Dr Heather Williams
Great, if everyone could take their seats, I think we’re ready to get started. For anyone I don’t know, my name’s Heather Williams. I’m a Lecturer at King’s College London, and I’m one of the Presidents of Women in International Security UK, along with Sophia Besch, and her colleague, Perla Bronzi. And WIIS UK is just absolutely delighted to partner with Chatham House today for a very timely and important event about changing geopolitics in Europe, and changing nature of institutions, I’ll get to the ‘B’ word eventually, as you can guess. But also, questions about the relationship with the United States. And I think we’re just going to jump right into things, we have a wonderful set of speakers today, and we’re going to start with Emily Thornberry, who is the Shadow Foreign Secretary, excuse me, then going to Sophia Besch, who’s a Research Fellow at the Centre for European Reform, and we’ll end with Xenia Wickett, who is the Head of the US and Americas Programme here at Chatham House. Each speaker will speak for about five to seven minutes and we’ll start off with – I’ll start off asking them a few questions and then, kind of, just see how it evolves and we’ll have time for Q&A at the end. So, Emily, starting with you, and the first question we had was, following Brexit, what does Britain’s defence and security policy look like and how do you think that this will change?
Emily Thornberry MP
And I thank you very much and, obviously, it’s an issue that we’re all wrestling with at this moment. I mean, who would have thought, you know, before this event, when this event was arranged, which I think was back in December, that we would be here today, you know, faced with such a stark demonstration, in recent weeks, of not just of the evolving security threats that we face as a country, but also, the crucial importance of European and other alliances, in dealing with those threats.
So, on the question that I’ve been asked to talk about in these opening remarks, which is about how Britain’s defence and security policy will change in the light of Brexit, I think that recent events have reinforced one clear point, which is that we have to ensure that our co-operation with the EU on defence and security policy changes, frankly, as little as possible and, hopefully, not at all, despite Brexit. Because on all the major challenges that we face, both now and into the future, from challenging Russian aggression, tackling cyber attacks and other hybrid warfare, to preventing a return to global neglect, and when it comes to climate change or to the new nuclear global arms race, we desperately need more co-operation, not less co-operation.
And there’s something else that we need, I think, which Brexit puts into sharp relief, I think that, and all of us here will agree on this, that there is a need for countries like ours to, at least, to attempt to show some global leadership, which I don’t think that we are and, let’s be clear, the world just can’t go on simply, you know, stumbling from one crisis to another, without any particular plan on how to get up again.
If we look at the situation that we face today, we’ve got two devastating, seemingly, intractable wars, you know, we’ve got the mass humanitarian crisis in Syria and in Yemen, and there’s no clear plan on how to bring them to a halt, and the only thing that we can do is to hope that DRC doesn’t end up the same way as well. And on the Korean Peninsula, there’s the nightmarish scenario, that we’ve faced in the last year, of a hostile regime developing nuclear weapons and an unpredictable administration in the United States, pondering, really seriously seeming to ponder the possibility of a pre-emptive military strike. And even before the crisis is resolved, we see the Trump administration spoiling to plunge us back into exactly the same scenario that we faced, you know, with Iran, so that we’ve got the crisis happening with North Korea and seeming to unpick what we’ve achieved, in relation to Iran.
And across the world, from getting to grips with the refugee crisis, we see, every year, hundreds of thousands of people being displaced from their homes by conflict and persecution, as we’ve seen, particularly, in my mind, South Sudan, and faced with an ever-worsening and even more widespread crisis. I was thinking, about ten years ago, to a, kind of, similar meltdown, it wasn’t about defence and it wasn’t about security, but it was the global financial situation. You know, ten years ago when that crisis struck, the world didn’t just shrug its shoulders and say that “Well, there’s nothing that we can do. The banks are going to have to fail, tens of millions are going to lose their homes and their jobs and their pensions, you know, countries are just going to have to go bankrupt.” No, I mean, there was a clear understanding then, that the world, as a whole, had to collectively face this crisis. And there was a need for a global plan and a need for global leadership, both of which I think that we can proudly say were actually offered by the UK, you know, were offered by Gordon Brown. And the leadership that we showed at that time shows that the world can dig itself out of holes, you know, when it finds itself in those sorts of things.
And I think that it shouldn’t be any different today, when it comes to the resolution of conflict, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, action on climate change, the refugee crisis, and all the other challenges that we face. But it does beg the all important question, and I mean this literally, where on earth are we going to find the leadership that’s required to make this happen? With America under Trump retreating into isolationism and confirming every worst fear of trade wars and unilateral aggression, with Russia under Putin retreating into – seeming to retreat back into being some, sort of, rogue state, whether it’s here with the attack in Salisbury or they’re aiding and abetting the war crimes in Syria, and with Britain and the rest of Europe seemingly more obsessed with negotiating its own divorce than offering marriage guidance to anybody else.
