is about insulating whatever deal would come forward from the vagaries of, you know, political machinations on a day-to-day basis. So, there would need to be some sort of insulation to make ensure either that becomes a treaty, so that’s something that’s set in stone, or it’s insulated, so it can’t be impacted or affected by domestic politics in Iran, or it can’t be affected by domestic politics in the US or any other – any of the other states. I mean, I think that’s one of the lessons, when we had the question about the lessons. I mean, I think that’s an absolute key lesson, that partners can’t walk away from this deal, it needs to stand firm, and we also recommend that penalties are imposed for partners that decide to withdraw at any given point.
Dr Sanam Vakil
Happy to address the issue of human rights. I think when you bring up the issue of human rights, you get into difficult territory. I mean, that’s the reality, and it’s difficult territory in the Middle East, and actually, we did ask people about human rights, and of course, pitching the US withdrawal from the JCPOA as an infringement on Iran’s human rights, I find that a bit slippery, particularly because there are a lot of international concerns about Iran’s human rights, and in the context of the issue of dual nationals, I think that we have to be a bit careful. Now, that said, is this infringing on multilateral agreement correct? Does it build trust going forward? Are there questions in Iran about the ability to make further agreements and trust the international community? Of course there are, and I’m sure that the Islamic Republic is going to try and implement new verification mechanisms, in order to protect any forthcoming agreement. But I do want to get back to human rights in general, because Mike Pompeo did bring up human rights, actually, as the 13th demand, and we didn’t address it, and our respondents overwhelmingly said that human rights did not have a place in new negotiation with Iran. And that’s really because the issue of human rights has not been a priority for Washington, and we’ve seen that play out with its relationships, very transactional relationships around the Middle East, in Saudi Arabia, in other Arab Gulf countries, in Egypt, and we can just keep mentioning them, and including Iran. So, it’s very hard to single out Iran on human rights, when you’re not singling out everybody else for human rights. But, I mean, in general Western policymakers have not prioritised human rights, it’s fallen to the wayside. So, you know, this is, sort of, a sad outcome of this process and a sad outcome of where we are today.
It doesn’t mean we should stop agitating, and I think that’s why we’re, sort of, here doing our bit, but human rights in general I think is, sort of, slippery slope in this discussion. And just to turn to INSTEX, INSTEX unfortunately, remains a big challenge going forward, really because of the sanctioning policy coming from the Trump administration. This recent designation of Iran’s Central Bank, I – as I understand, is causing problems to again facilitate INSTEX. So, any time there is progress on the European side, there is an obstruction, and this recent designation has posed a problem. But I think the model of INSTEX is an interesting one, and the model of INSTEX in a new deal could be used to facilitate trade in an interim period, where you are trying to incentivise good behaviour and get negotiations going in a meaningful way. So, there is scope to build on INSTEX, and you do hear Europeans talk about how this mechanism could become bigger, also, to protect Europe from this US-based sanctions policy, which is very frustrating, and I think, as our report says very clearly, Europe has a very important role going forward.
We think that Europe is the most neutral policy actor that can shepherd through regional negotiations, but that requires determined commitment and strategy, but it has the ability to bring all of the parties together and to manage a multilateral and also, bilateral process. So, we hope to see that get off the ground, and we’ve seen, for example, the French, under President Macron, try and, sort of, conceive of that idea and shepherd that idea, and perhaps it will come to fruition.
Dr Neil Quilliam
I mean, none of what we’re recommending in our report is simple, we appreciate that, it’s taken ten years to get to JCPOA, effectively. So, I mean, this is a big, heavy lift for all of the partners, all of the players that are going to be enacted – active in that, and that also means having a long-term view and being prepared to, sort of, you know, roll up the sleeves and really invest time, energy, commitment and determination, just to push it all the way through. But at the moment, I mean, that’s, again, that’s why we came to the report, because we thought everyone’s just looking down at the floor at the moment just thinking about today.
Sir Peter Westmacott
Got a question here in the front, yeah.
Member
I don’t need a microphone, I don’t think, and this may be…
Sir Peter Westmacott
Yes you do, for other people.
Patrick Wintour
Sorry, thank you very much. I’m Patrick Wintour and I work for The Guardian. I just wanted to ask, you talked about the risk of miscalculation, and I was wondering what you thought a – next week, the Iranians are due to make a fourth step away from the JCPOA, and sitting next to the Embassy, I could say, that they say each step has been carefully calibrated and is reversible. But is there a fourth step that you think would force the European Union to react in a different way to what – the way in which they have so far. I mean, so far they’ve just absorbed the hits, as it were. Do you think there comes a point when Europe will have to respond?
