Nomi Bar-Yaacov
Good evening everyone. I’d like to welcome you all to this panel on Iranian Foreign Policy: Prospects for Change. We couldn’t have chosen a better time for this panel. We’re absolutely honoured. I feel very privileged to have two distinguished speakers on the subject. I think, with almost, you know, 24 hours to a landmark announcement, the US withdrawal from the JCPOA, we’re in – we’re heading towards some new realities in the Middle East, in the world. Pandora’s box is opened and extremely complex issues need deconstructing. More insight, more depth, and without any further ado, I’d like to give the floor to the two speakers.
I’d like to, first and foremost, introduce them. We will then open the discussion and I’ll, sort of, kick off with a couple of questions and within half an hour, we’ll open the discussion to the floor, so feel free to ask your questions then. I’d like to introduce Professor Mahmood Sariolghalam, who is a Professor of International Relations at the University – for the State University of Iran, in Tehran. He has been writing articles, books, with extreme insight and tremendous influence, over the past 28 years. Oh, we’re, as I said earlier, extremely fortunate to have him here. He’s just published a paper, on this particular subject, of Foreign Policy: Prospects for Change in Iran, at Carnegie, on the Carnegie Endowment for Peace website. He’s also published in English, I start with English, because we’re here in the UK, Farsi and Arabic, very detailed books on the culture of Iranian politics and of various aspects of international politics. He’s a Member of the World Forum – the World Economic Forum in Davos and has an ongoing relationship with Carnegie and was a visiting Fellow at the Brooking Institute.
Without any further ado, I’d like to give Professor Sariolghalam the floor.
Professor Mahmood Sariolghalam
Thank you so much, Nomi. A great pleasure to be here. Thank you and much appreciation to Chatham House for having me here. I have six points to make about the subject and I hope, as I try to develop them in a sequence, they will make sense for you. The first point is that revolutions are about rigidities and if we study the Iranian Revolution in the four – last four decades, I think, in the internal structure of Iran, there have been occasional flexibilities, some compromises, concessions, balancing political acts within Iran over the last four decades, with regard to culture, education, economy and the social atmosphere in Iran. But ironically, when we study Iran’s foreign policy behaviour, I think the foundation and the hallmarks, the lexicon, of Iranian foreign policy, have remained solid and very consistent over the last four decades.
Anti-Americanism and anti-Israeli trends have served Iranian foreign policy in a very consistent way. The typical anti-Imperialism of the left in the Iran – in Iran of the 1960s and the 70s, was put together with political Islam’s definition of sovereignty, producing quite a bit of defiance for Iran at the regional and the international level. And it produced a self-imposed isolation, and if we notice the timing of the Iranian Revolution, Iran went inwards when China, Brazil, Turkey and many other countries entered processes of globalisation and interdependencies. So, in contrast to domestic, relatively speaking, domestic compromises and flexibilities, Iranian foreign policy has remained rigid and very consistent at the regional and the international level.
That takes me to my second point: why has this consistency been practised by Iran, at a high cost for its economy? And in a way, we can say Iranian economy has been hostage to Iranian foreign policy, and over the last four decades every single President of Iran has tried to bring an alliance between Iranian foreign policy and Iranian national economy, with basically, no success. Iranian economy has pursued its own objectives, with much problems and difficulties, particularly with the Western World, and Iranian foreign policy has conducted on its own course, the anti-American and anti-Israeli discourse have dominated Iranian foreign policy. Now, two separate illusions have overshadowed this Iranian foreign policy behaviour. The first illusion is this, that the Muslim world will embrace Iranian foreign policy and revolutionary message. That has not been materialised. The second illusion, that began in the 1990s, was that Iran would be able to separate American and European objectives, so that Iran can build an alliance with the Europeans, separate from the United States. Both illusions have not – have proved to be wrong in the way Iran has conducted its foreign policy.
Now, let me say a few things in my third point about why there has been this consistency in Iranian foreign policy. For a period of time, I would argue, in the 1980s and part of 1990s, I would say Iranian foreign policy was based on ideology. An ideology focused on political Islam and the definition, the particular definition of political Islam, on sovereignty, bordering on isolation from the rest of the world. But I would say after 1995, with the Clinton administration in the US, when some non-governmental institutions, think tanks, in the US began to talk about the whole concept of regime change in Iran, Iranian reaction were twofold. One, to develop a nuclear programme, in order to have leverage and contain American designs on Iran, and another was to engage in a very proactive foreign policy at the regional level in the Middle East. So, the anti-West doctrine, regional activism and the nuclear option provided ample opportunities for Iran to maintain the configuration of power inside Iran. So, I would say after the 1990s, Iranian foreign policy has been at the service of maintaining the domestic political order in Iran, instead of pursuing ideological objectives. And this foreign policy behaviour has been substantiated by an ideological religious narrative, by a populous impulse, pivoting almost to political isolation and what I would call the Sinatra Doctrine in Iranian foreign policy, that Iran wants to do everything on its own, without any alliances at the regional level and the global level. And the question is, can a country develop economically without alliances, without coalitions, without integrating into the global economy?