So – and I think, perhaps, worst, and saddest of all, I look at the United Nations, the very institution whose job it is really, to be an expression of global will, it is there to give some form of leadership. You know, it was an institution that my father very proudly served in for many years, but today, I think is not so much leading from the front in resolving these issues but is fighting a rear-guard action for its own survival and its own relevance. Not just in the face of relentless attempts by the Trump administration to undermine its authority and attack its funding, but also, let’s be honest, in the powerlessness it has experienced in tackling many of the issues that I’ve raised, let alone those that I’ve not discussed, you know, like the entrenchment of inertia in Israel and Palestine, the inability to be able to find a solution in relation to Afghanistan and Libya, Jihadism and the ungoverned spaces that have been created recently, that Jeremy Corbyn spoke about here, during the general election, and, you know, all of these, if it sounds like a Council of despair, yeah, and maybe it is and maybe we need to start with an admission that the world order is failing. But we simply can’t carry on like this. We can’t carry on pretending that things will turn around and we have to make a choice. We have to choose that we will take another course.
So, it begins with an awareness of where we are, and it brings me back to the question that I started with, how will Britain’s defence and security policy change as a result of Brexit? I can only offer my suggestion of how it should, and I believe that it should be like this. We should not have abandoned that vital co-operation that we have with our European allies, but we should also use this transition as an opportunity, an opportunity to take a leading role in the world, to argue for solutions to our defence and security problems, not just responses to them. An opportunity to be a leading voice in the United Nations and which we are a member of the Security Council. We should demand multilateral action. We should defend international treaties and laws and not just watch them being abused and ignored. And if we can do those things, and more, there is an opportunity, just like the one that we seized a decade ago, in response to the financial crisis, where we filled a gap in global leadership. And we shouldn’t be afraid to play a role in this, because there is a – this is the time when the world, in a way, needs it most.
Dr Heather Williams
Great, thank you. That’s a really great way to kick as off, and I know you say that we’re a Council of despair, but I actually heard a lot of inspiration and vision in there. So, Sophia, I’m going to turn over to you to carry us on with that and to offer a bit of the EU European perspective on this. So, you know, in amidst these changes in the UK and in the US, do you think that the EU is going to start seeking more strategic autonomy and how can the EU and the UK work together on defence issues? Thanks.
Sophia Besch
Can I just start out with saying that it’s such a pleasure and such an honour to be on the panel with these amazing women, so thank you so much for the invitation to Chatham House. Right, so, in this triangle of UK/US/EU, I want to talk a bit about the credibility of the EU as a defence actor in the context of the ambition of strategic autonomy and then, how the defence relationship between the UK and the EU might develop after Brexit. So, first of all, what is strategic autonomy? I think, in simplest terms, and it never stays simple, but for our purposes here, the ability of the EU to defend itself without the help of the United States. A little bit of context, the EU Global Strategy of 2016 has, for the first time, set out strategic autonomy as an objective for the EU.
The EU Global Strategy came out in June 2016, and the drafting process took about two years. So, this was on the mind of European leaders before Brexit and Trump but, of course, these three events have propelled this forward and have led to a bit of a more controversial discussion. Uncertainty over the commitment of the Trump administration to European security has turned this into, actually, quite a hotly contested ambition. Because, on the one hand, you have those that say that you the EU needs to take defence into its own hands, on the other hand, you have those that say that any steps that the EU takes in this direction, will further repel the United States. And that’s linked to this argument that EU strategic autonomy might undermine NATO and thus, weakens the organisation that binds the United States to Europe.
At the Munich Security Conference in January of this year, where some of you may have been, you could really see these two sides of the debate play out and with NATO Secretary-General Stoltenberg saying that “We are dependent on North America and the reality is that the EU cannot protect Europe by itself.” So, I think that is the real question that we should ask, which is, how realistic is it that the EU can achieve strategic autonomy and what needs to happen for that? And, in this context, I want to talk a bit about the defence initiatives that the EU has launched, over the last two years, and I’m going to try to limit the acronyms, but PESCO might come up.
So, I think, for me, there is an operational aspect to this question. There is an industrial aspect and a political aspect. In operational terms, how has the EU defined strategic autonomy? They did formulate the headline goal, does anyone remember this? The headline goal of 2003, which was a force objective of 50,000 to 60,000 troops deploying within 60 days and for up to 12 months. They never quite did get there. They did create the EU battle groups, which are these rotating troop contingents, and they’re, in theory, ready to deploy at ten days’ notice, but they have never been deployed. Why? I think, one, because there’s still a lack of shared vision of how to use EU forces, which is linked to different national military strategies and very different threat assessments. There’s also an unattractive system of cost distribution, which places, sort of, the brand of the operations’ financial burden on the deploying country.