Sir Peter Westmacott
Shall we take one other before you answer?
Dr Sanam Vakil
There was a question over here.
Sir Peter Westmacott
Okay.
Member
[Inaudible – 49:40]. Just a question – oh, sorry. As an American, and I’m British too, but going back to America, the concept – how would you change the thought – the thinking and the perception of Iran right now in the US? I mean, it’s clearly thought of as a rogue state, and if we were fortunate enough to get almost an agreement, to get your plus, getting that through Congress at this point in time, I don’t care if it’s a Democrat or a Republican, you know, leadership, it’s going to be really hard. So, how do you change this perception? Because here we – a couple of weeks ago we listened to the Saudi State Minister, and he was very clear, and people had bought that Kool-Aid in the United States, and I think that’s a real important issue you have to get through and, you know, that’s where obviously Sir Peter is, and a former Ambassador, you know, could he be helpful? But I’d love to hear your recommendations, because there’s nobody in the United States who would support Iran at this point in time, in the state that it’s in today.
Sir Peter Westmacott
Can I just add a comment to that before you answer? It’s a very good question, I think, there. I think that the mood in the United States oscillates a bit. Not very long ago, when I came back here, I remember a senior United States Senator saying to me “There is no mood for doing anything better with Iran. The name of the game politically is who can out-hate Iran on Capitol Hill.” I think that’s changed a bit. Khashoggi changed things, a number of other things have altered perceptions, but I’d be interested in your views. But I was going to throw in a little question, my only question, which was this, which was if we are looking for ways in which we can unblock attitudes and moods and a willingness to look at things differently, are there things that Iran itself could do in the region, not winding up the assets and the relationships as you’ve put it, Sanam, but let’s say some sort of constructive policy initiative in places like Yemen or Iraq or Syria, which would not only be useful in their own right, in terms of trying to alleviate the suffering and the mess, but also, help people see Iran in a slightly more constructive light?
Dr Sanam Vakil
Okay, great. How do we want to tackle this?
Dr Neil Quilliam
Do you want to take the fourth step?
Dr Sanam Vakil
Yes.
Dr Neil Quilliam
And that’s the…
Dr Sanam Vakil
Pardon?
Dr Neil Quilliam
Do you want to take the fourth step, this question that came up here?
Dr Sanam Vakil
Oh, yes. In terms of next week, I think I can’t tell you specifically what the red line is, and I think that’s a bit of the problem. We don’t know what anyone’s red lines are right now. The US has a loss of life red line, but I think that it’s time for them to reissue what those red lines are, because I think the lines are much more blurred than we’re aware of at this point. So, is it infrastructure? Is it next time is one step too far, in terms of an attack, that is? And in terms of the JCPOA itself, also we don’t know what the red lines are. The E3 did issue this very strongly worded statement, but is that the red line? I mean, is it levels of enrichment? Is it returning IAEA Inspectors? To be honest, we don’t know, and in this, sort of, grey zone that we are all operating, this is where it’s dangerous, and this is where Iran can miscalculate, and then everyone else can act or overreact and we can find ourselves in a moment that we’re not prepared to address. And so, everybody’s hedging and focusing again on the here and now and not thinking about how are we going to get out of this crisis? So, that’s a bit of the challenge again, to reinforce the point.
Dr Neil Quilliam
No, absolutely. Absolutely. On your question about Iran and, say, in Yemen or Iraq or Syria, I mean, what was striking for us, I think, when we were carrying out our interviews, a lot of our interlocuters, a lot of our interviewees, particularly from France, Germany and Israel, in fact, thought Yemen, there was – that was the, sort of, low-hanging fruit, if you like. That’s one area where the Iranians can come to some understanding, and I think the Saudis now, irrespective of whatever rhetoric is coming out since those attacks on its soil, are more amenable to de-escalation there. So, I think Yemen definitely is one theatre. Iraq, I mean, things have changed since – on the ground, since we carried out this, you know, the research, so I’m not entirely sure whether there is that scope or that willingness to discuss them. But Syria is always something that, I think across the border, seems just far too difficult, that’s something we really can’t touch, but Yemen just came up constantly. Yemen is one of those kinds of theatres, I think, in which the varying sides can probably come to some understanding, or at least begin…
Sir Peter Westmacott
And altering US perceptions?