So, my fourth point is this, how has this narrative been able to survive, separating foreign policy from economic policy and the pursuit of regional activism for the purposes of maintaining domestic political order? I think oil income has produced excessive complacency in Iran over the years. It has been able to maintain the domestic order and it has been able to furnish its foreign policy behaviour at the regional level and then, we need to look at the decision-making structure in Iran, foreign policy decision-making structure. I would use the concept of calcification to characterise Iranian foreign policy decision-making, the fact that the group that makes the decision is fundamentally, an introverted group, with little global exposure and has a domestic agenda separate from Iran’s national economy. And not much new thinking has been utilised, over the last, particularly two decades, in producing new narratives or new interpretations of the global economy or global political system.
In the last four decades, so much has happened at the global level: the demise of the Soviet Union, the Arab Spring, but none have had much impact in the way Iran has defined its foreign policy. And the other characteristic of Iran’s foreign policy decision-making is what Social Psychologists would call cognitive dissonance, the fact that not much new data is inserted in the way Iran defines actors and players and issues, both at the regional and global level.
And my last concept that I used in understanding Iranian foreign policy decision-making is the concept of group think, the fact that very few people do enter that very small group of people who make Iran’s foreign policy decisions. So – and in the 2017 Presidential debates in Iran, among the candidates, if you have noticed, there was no discussion of Iran’s foreign policy. Economic, social, and cultural issues were discussed, but not much about foreign policy. So, what we have also in Iran, another characteristic of the decision-making structure, is what I would call the prevalence of gerontocracy. A group of people who may be dissociated from, not only the rest of the society, but also, very little exposure to the outside world. So, Iranian foreign policy has developed its own version of containment. Iran has been active at the regional level because it wants to gain leverage vis-à-vis the United States and Israel. So, at the service of maintaining the domestic order, Iranian foreign policy has been defined for proactive regional environ – activities.
My number five point about this issue is where American foreign policy enters this whole matrix. American strategy, I believe, has been centred in targeting Iran’s economy to induce Iran for concessions, for political concessions. And one of the points that I have maintained over time is that the nuclear issue is not the number one issue between Iran and the United States and that’s why, I think, the current Government in Iran two years ago oversold this issue to the public, arguing that if we resolve this nuclear issue with the United States and other members of the team, then we can count on opening up Iran’s economy to the world. Then we can encourage foreign investment in Iran. Then we can have normal economic relations with the rest of the world. But the conceptual centrality of American aim has always been to intensify internal contradictions in Iran in order to induce, again, concessions from that country.
That takes me to my conclusion and the sixth point, that I think Iran is facing a situation, after yesterday’s announcement by the Trump administration, that there will be no tactical solutions possible on the part of Iran in resolving its economic and foreign policy problems, particularly with the United States. Iran has maintained a strategy, in the last two decades: no normalisation, no confrontation with the United States. That may not be viable anymore, particularly, if President Trump is re-elected in a few years from now.
I think the message of the American decision is this, Iran cannot freeride the international economy. There will be political costs for that. Iran cannot have its own way of conducting its regional policies and at the same time, pursue economic development, banking, commercial relations with the rest of the world. Iran, in a way, is an unsatisfied power. It does have the potential and the capabilities of disturbing a regional order in the Middle East, but it cannot shape a regional order and that’s why I think if we study Iranian behaviour, it has basically been a defensive country and I would argue, it has not been offensive. It is involved in the region in order to maintain and to sustain the homeland. I think Iran’s charm offensive will no longer work, given the decision yesterday, by the United States, to enter Iranian-American confrontation into a new phase. I think the art of avoidance may not be used anymore.
Iran has avoided the international signals that I want to have an economy and at the same time, I do not accept the current international political order. And I think the message, particularly yesterday, is this, that this is a package that if you want to develop your economy, have normal banking, oil and gas and commercial relations, Iran’s political behaviour needs to be altered. If we look at the nuclear agreement, the technical aspects of the agreement are very clear and transparent, but not the non-technical aspects of the agreement and that’s why the agreement can be exploited in any way by any participant in – for their own interests.