So, what is the EU doing now to change that? This is where PESCO comes in. Will PESCO make it easier for Europeans to launch military operations and missions together? Quickly, what is PESCO? Permanent Structured Co-operation, it’s the idea of, or it used to be, the idea of an avant-garde of high performing EU countries working together to achieve a higher level of ambition when it comes to defence. What it has come to be now is, almost all European countries signing a document saying that, eventually, they will actually fulfil all of these ambitious obligations, just not now, quite yet. So, what are they promising is that through these common commitments, through increased co-operation and jointly developed capabilities, in particular, joint training centres, this is going to make it easier for EU militaries to deploy together. PESCO members also promised that they will reform the financial contribution system. But this doesn’t get us over the fact that European countries still have very different strategic and military cultures. They still lack a shared view of the threat environment and the EU Global Strategy doesn’t change that and, in fact, it does really show where there are huge gaps between member states. So, there’s no guarantee that PESCO member states will actually commit forces in a crisis. Which is also why, and I’m not going to get into this now, but, perhaps, in the question and answer section we can, France is actually hatching against PESCO by developing the European Intervention Initiative outside the bureaucracy of the EU structures, possibly together with the UK, to actually achieve a troop contingent that does deploy.
So, fairly pessimistic on the operational side of this question. There’s the industrial dimension of strategic autonomy, and this requirement of having a European defence industry that can produce everything that the EU requires to deploy your operations. Notably, it’s strategic enablers, like air-to-air refuelling and intelligence and command and control and strategic recognisance. And this is, I think, where some of the most interesting work in the EU is taking place right now. For now, the EU’s defence industry is filled with fragmentation and duplication and protectionism. National defence budgets are spent pretty ineffectively. many member states are staying uncompetitive defence industries or buy off the shelf from the United States. The main problem, however, I think, is still the low level of defence spending in general and the low level of spending on research and development.
But now, the Commissioner’s getting involved and the Commissioner wants to spend money on strengthening the EU’s defence capabilities and the EU’s defence industry. With the European Defence Fund, the Commission wants to fund joint research and joint capability development projects. Discussions are still ongoing. We don’t know yet whether this will pan out, but I think this is one of the most promising initiatives and that could actually change the game. We are still a long way off from that; development phases are long in the defence industry and even if all member states continue on this trend of slowly increasing their defence budgets, we’re years away from industrial defence autonomy in Europe.
So, this brings me to the third dimension, which is the political dimension of strategic autonomy, and that also, actually, leads into the second question that you ask, Heather, which is about the co-operation between the UK and the EU when it comes to defence after Brexit. So, the political dimension of this question, I think, is about the ability of EU member states to decide over the deployment of their troops independently from third states. And I was in Brussels last week and we were discussing this, and someone asked, sort of, half jokingly, “Who are we trying to be autonomous from these days in the EU, is it the US or is it the UK?” And they do have a point, when you look at the negotiations over defence co-operation that are currently starting. On the one hand, something you hear a lot is that defence really is the one positive sum game when it comes to Brexit, because both sides, so clearly, benefit from co-operation, and that’s what you’ve laid out as well.
But, on the other hand, there are quite a few difficulties that actually will come up, over the next few months. One, there is this question of decision-making autonomy, so the UK has made clear that as a precondition for it to continue to contribute troops to the EU’s missions and operations, after Brexit, it will want to be involved in the detailed operational planning and mandate development of the EU’s missions and operations. But, so far, that’s really not something that third states get to do, and the EU has been pretty clear that there’s no participation in the decision-making. There is no participation in the decision shaping for third countries. There’s no veto, there’s no vote, and that affects the leadership role that the EU – that the UK is currently taking, in many of these operations, for example, in Atalanta, with the headquarters in Northwood, it might also have effects on the DSACEUR role, in the Berlin Plus operations.
And then, secondly, and finally, there’s the question of defence industrial co-operation after Brexit. The UK Government does want to participate in the EU Defence Fund, both in the research programme and in the capability development programme, because valid concern here is that UK defence firms might be excluded from, sort of, big ticket capability development projects that the EU might want to pursue in the future, it’s a hypothetical scenario, but we might actually get there. And this negotiation really does get quite a bit more challenging, because there’s an overlap here between the defence relationship and the economic relationship. This is where the single market becomes relevant. This is where, actually, the ECJ and Arbitration Court becomes relevant for defence industrial co-operation. So I think, from me, finally, there are two tensions that come out of this. On the one hand, there’s the worry for the UK and the US that European autonomy ambitions could turn into European protectionism, which shuts out third countries that want to contribute. And the other tension is, how realistic is it that the EU can even aspire to reach strategic autonomy without the UK? I think I’ll stop here, thanks.