Dr Sanam Vakil
And let me just add on what Iran can do. I don’t see Iran doing too much in the region beyond Yemen, but I do think that Iran can do something, and I’ve been waiting for them to do this now for over a year, release some dual nationals. It’s very simple, you will – the good will coming from that very simple move, it would be immense, and it would change the message. So, I think that’s the number one thing that Iran can do, and seeing hostage taking as part of their strategy, I don’t think that that’s something that we should reinforce. And even though there are off ramps and negotiations that will be taking place in this space, whether it’s by transferring Iran’s money back from the British perspective or exchanging hostages, I think that would really change the tenure of what Iran seeks, ultimately. So, that’s what I would recommend.
And with regards to the United States, I think that is a really important issue. I think Iran has become such a toxic issue in the US, it’s almost frustrating. You always have to just almost say, “Yes, yes,” and demonstrate your anti-Iran credibilities before you get people to listen to you in Washington, which is ridiculous in itself, and so it’s a bit of a silo for true, honest discussion about what the United States has gone wrong, with regards to Iran. But I do think, ultimately, it’s a question of America first. What does the United States ultimately seek for itself and its role in the world? Is it about America first? Well then, are you disengaging from the region? Are you going to leave behind a stable region? Is it about engaging economically with the Middle East?
Well, in order to see all of that happen, you actually have to try and help shepherd. You don’t have to, but you should shepherd a, sort of, resolution to a situation. And I think what I tell American policymakers all the time is, frankly speaking, if – you’ve tried one policy for 40 years, it’s four decades of containment and sanctions, with a two-year window, where you hoped for transformational change in Iran. Frankly, it takes a long time. We’ve seen China has yet to, sort of, develop in the way we wanted it to, Russia has yet to develop in the way we wanted to, post the end of the Soviet Union. You’ve got to give the country time to evolve, and so you have to nurture that change through more diplomatic tools than just sanctions. So, I’m, sort of, trying to encourage people to think beyond sanctions as an effective tool of engagement or coercive diplomacy.
Sir Peter Westmacott
Got time for one more quick question, if anyone has not yet raised a hand. Here, there’s one in the middle.
Rob Underwood
Thank you. Rob Underwood, Member of Chatham House. Haven’t said much about the economic situation in Iran at the moment, and therefore, the effect of sanctions, and obviously, there was a significant move in the middle of the year, when they lost the waiver right to sell oil to Turkey, India and China, and since then, we’ve seen an escalation in certain activity, as the questioner asked previously. To what extent do you think there is that economic pressure, and could it be that Trump’s approach, you know, whether we agree with it or not is a separate thing, but Trump’s approach might be to bring them to the table financially on their knees, rather than through engagement?
Sir Peter Westmacott
You’ve got one minute.
Dr Sanam Vakil
Yes, one minute. The impact of sanctions, of course, is quite clear. The IMF just downgraded growth to negative 9%, I think, just last week, inflation is increasing, so is unemployment, the currency devalued significantly and then has appreciated. You know, there’s sort of a mixed basket in how to read how Iran is surviving this sanctions strategy. I think one of the findings or one of the, sort of, outcomes was that a lot of respondents did not think that Iran was going to make – or its decision-making was not predicated solely on the impact of sanctions on the Iranian economy. It does very much matter, people are hurting, but the government message has been, “This is economic warfare, and we are going to fight back, you know, using similar means, and we are going” – you know, they think – the message has also been that people have weathered the hardest part thus far. So, they’re trying to fuel this, sort of, resistance mindset, building the resistance economy and promoting non-oil exports and the like, and their ties with Russia and China and other countries have been relatively helpful, as well as the region has been relatively helpful for them to survive, but, yeah, of course, it could.
If we go the UN route, we could result in more sanctions, and this could alter the calculation, but we know from the case of Iraq and all of the years of sanctioning that Saddam Hussein chose repeatedly to impoverish the country, rather than negotiate. And I’m not saying that I’m privy to knowing what the political leadership in Iran is going to choose to do, but that is a scenario that we have to consider as well.
Sir Peter Westmacott
Okay, we have a hard stop at two. I’m in disgrace, we’re a minute late, but I think we’d better wind it up there. I’m not going to try to summarise. Thank you both very much. Those who want to learn more, read the report, there are copies on the table. Thank you all for coming [applause].