My last point is this, that in Iran, we have a State and we have a Government. The Government is responsible for conducting and managing the economy. The State, constitutionally, is in charge of formulating foreign policy direction and I think the decision yesterday may force Iran, constitutionally and conceptually, and ultimately, politically, to think in a different way, in a different legal way, of State priorities that focus on security and foreign policy and then, Government priorities that focus on Iran’s national economy.
So, I think we are entering a new phase in Iranian-American relations. Yesterday was a breakthrough that dissociates the past from the future and I think Iran is up for very tough decisions in the coming months and perhaps, year. Thank you.
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
Thank you very much, Mahmood, for this insightful analysis of the situation in Iran. Dr Sanam Vakil, I’ll just say a couple of wor – a few words about you before you start, is an Associate Fellow at the Middle – I mean, Middle East and North Africa Programme here at Chatham House and also, heads the Iran Forum here in Chatham House. She’s based in London, but she also teaches in the SAIS John Hopkins University in Bologna. She has consulted extensively with high level risk analysis groups, as well as been consulted by Governments, and her main area is indeed, Iranian foreign policy, but she also teaches Middle East security and Middle East politics. The floor’s yours.
Dr Sanam Vakil
Thank you. Thank you, Nomi. It’s a great pleasure to be here with Dr Sariolghalam, who I haven’t seen in many years. I will pick up on a lot of his very astute statements and try to make sense of the practical implications of yesterday’s decision and how it will play out in Iran and how it will play out, with regards to Iran’s foreign policy. I will also be brief, because I have a cough and I apologise. After I speak, I will probably cough for a few minutes, so excuse me for that. I’m controlling it for the time being.
Yesterday’s decision, of course, was very decisive and in a way, the certainty and the clarity is very important, because the ball is really, in Europe and in Tehran’s court, on how to respond and although we don’t know how things are going to play out, in the coming months, if not years, ahead, this is still a bit of a limbo phase going forward, and while we’re in limbo, it’s important to consider some of the implications. President Trump, I believe, made his decision gambling, if you will, believing that Iran responds to pressure and this is a big belief among neocons in Washington, who think that Iran, in the past 40 years, comes to the table with pressure. Another current driving this decision today is, also their belief that Iran is weak. Iran has suffered from recent protests in December and January. These were protests all throughout the country and Washington was very animated by these protests and there was a lot of hope that political change would come to Iran and this hope continues, I think, to guide some of President Trump’s decisions.
President Trump is also very much emboldened by his new team of Mike Pompeo, as Secretary of State, John Bolton, as National Security Advisor, and has support from American traditional allies in Israel and Saudi Arabia. So, this team is important and this team is telling him the time is right, Iran is ripe for change, Iran responds to pressure. They’re also telling him that Iran is not as factional as everybody presents it to be, and in this context, I would, sort of like, to unpack and walk – and challenge some of these ideas and connect it to Iran’s foreign policy and how it will respond. Pressure doesn’t necessarily work for Iran, and I’d like to remind you that Iran withstood an eight-year war. And I don’t say this because it’s something to be proud of, but if you talk to hardliners in Iran, they will remind you of that, as a sign of their resistance, as a sign of their ability to withstand international isolation and that war has driven a lot of Iran’s sense of strategic loneliness throughout the region and in the wider international community. Also, in Washington, they might point to the resolution of the nuclear agreement as a sign that respon – Iran responds to pressure. But I would challenge that also, because if you remember, the nuclear negotiations began in 2003 and we got the JCPOA in 2015. So, that’s a long time for a country to withstand pressure and of course, international and really crippling sanctions began in 2011 and of course, that was part of the decision-making involved to come to the negotiating table, but it was not solely that decision.
So, I don’t believe that the regime necessarily responds to pressure. I actually think that for hardliners, within the Islamic Republic, pressure is perceived as a good thing, because pressure feeds into their narrative of resistance and that the Islamic Republic has survived, amidst isolation, amidst adversity, and it’s because of their narrative of resistance that the Islamic Republic has persevered, and I’m going to get back to that in a second.
I want to talk about this perception, specifically, also, that the Islamic Republic is weak. This is a point that I hear a lot in Washington and the Islamic Republic, indeed, has had protests almost every day since the protests erupted and it’s likely that those protests will continue. They’re acts of serious civil disobedience, women protesting, people are angry, frustrated. They’re widespread economic, political, environmental challenges within Iran today. They’re human rights challenges, they’re detaining dual nationals, the list is long. But I think, at the same time, it overestimates, and I don’t want to be simplifying the Iranian population by any means, but it’s overestimating Iran’s desire for a regime change.