Dr Heather Williams
Wow, great. Really great questions. So, we’re years away, or the EU is years away, from defence autonomy. There’s a bit of a leadership vacuum, so the scene is set for America to just walk right in and fill that role. So, we’ll hop across the Atlantic and turn over to you, Xenia, so we’re now into – well into Trump’s, sort of, passive first year, into the second year. So, if you could speak to what has been the effect of Trump’s Presidency, so far on US/UK and US/EU relations, please.
Xenia Wickett
Sure, thank you and thank you for inviting me to join you all today. The past year has been a, I think, a very rude awakening for the UK, but really, it shouldn’t have been. If you – it would be extraordinarily easy for me to sit here and presume that there had been a major change in US/UK relations over the last year, so, what, year – what, 16 months or thereabouts. But I would argue that that actually isn’t the case. That actually, all that’s really changed is that the reality is far more stark for the UK than it was during the Obama administration. All Presidents, all leaders, in fact, are focused on their country’s interests, it’s just that President Trump has focused on his country’s American interests far more transactionally and explicitly than his predecessors have. Now, I can make an argument, also, that this is actually a good thing for the UK, ‘cause actually, it makes British choices far clearer than they might otherwise be.
But let me take a step back for a moment and look at this, you know, why is it that America cares about the UK? And, essentially, there are three reasons. America cares about the UK because the UK has been, historically, its entree into Europe, into the European Union. The US cares about – the second leg of the stool, if you will, is the assets that the UK brings to the table: defence, security, intelligence, in particular. And then the third reason is Britain, as a partner in international engagement, having somebody by your side. Well, let’s look at where these three, stand today.
It would probably not be smart today, and I think we can probably all agree upon this, if nothing else, that actually, the US, using the UK as an entree into the European Union, is probably not a smart idea today, so that leg has gone. The second leg, you know, Britain’s ability to bring force to bear, intelligence, military, etc., I would say that’s pretty unstable at the moment. Intel’s still very good, actually, but on the military side, the decreases in defence spending, the challenges that we have here in the UK in this space has meant that it’s a less reliable partner. And then, the third element, this partnership. Well, the fact remains that actually, recently, America has looked to others, you know, who was it? It was, the US was partnering with France in Mali. Now, we can debate whether it was France or the UK that pushed the agenda on Libya, but, you know, certainly, it was pushed by both and many would argue that actually, France took the lead in that, in that case. If the US is thinking about what to do with Russia, if the US is thinking about what to do on economic issues, they do not come to the UK, they look to Germany.
And so, if you look at these, kind of, three reasons that US really looks to the United Kingdom, I would argue that actually, that’s a pretty rocky stool right at the moment. And so, you know, the bottom line, if you will, is, you know, I get asked a lot, is the, you know, is the US/UK relationship still special? And, of course, the answer is yes, it is, whatever that might mean, yes, it is special. But I would argue that actually, the US now has special relationships with quite a few others in Europe.
Let’s look at it from the other side, if you look at it from the British side, why does the British need the United States? And I would argue after Brexit, Britain needs America, or at least appears to need America, talks about needing America, far more than it has historically. And that means that you have an increasingly unbalanced relationship, an increasingly unbalanced relationship is really not a good thing, particularly, if you’re getting a more transactional relationship, and I’ll take you back to my first comment, you know, I think Trump sees things far more transactionally.
So, you know, this is – yes, it’s special, but this is not a comfortable place to be, which is why I started with the idea that, you know, it’s been a rude awakening. I can talk about details. I don’t really have enough time to talk about details, but we can talk about what does this really mean in security and intelligence terms? What does this really mean in trade terms? And we can talk about it in the Q&A, but I think, across the board, I would say you’ve actually seen very little change in the bilateral relationship since Trump and that is because Trump hasn’t been harbouring of too many new things, a lot of this was happening during the Obama administration. But we see it in a different, kind of, rhetorical bubble, if you will.
I will just put, as a footnote, here, of course, you know, there’s been a lot of attention on Trump’s tweeting of the Britain First videos, you know, the, kind of, war of words between Trump and Sadiq Khan, and I would put those all into a cat – that is white noise, you know, don’t – and we can talk about this, but this is not the reality. This is noise and we need to make sure we don’t get too caught up in noise.
Let me say a few words now about the US/EU relationship. The US/EU relationship has been driven by the same motivation that is motivating a lot of – that is driving a lot of Trump’s foreign policy. Essentially, he’s driven – with exceptions, he’s driven by two things. He’s driven by appealing to his base and he’s driven by the idea that America has been disadvantaged in negotiations in deals in engagement, particularly in multilateral fora. What does that actually mean? Again, the relationship is more transactional, explicitly transactional, than it has been in previous Presidents. What does it mean in security terms? You know, on the one hand, Trump has made very explicit his questioning of the value of NATO. He has made very explicit the idea that unless other countries come to the table and spend more, why should America defend them? And this includes within NATO member states. And on the other hand, though, you’ve still got the fact that, actually, under the Trump administration, the spending for the European Reassurance Initiative has gone up by 40%. So – you know, and he’s got his Defence Secretary and his Vice President coming to Europe and standing in European capital saying this is really – “Our alliances are really, really important.”