There’s no organised opposition. The regime has been very effective at controlling and limiting the development of groups inside the country, and I think that that’s important to think about. The outside opposition is not a viable, creditable, united opposition as well and thinking about these dynamics are important in overstating Iran’s weakness, and through the years, the Islamic Republic has survived worse threats. In 2009, that was a big destabilising moment. In 1999, they also had widespread student protests. So, I’m not minimising, I don’t want to minimise, but I’m just saying, consider that this State is stronger than we expect it to be, or that we want it to be, and this plays out in the domestic context, because factional politics are relevant and are very important to understand Iran.
Iran is not a monolithic. The Islamic Republic’s Government is not monolithic. There are differences of opinions and these debates are very visible, if you follow them in the press. Debates over whether Iran should be in Syria, whether it’s going to pay out – pay off. Doesn’t always translate into the foreign policy realm, but they’re important to follow and the consequence of this nuclear agreement, I think, as articulated by Dr Sariolghalam, is that in the domestic sphere, President Rouhani is going to be very delegitimised going forward. This was his legacy and this is what he banked on. This was his vision. This was his way to protect the Islamic Republic against the narrative of resistance put forward by the supreme leader and other hardliners. So, with this deal being discredited and on life support, eventually, perhaps even dying, this is that told you so moment for hardliners in the Islamic Republic. And this will allow them the ability to perhaps gain greater legitimacy with the electorate and translate deep frustration with the United States into newfound nationalism and I think we have to consider the consequences of that, as well, and that is particularly dangerous.
Finally, how does this play out in the region, ‘cause I’m limited for time? It plays out because the resistance narrative wins. The resistance narrative has been the predominant narrative and the Islamic Republic’s Resistance Alliance is with Hezbollah. Today, also, with Bashar al-Assad and they have successfully built networks in Iraq. They have now also, extended in and developed a relationship with the Houthis, also, in Lebanon, and this vindicates that vision for the Islamic Republic. So, I apologise if I’m being a bit too pessimistic in looking at how this all plays out, but I deeply believe this is a bit of a miscalculation and I also believe that the main problem, the main obstacle here, is about Iran’s role in the region. And in order to resolve this, ultimately, it resolve – requires talks that address the regional issue and redress the security issue, but, in the current environment, it’s going to be very difficult to convince Ayatollah Khomeini and Iranian hardliners to come back to the table, when they perceive that the United States has yet again, moved the goalposts and is not to be trusted.
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
Thank you very much, Sanam, for this, again, extremely insightful, thought provoking and important contribution. I’d just like to kick off the discussion, also, in a not very pessimistic way, but it’s been made very clear that the no confrontation and no normalisation may not be able – that Iran may not be able to sustain it and hardliners have been strengthened by this United Nat – United States violation of the agreement. I mean, it’s been enshrined in the Security Council, binding Security Council Resolution, it’s ‘cause it’s not just an agreement between Iran and the US now though, there are many major powers and it’s binding by international law. So, the question now is, how is this going to affect the whole region, how do you see things happening? And this is addressed to both of you, you can start, Sanam can start, since Mahmood kicked off the discussion, how do you see things evolving in the region in the short, mid and, you know, if you are willing to be gutsy and forecast, you know, and analyse the various trends and dynamics, because we’re sitting, you know, in a very complicated reality and you deal with it daily?
Dr Sanam Vakil
Well, I’ll take short to mid. I’m sure I’ll take the long-term, because anything could happen and black swans are black swans. I think that Iran is going to be very calculated going forward, really because in the short run, a couple of weeks to a couple of months, Iran is going to try to be the good actor and try to retain, convince, cajole, pressure Europe to save the deal in some way and by being the good actor, it has to behave in the region. But at the same time, Iran has these deep ties, these relationships, so that it has been cultivating and it’s played the long game and it has been very strategic and the potential to be destabilising is very high.
Iraq is having elections this Saturday and many Iranian allies could win and that could be a very positive outcome for Iran, because one of Iran’s objectives in Iraq is to see US with – military withdrawal and so, that’s something we should keep on our minds. I don’t see immediate destabilisation, even in the Levant, even in the conflict between Israel and Syria. I do think the Trump administration has, sort of, passed the baton in that realm to Iran – to Israel to deal with Iran, and we will continue to see this Israeli response, and rightful response, to push Iran off and out of its borders. But for the time being, they’re going to be very careful.
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
So, would you like to respond to this and my…?
Professor Mahmood Sariolghalam
Yeah, just a few notes.
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
Thank you for that.
Professor Mahmood Sariolghalam
I think the region is going to be polarised further and Iran’s regional activities will be further intensified, in many countries, and the divide between Iran and the Arab world will be much wider. If we look at the history of Iranian-Arab relations, I cannot think of any other time when there’s been, basically, absence of both diplomatic and commercial social relations between the two sides. There is virtually no contact between Iran and Saudi Arabia and by that token, most of the Arab countries keep their contacts with Iran at the lowest level possible and, of course, Turkey is a different phenomenon.
I think Iranian-Israeli confrontation will be played out in Syria, increasingly. It was very clear, when the United States announced that they will leave Syria and I think that provided open ground for the Israelis to make their own security decisions in Syria. That will open up a playground between Iran and Israel over Syria. The Russian element is ambiguous. I’m not sure if Russians will get further involved in the region, depending on their negotiations over many other issues with the United States. So, I think we’re going to see a polarised, more polarised, Middle East and quite a bit of proxy activism in the region, by all sides, and which will have quite a bit of implications for the regional economy, I think, yeah.
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
Yeah, and regional stability. Thank you very much for that. I have many more questions, but I’d like to open the floor. I just – one question, which I would like you to think about in your – and address in your concluding remarks, because I’m worried that if you con – if you address it right immediately, you will – we will run out of time, and that is, given that we are predicting an escalation in tensions through proxies and otherwise, the question is what kind of mechanism to de-escalate can we think about? There must – you know, there are conflict – you know, this is dispute resolution clauses here, there and everywhere, but the question is really, we’re in – we’ve – as we said in the opening remarks, we’re in a new era, really, the post-JCPOA, or as it stood with the US in it. So, if you could address the potential de-escalation mechanisms at the very end that would be wonderful. But I don’t want you to address it now, otherwise we will run out of time.
I’m going to take questions in clusters of three at present, given, yeah, and given there’s a lot of interest. Please state – please wait for the roving microphone and please state your name and affiliation and if you’re a Chatham House Member, that’s all very well, but we’d like to hear what else you do, so, none of this, I’m just Chatham House Member. Thank you very much.
Amy Kellogg
Okay, Dr Sariolghalam, Amy Kellogg from Fox News. What might cause Iran to come back to the table? Is there any chance that some other deal, further deal, could be cut?
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
Thank you, Amy. Yes?
Alex Folkes
[Pause] Thank you, I’m Alex Folkes and I am a Chatham House Member, but I also work as an election observer. One of the objectives you said was, perhaps the long-term objectives, was to split the Europeans away from America, in terms of foreign policy and their relations with Iran, has that not now come up as the ideal opportunity, is that not now happening and how do you foresee either Iran or the Europeans taking advantage of the current situation to advance their own causes?
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
Thank you. Over there at the back, please.
Simon Albert
[Pause] Simon Albert from the Department of International Trade. What do you think the Saudi Arabian and GCC response is going to be to the decision yesterday?
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
Thank you very much. Who would like to go first, Sanam?
Professor Mahmood Sariolghalam
Sanam, you speak.
Dr Sanam Vakil
Okay. Well, I’ll start with the EU-US. It is indeed an objective of Iran’s and they tried to do it for many years, particularly from 2003 until 2011. I think both sides are going to try to maintain that split for the time being. I think there are benefits, but it might not – I mean, it’s very likely that it’s not going to yield any net gain for either side. From Iran’s perspective, we already heard yesterday and today that they need very tangible economic benefits from the EU and it’s going to be very hard for the EU to meet those commitments to Iran, but specifically, obviously, maintaining the TOTAL deal, maintaining their Airbus deals, allowing oil sales to go on. Those are tangible benefits that are very important for Iran to stay onboard.
But I think from the European perspective, I’m a bit dubious that they’re going to be able to provide all of that, because obviously, US pressure is going to be very painful for international companies. But Europe has this special role to play now. In a way, Trump has passed the buck, at least seemingly, to Europe and Europe is going to try to be the bridge between Washington and Tehran. Unfortunately, they didn’t get the deal agreed upon before May 12th and that would’ve given them a bit more unity and co-ordination going forward. But Europe is going to try to shuttle back and forth and keep Iran onboard for as long as possible and open the door to wider negotiations, because that’s ultimately, what is at stake. I’m not sure they’re going to be able to succeed, but they do have some ideas. They’re already meeting – the E4 is meeting with Iran on Yemen and the idea is to then build upon that. I mean, this is Macron’s vision, to build on that model, to then address the Syria file, then bring in Israel, then bring in Saudi, then bring in the US. It’s going to be long, and you know, I think, maybe from the European perspective, this is the soft exit option, where maybe, if we can be hopeful, in a few years, President Trump won’t be there and then there will be a new potential to bring everyone back in on a stronger deal.