So, again, I would argue that actually, things haven’t changed a vast amount, except that it’s become more transactional, there is an expectation. On trade, you know, TTIP is off the books for the foreseeable future. If you look at other foreign policy, things are getting a little bit uncomfortable here in Europe and I think that’s going to increase again. America’s looking at this from an interest first perspective. Trump’s view on Iran and the JCPoA is not where Europe is, on the environment is not where Europe is, on, arguably, North Korea, is not necessarily where Europe is.
What does all this mean in the bottom line? And here’s where I’ll conclude. The UK should not put a lot of weight in the idea of a special relationship. That isn’t going to count for terribly much in this administration. Transatlantically, more broadly, the US/UK/US/Europe, it’s going to be a really rocky period because, from the American perspective, it’s really explicitly about interests rather than about friends, and we have relied a lot on the idea that we’ve been friends, and I think that is valued a lot less.
The US is expecting more from its allies, from its partners, and this is not just in Europe, but this is in Asia. I think we’re going to have real challenges on some bilateral issues, you know, Iran is going to be the first one to hit, I think, but environment, trade and others. And I think, just to put a dampener on the conversation, I think things are going to get worse, over the next six months to a year, with the arrival of Pompeo as Secretary of State, he’s almost certainly going to be approved, and with Bolton at the NSC, this is going to be really quite painful. But, and here’s my glimmer of hope, to close up, the fundamentals in the transatlantic relationship remain strong, they really do. It is going to be rocky and it is going to be painful, but whether it’s four years or eight years from now, the fundamentals do actually remain strong, because we actually do have many common interests.
Dr Heather Williams
Thank you for the glimmer of hope, Xenia, I was really worried for a second there. While you’re all thinking of your questions, I’m actually going to, if I can, steal the Chair’s prerogative, and I wanted to give you an opportunity to respond to some of the things that Xenia said just about the changing nature of the special relationship and the difficult time ahead, if you want to just take a minute or two, if you had any immediate reflections on that?
Emily Thornberry MP
Yeah, no, I thought what you were saying was really interesting and I’m going to the states the week after next, so I’m really looking forward to it. I think it’s going to be fascinating. And I think one of the things that, I mean, I want to say, as representative of the opposition here, is we’re friends of America. We share the same values, the same history, we have many interests in common, you’re absolutely right on that. And it will survive this President and, as far as we’re concerned, you know, Americans of good will, will remember who their friends were and those who stood up to Trump and those who criticised and we should not be pulling our punches, that’s my view.
And I think what you say about the transactional arrangement is absolutely right, but I think that something that we need to, kind of, put into the debate is also, the way in which our – the way in which we’ve been changing our capability, in terms of making our own armaments and how much we’ve been buying from abroad and how much we’ve been buying off the shelf from the States. Because if we’re talking about transactional arrangement, you know, yeah, we spend, you know, we spend 2%, obviously we’ve been bundling all sorts of things into that 2% that were never in the 2% before but, equally, we are stripping out our own ability to be able to build our own, you know, fighter planes and buying them straight from the States instead, because it’s cheaper, because they, you know, they’re building loads. And then, we also buy it with a contract, so that, you know, the planes come over here and their, you know, and their innards are in a black box that we can’t open, and the company has to come over and fix it if it breaks and so, we’re losing our capability as well. So, I think that’s, kind of, part of it too. I think, you know, I think that it’s, sort of, almost a, sort of, increased dependence on the United States and an inability to be able to stand on our own and we need to build helicopters, the nuclear submarines, but, you know, exactly how much of it we have in terms of capability is being eroded and we need to be mindful of that.
Dr Heather Williams
Great, thanks. I’m going to turn it over to you all. I have a few requests, if you’re asking a question, please start off, introduce yourself, where you’re from. Please try to keep your question brief. I have a sneaking suspicion there is going to be a lot of questions. Make sure you’re asking a question and not making a statement. And this one is the most important, please try to be on topic. If you go off topic, I’ll probably cut you off. I’m playing the American card there, just so you know. And so I’m going to – whoa, okay, I’m getting all the hands at once. Ma’am, I saw you first, if you’d like. If you’d wait for the microphone. Sorry, it’s coming along.
Jane Sharp
Thank you. My name’s Jane Sharp and I’m a member here and I’ve spent time in war studies, too. In the 90s, I edited a volume called About Turn, Forward March with Europe and it was as a, sort of, Defence Advisor to the IPPR, which some of you may remember, it still exists, so you can tell how much notice people take of me. But listening to you talking about the defence equation, isn’t – I would like to ask all of you, is it feasible that you could have a situation, over the next four years, through the Trump administration, where you get the European nations in NATO, who are also EU nations, apart from us, just to speak to the United States with one voice? It seems to me that’s where we’ve never achieved that and given the chaos in Washington, that seems to me that would be a real advantage, thank you.
Dr Heather Williams
Great, so can Europe speak to the US as one voice? Sophia, can I start with you on this one?
Sophia Besch
I mean, I get the sense that it’s a bit of a rhetorical question, isn’t it? Yes, I think what this really brings out is that whenever we talk about defence, I think we need to remember that defence is the last possible step, right? It’s the tool for common foreign policy. If we have a common foreign policy stance on Europe, then we can really think about having a common defence policy. And as long as we cannot agree on a common threat perceptive, as long as we cannot agree, even on the relationship to Russia, the EU Global Strategy barely talks about Russia because, over two years of drafting, EU member states could not really agree whether Russia was a threat or a partner or an opportunity. And as long as we can’t do that then, I think we’re far from the aspiration of talking with one voice.
Xenia Wickett
I utterly agree with Sophia. I think it is an aspiration. It’s an aspiration that I don’t think is going to be fulfilled and if I can – I’m just going to be controversial and just, you know, warm things up a little bit here. I think in part it can’t be fulfilled, for the reasons that, Emily, you raise, as long as we, as states, sit here and say, “We need to keep our own industrial complexes alive and we’re not willing to share capabilities, we’re not willing to share production facilities,” we put all sorts of caveats on them. And I’m not necessarily actually suggesting that Britain should be buying everything that it’s buying from the United States, but as long as we put that, kind of, sovereign cloak on top of us as being paramount and not willing to rely on other people, we will always be speaking in our own voice, as opposed to with a joint voice. Until we actually find that all of these things we are required to work with one another, ‘cause we cannot do it alone, then we’ll start speaking with one voice, whether it’s to the United States or to Russia, and I think that would be a wonderful place to be. I just – I don’t see it.
I think the – I think let’s turn it on its head for a moment, and I have something else to say. But turn it on its head for a moment and, I mean, I think we should also need to be mindful, at the moment, that America doesn’t speak with one voice. You know, and I think that, you know, that’s what’s so interesting about what’s going on, you know, we have a loud voice, particularly at 4 o’clock in the morning on Twitter, you know? Coming out with all sorts of things and then that same voice seemingly saying something else, depending on who they’re talking to and who you spoke to last. But then there is a, you know, a circle of people around whom some approved, some non-approved, sometimes approved one day, sometimes approved another day, saying, you know, many different things and so actually, working out what it is that United States are saying is something.
I don’t have a problem with sovereignty, I think it’s, kind of, quite a good thing, that we need to be able to – and I think actually, the British people would want to have a bit of sovereignty here and would be horrified if they realised that we were losing all the capabilities that we are, and we are and nobody’s really debating it, and I think we need to have more of a debate about it. And, you know, we were just hearing about the suggestion that when we leave the European Union, if there’s a European force, you know, going off somewhere, that Britain must provide the money, provide the troops, provide the kit, but not argue about it and not be involved in any decision-making. I’m not interested in that. I don’t see why we should be.
Dr Heather Williams
Great, so the next question is gentleman just right there.
Gabriel
Hi, I’m Gabriel, I’m a history student. They say it’s an urban myth that a chicken can survive for ten seconds, a minute, three days, without a head, how long do you think the West can survive headless? And if there’s a second term for Trump, is that going to be fatal to NATO and Western institutions? And, also, if that does happen, is there a new head the chicken could find in France or in the UK?
Dr Heather Williams
Xenia, I think the chicken head question is for you. I will start with you.
Xenia Wickett
There’s no political – so, I think that – I always get actually, quite worried when people start saying the US/UK, or even the US/European relationship will survive ‘cause we have common values, ‘cause I do. I feel like there’s an assumption there that we’re making and I just wonder whether that is quite as true today as it was 20 years ago. ‘Cause I see an awful lot of areas where we actually don’t, we’re – it’s not that we don’t have a common values, but we are dividing on those things. I think that, and this is a very personal view for a second, quite apart from Trump, quite apart from the populist, you know, risings here in Europe as well, I think the – our old image of what the West was and has been for the last 60 years really, or 70 years, really needs to be rethought.