On the regions, just briefly, the Saudi response is obviously very – well, they’re supporting President Trump and specifically, I’m not sure if there is a full scale GCC response, because the GCC is divided, but Saudi will be the swing producer, or has committed to being, it seems, the swing producer, as Iranian oil goes off the market in the next six months. But I think that there are implications there to consider as Iran looks at its diversified relations around the Gulf, the Arab Gulf. It has relations with Oman, Dubai, Qatar and Kuwait that will also suffer, as a result of this, and how Iran struggles to retain those relationships, amidst that pressure, is really going to be a challenge.
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
Thank you Sanam.
Professor Mahmood Sariolghalam
Yeah.
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
Mahmood?
Professor Mahmood Sariolghalam
On what will make Iran to come back to the table? I believe, in the coming days, or in a couple of weeks, we will probably hear about American sanctions on Iran’s oil and gas industry. Kor – South Korea has already cut down 45% of its oil imports from Iran, under American pressure. India is under pressure from the United States to reduce its oil dependence on Iran. The Chinese have also made it difficult for Iran to do business with Chinese companies and banks. So, the three Asian allies of Iran, in the post-nuclear agreement, have reduced their commercial banking and oil connections to Iran.
There are a few European refineries that import oil from Iran and they can also be easily persuaded to shift to other countries in the Middle East. So, I think the real pressure on Iran has always been the oil and gas industry, where Iran earns its national income to maintain its domestic order and to promote its regional activism. So, further sanctions on Iran’s oil/gas/petrochemical industries are – will, and I think it, to a large degree, is going to be the American strategy in the coming months, to pressure Iran into renegotiating the deal, or changing its priorities. So, I think it’s centred on Iran’s oil and gas industry.
About EU and US, it’s one thing to talk about EU Governments and how they define Iran and how they look at the nuclear agreement. It’s another thing to talk about European companies and European banks. I think there is quite a bit of enthusiasm in Europe by the Governments to work with Iran, to keep close to Iran, to contain some of Iran’s ambitions, but European banks and companies are very much constrained by the Treasury in Washington, so I think they will maintain the current policy of keeping distance from Iran and looking elsewhere. So, I’m not very optimistic that the European option for Iran will work in the coming months, and it’s going to be very difficult for many European countries to distance themselves from the official American policy on the nuclear agreement.
About the GCC and Saudi Arabia, I’ve often asked myself, as a student of Iranian foreign policy, why do Iran and Turkey maintain and can maintain, friendly relations? I think there is perhaps a simple reason. Iranian power does not threaten Turkish identity or Turkish national interests and vice versa. The issue between Iran and the Arab world is that Iranian power will diminish the power of Arab countries and vice versa. So, there is a zero – some gain between the two sides of the Persian Gulf. I would think that many of these countries are extremely pleased with the development and mainly because Iran cannot develop into a prosperous country and maintain good relations with the rest of the world. So, it’s all – there has always been fear by Arab countries, and this is not just post-revolutionary Iran, this goes back to the 1960s and the 70s, there’s always been fears of improving or expanding and – or even developing alliances between Iran and the United States. So, I would guess that the main objective on the other side of the Persian Gulf is to keep a weak, vulnerable, marginalised, isolated Iran, but keep it intact. A huge country, with a talented population, quite a bit of potential and has all the resources to become a full regional power, but with the current policies, Iran will be an isolated country. So, I would think that they welcome this development to keep Iran weak and isolated.
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
Thank you, Mahmood. I’ve got three people, who I’ve noted down, four, ah, five, gosh. Okay, sorry, was there a question here as well? No. Yeah, no, there I’ve got, that – yeah, I’ve got you down. We can extend maybe by five minutes, but if those who want – need to leave at seven on the dot, could just leave quietly, that will be fine. We’ll take a – okay, yes, there’s another. Those who want to ask questions, if we don’t have time in the session, do come up to the podium afterwards and ask them privately. We will be available here to answer everyone’s questions. But the ones – I’ve noted them in the order that different people in the audience have signalled to me, so we’ll take them.