You know, does the West include Japan, Australia, or does it not include Japan, Australia and some other countries? You know, I have heard far too much people say, “We want to include other people in the, kind of, these universal values and the West, but, by the way, we’re not willing to make any compromises about what those universal values are, they just have to sign onto ours that we’ve” – you know, and so – and I think ours are actually changing and this is, you know, fairly obvious that they’re changing, because you’re seeing huge political changes take place across the US and Europe. So, I agree, absolutely, with Emily, that we need leadership. I do question where that leadership is coming from, in the public sector, I certainly – I look to the private sector, I look to NGOs, and I see a lot more leadership there. But I think the old image of the West, we really need to rethink that and I think, you know, we’re sitting up here, we’re stuck in the grooves and I think that time is history.
Dr Heather Williams
Emily, did you want to respond to the question?
Emily Thornberry MP
No, I just think that’s really interesting, no, when you talk.
Dr Heather Williams
Sophia, did you want to…?
Emily Thornberry MP
I mean, okay, so, I mean, I think the – I mean, I get what you’re saying about, you know, what is the future of NATO? I mean, I have to say that one of my experiences, when speaking to countries across Europe about their defence needs, it is so interesting, obviously, which part of Europe people come from, and it’s self-evident. And, you know, you talk to people in northern Europe and they talk about Russia, but you talk to people from southern Europe then, obviously, they don’t talk about Russia, but they talk about, you know, other things, they talk about, you know, what’s going on in Syria and what’s happening in North Africa. And so, people do, you know, they look in different directions, there are different priorities. And those in Northern Europe, who’ve been talking about Russia, you know, and who feel as though, you know, that, in a defence capacity, that we need to have as being – it’s not being taken sufficiently seriously because of the preoccupation with what’s going on in the Middle East and the way in which it also expresses itself with, you know, with attacks in the cities throughout Europe. People, kind of – it’s as if we turned our eyes to the South and now we’re turning our eyes back again, you know, to Russia. And, within that, I think there’s a contradiction and I think that – you know, I think that needs to be, kind of, that needs to be part of the equation, you know, and, sort of, if we’re turning our – if we’ve got a new relationship, you know, a colder relationship, a worse relationship with Europe, what will be, what will the new threats be? In the 21st Century, what will the new threats be? Will NATO be capable of responding to that? You know, what does Article 5 really mean in those circumstances? You know, there are a whole load of other questions and we don’t even have – we haven’t – you know, there’s a debate going on, but we – but there’s no – you know, I don’t think there’s any particular agreement as to where any of that is taking us, let alone, you know, how it will respond to – how it will survive two terms of Trump, I hear you.
Dr Heather Williams
Sophia.
Sophia Besch
Yes, I’ve been trying to find an animal metaphor, which is the animal that grows? A worm grows a new tail when you cut it off. I think we have to grow a new head, is what I’m saying. And for just two points, for the record, one on NATO, I did mention that there is a bit of conflict, potential tension, in the debate over European strategic autonomy in NATO. I want to make very clear that actually, the EU and NATO have found a different relationship than the one that they used to have. They work quite well together. Partly, that’s related to the personnel that’s at the head of both the EU and NATO now, Mogherini and Stoltenberg get along very well, partly that’s related to a changed security structure. That does, sort of, slightly take away from the function that the UK used to fulfil as a, sort of, bridge between the two organisations, but there is a question, anyway, of how much you can be a bridge, if you’re only a part of one of the two. So that’s point one, for the record. Point two, for the record, on this plugging into EU missions and operations, and whether – and what, kind of, obligations and what, kind of, benefits the UK might have.
There is a bit of a question here, a difficulty for the European Union, which is that uncommon defence and foreign policy, member states have a lot of benefits and very few obligations and requirements, just because it is, sort of, the last bastion of sovereignty in the EU, still. And so, if there are very few requirements from member states and the many benefits, then, what can you ask of third countries, if you want to give them the benefits, right? So, I do think that there is an opportunity, there’s an opening here for the EU to perform the way that it interacts with other third countries, not just the UK, but also, Norway, Canada, the United States and others. If it is done well, strategically and tactically well on the UK side, if there is some demonstration of political goodwill on the UK side. Because, of course, it’s difficult for the EU to say, “Right, because of Brexit, we’re going to change the way we go about things,” but in the medium to long-term, there is an opportunity there to find a way to plug in third states into missions and operations, without them having to only give and not receive anything, for the record.
Dr Heather Williams
For the record, thank you. I’m going to start taking questions in batches of three, and the next one is the woman in the red in the middle there, please.
Abigail Watson
Thank you. Abigail Watson, the Remote Warfare Programme. I just wonder how much the UK’s preoccupation with international relationships, rather than with a coherent strategy, is undermining its ability to ever lead on an operation. You mentioned the France in Mali case and I think that’s a perfect example of where France was willing to go in, even if the US or any of its other nations weren’t willing to join. And it doesn’t seem like recently, the UK has had a situation where it would have gone in anyway, and so then, you find yourself in a situation where I’ve had conversations with senior people, who spoke about the fact that they knew that arming the Kurds was a bad idea, but they were always going to do it because they were maintaining their relationship with the US. And so, in that sense, you’re never going to be able to use influence at critical junctions, because you’re so focused on the relationship, rather than a coherent strategy. I wonder how you mitigate that risk.