First Nazenin Ansari, afterwards Dr Patricia Lewis, and then this gentleman over here and if the others could – there was a lady, yes, over there and – okay. Keep your questions very, very, very brief and I will cut you short, if they’re not very brief, and keep the answers very brief, as well, and after the questions, then please wrap up, make your, sort of, one line. We were discussing this one line message to the audience and one min – and one line conclusion for each speaker at the very end. Nazenin?
Nazenin Ansari
Thank you. Nazenin Ansari, Kayhan London. In the past month, at least four British Iranians have been arrested in Iran, including a Head of a Bank, Parsian, Mr Masri. This is in addition to Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe and the other British Iranians that were arrested prior to these four. Why have they been zooming on British Iranians and how is this going to affect Britain’s ability to play a part in this deal, this new deal and what is – what does it take to have them released?
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
Thank you, Nazenin. Dr Patricia Lewis?
Dr Patricia Lewis
Thanks. I’m the Research Director here for International Security and increasingly, we don’t have time to do anything else. So, I just wanted to say, I think that there have been many instances, throughout the last few decades, in which European countries and the United States have diverged on big issues, like sanctions on certain countries. One can think of Cuba, one can think of Apartheid South Africa, etc. So, is it possible perhaps to go forward in cementing a different approach from Europe? And then, so then, the final question, which I think is connected to the last one, is how will Brexit affect that?
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
Thank you for that reminder, Patricia. I thought we had a break from it. The gentleman over here, please. Thank you very much.
Dr William Crawley
[Pause] Thank you. My name is William Crawley. I’m a Fellow at the School of Advanced Study at London University, as well as a Member of Chatham House. Given Professor Sariolghalam, that you say that foreign policy has traditionally been a servant of domestic policy and given that you say that hardliners are likely to benefit from President Trump’s decision of yesterday, what would you expect the leader, the present leaders of Iran, to do to help them exploit what they perceive as differences in Western policy?
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
Thank you very much. I’ll take the question from this lady here in the centre, please.
Sharo Tam
Hi, I’m Sharo Tam. I’m undergraduate student at LSE. When the Deputy Ambassador of Israel, Ms Sharon Bar-li, came to speak to us last week, she spoke of Israel’s vulnerability and its need to check on players such as Iran for the sake of regional security. What do you make of the suggestion that a more hawkish stance, perhaps by Israel, to bomb – that it’s more effective to bomb brick and mortar facilities compared to air strikes, what do you make of that, in the aftermath of Trump’s announcement yesterday?
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
Thank you for that question. Sorry, last question over there.
Emma
I have a very brief comment.
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
Can you kindly stand up?
Emma
Yeah.
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
Thank you.
Emma
My name’s Emma. I’m a Researcher at King’s College London and I work with the European Iran Middle East Research Group. I have a small comment and a question. My comment was in relation to your discussion on the narrative and I felt something, which was absent was that in relation to Iran also securitises the narrative. It’s always talking about plots against the Islamic Republic, Iran’s enemies and spies of dens, so I just felt this was absent and then, the second – the – my question is in relation to the article you published this morning in The Guardian. I read this and I was wondering how you arrived at the conclusion, whether or not Iran – whether, in the Parliamentary elections, how the hardliners would win these elections, because I’m more observing the Presidential elections, but what I’ve observed is that it’s always the reformists who are the winners, at least when it’s left to the general public to decide.
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
Thank you very much, Emma. We need – you have ten minutes to conclude. Yes, I think it’s your turn. No, Mahmood, Mahmood, your turn.
Dr Sanam Vakil
You, please.
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
It’s your turn.
Professor Mahmood Sariolghalam
Some of the questions do not concern me. I really don’t know much about them.
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
Sorry, let me just clarify.
Professor Mahmood Sariolghalam
So, yeah.
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
You shouldn’t both answer all the questions.
Professor Mahmood Sariolghalam
Right, yeah.
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
You answer the questions that you feel you can answer and likewise, Sanam.
Dr Sanam Vakil
Yeah.
Professor Mahmood Sariolghalam
Yeah.
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
Why don’t you start only with the questions you feel that you can answer…
Professor Mahmood Sariolghalam
Right, I…
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
…or would like to answer.
Professor Mahmood Sariolghalam
I think Iran is very limited, in terms of trying to exploit the differences between Europe and the United States. They will – they’re going to have discussions with the EU3, plus Russia and China, but my expectation is that the United States will try to shape the agenda for those kinds of negotiations and I’m not sure that Iran will make any concessions, particularly on security and regional issues. And from what we have heard yesterday by Iran’s leadership, that if those negotiations do not serve Iran’s national interests, then they will exit the nuclear agreement, then that will bring Iran into a, not only a political confrontation with the United States, but also, I think, there might be elements of some military confrontation, at least in the Syrian landscape, or other areas in the region, like Yemen and other places.
The other issue that I’d like to mention is that I think Iran’s future will be shaped by how the country will resolve some of its soft issues. Environment, education, its economy and the fact that there is a national problem in water resources. These are soft issues, no matter which kind of Government, with what kind of mentality and orientation come to power, they need to resolve these issues and Iran, in order to solve these soft issues, they need to co-operate with the rest of the world for technology transfer, for capital investment, particularly in its oil and gas industry.
One estimate is that for Iran to return to its oil exports level of 2009 and 2010, Iran needs some $100 billion of foreign investment in order to return to those days. So, I think if we look at Iran, from an economic perspective, Iran needs to co-operate with the rest of the world and to what degree the country will be prepared to reorient its foreign policy at the regional level, so it can accommodate both the United States and Europe, is really open – is an open question.
But I would like to share with you what I wrote 17 years ago, in an article in the US. I think the main issue between Iran and the United States is not the nuclear issue. The nuclear issue is the symptom of a larger problem. The main problem between Iran and the United States that has overshadowed economic commercial security problems, is Iran’s definition and attitude towards Israel. And I think I have also written that if I were to quantify the extent of this issue in Iranian foreign policy and the problems that it faces with the outside world, I would say the issue of Israel, in Iran’s foreign policy, is about 80% of the country’s problems. So, as long as Iran does not address this issue, it will not be able to gain support within the United States for an improvement or a change of perceptions in the United States towards Iran.
One reason why the Trump administration, or any administration in the US, can promote its own policies is because Iran does not have any friends in the US, whether among Democrats or Republicans, particularly in US Congress. So, in order to change that attitude and perception, I think Ira – the only option for Iran, if it wants to pursue that strategy, is to have a different definition of the issue of Israel in the Middle East. No American administration will be able to improve, let alone normalise, its relations with Iran, without addressing the issue of Israel. It will be item number one on the agenda for domestic American politics. So, I think if we want to look at Iran, the US, the region, in a – in the next five years, that’s the challenge that Iran has and the US policy towards Iran will determine, shape, the policies of many other countries, not only in Europe, in Japan, but also ,in the Middle East and other places. So, that’s, I think, the main issue. We cannot say that Iran has, say, 25/30 problems with the rest of the world. I think we need to prioritise and look at the main problem that Iran is facing. So, the nuclear issue is a reflection of that other issue, larger issue, that Iran needs to address. Thank you.
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
Thank you very much, Mahmood. Sanam?
Dr Sanam Vakil
I will only endeavour quickly to answer a few of these issues, Nazanin, John on British-Iranian dual nationals, I don’t know any more than most people. You know, there are many theories out there, including perhaps getting some money repatriated and this is an effective strategy at doing that. But of course, I think there is, indeed a fear of dual national interference, foreign influence, [inaudible – 59:48] we hear about it in the press and I think that this is probably the worst example of how things are playing out domestically in Iran and it’s very unfortunate and sends horrible signals, ultimately. And I think it’s – it can tie to Patricia’s question on Brexit, and the fact that we are still here and Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe is still there is a reflection of the Brexit effect and the British Government ultimately, is distracted and focused more on its relationships with the Gulf countries, the Arab Gulf countries. They are a priority economically and there is money to be made in the Gulf. There is investment to be made and, you know, that’s the area of focus. But Iran will come back into the orbit, in terms of strategic issues and it will be important to focus on Iran and to maintain the relationship. So, I wouldn’t completely write the UK off just yet.
Finally, regarding my thoughts on future elections, perhaps I’m being overtly pessimistic, but in looking at the different trends in Iranian politics, they vacillate, like in most countries. This is a managed system. It is not a purely free for all every time there is an election and I think their system will be managed. It is already – Parliament is already very Conservative. Chances are, it will continue to be Conservative going forward. Institutional unity could be good for the regime going forward, but also, at the same time, it’s important to note that reformists and Rouhani were very much implicated and attacked in the protests. They are managing the administrative arm of the Islamic Republic today, in Parliament, to a certain degree, at the Presidential level, municipal and local councils throughout the country. So, they are just as – they’re also in trouble with the Iranian electorate. So, we could be at another 2005 moment and should there be someone to emerge, we should be prepared to see that, both at the President – Parliamentary level and the Presidential level.
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
Thank you very much, Sanam. I’d like to wrap up, thank the audi – I’d like to thank you for coming and I’d like you to join me in thanking the participants [applause]. We really appreciate it.