Dr Heather Williams
Thank you, the next one was at the front row here.
John Wilson
And John Wilson, a Journalist, member of this and other military think tanks. On his recent appointment, Mr John Bolton, President Trump’s Advisor, quoted the old adage, “If you want peace, make ready for war.” How much do you think this country should spend on its defence? And how can it increase its power to achieve the aims and aspirations, which Miss Thornberry mentioned in her talk?
Dr Heather Williams
Thanks. Are there any others on this side of the room? I don’t want to neglect this side of the room. No, then the next was in the front. I already have you on the list, thank you. The next is the front row here, please.
Ulrike Franke
Thank you. Ulrike Franke, I’m a Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. I wanted to ask you about this idea of a common European defence industry, because we keep talking about this and every pundit mentions it and Government mentions it and even the defence industry, themselves, is usually, you know, quite in favour. Just talking to the Head of the German Defence Industry Association and they said, “Oh, that would be great.” But somehow, it’s not coming at all and everything I see is countries working against it. I mean, Poland, basically, joined PESCO to make sure that if there are PESCO projects, they would either go to Poland or not be done. And Germany, that, allegedly, always puts the EU first, and when you look at the 17 PESCO projects, Germany, interestingly, is not involved in those where it actually has an industrial know-how. So, my question is, in an ideal world, if you could decide, how do we get to this common European defence industry? Or is that even something that maybe we should abandon for now, because we just keep talking about it and it’s not coming along?
Dr Heather Williams
Great, I’m going to turn back to the speakers and then we’ll come back and I have a gentleman here and then there were two others over there. So, Emily, I think all three of those were, somewhat, directed to you.
Emily Thornberry MP
Okay, so I think, on the European common defence industry, I think part of the problem, obviously, is that we have, you know, the private sector playing off one country against another. I mean, that’s the truth, and not enough solidarity between the countries. And so, you know, when you get a wing made here and a something else made there and then there’s a, you know, argument about who’s going to do the wheels and, you know, and they’ll be different bits from different countries and that’s, kind of, that’s how there’s this, sort of, divide and rule going on. And that’s why it ends up being so, you know, we’ve had so many unfortunate examples of it not exactly being the most efficient way of doing things, which is a problem. So yeah, I mean, I appreciate that it’s a political problem and not one that I have a ready answer to.
The, “If we want peace, make ready for war,” and how much should we spend? The first question is, and I have been saying this for some time, what are the threats to us in the 21st Century? So, what is it – what are the threats? You know, are the tanks going to roll over the hills or is our infrastructure going to be undermined by a cyber attack? You know, what is more likely to happen? And in what way ought we be defending ourselves? What should be our priorities? Because, in our preoccupations, in some ways, about some of the older forms of defence, we have, I think, taken our eye off.
I said two years ago at RUSI, I think, perhaps, you were there, I said two years ago at RUSI that the 21st Century threats to Britain were propaganda, were interference in the elections, and were cyber attacks. And I was told that I was paranoid, I was deluded, that I was trying to distract people from the importance of renewing the nuclear weapon, duh, duh, duh, duh, duh. You know, but actually, you know, we do need to have a bit of vision and we do need to look at what are the threats that are coming down the road and how do we defend ourselves in those circumstances? And how are our current structures, to what extent, as I was hinting in my question in relation to NATO, you know, how does NATO defend itself? You know, how do the NATO states defend themselves against the 21st Century threats now? How do we do it collectively? What are we doing now? You know, in what way are we in a proper state of readiness? And are we just waiting until something dreadful happens?
John Wilson
But you give Russian weapons that we have no defence against.
Emily Thornberry MP
Well, I’m sure there’s always a…
John Wilson
[Inaudible – 49:45].
Dr Heather Williams
If you can let her – if you would just let her answer.
Emily Thornberry MP
Yeah, yeah, yeah, I mean, I’m sure there’s always a Russian weapon that we have no defence against. I’m sure that, you know, since the Cold War there’s always been a Russian weapon that we have no defence against and, you know, we keep hearing about this. And, obviously, you know, I mean, if we go back to conventional weapons, clearly, there is a huge concern about the idea of the Russians renewing, particularly, their nuclear capability, and particularly this idea of having little nuclear weapons that they can use on the battlefield and that they can, somehow or other, you know, use nuclear weapons and that we can survive and that there won’t be an escalation and, clearly, that is a huge concern. And, as I said at my beginning, you know, one of the things that we, you know, we are currently forgetting, I think, we’re not given sufficient focus on climate change, and we are not. We are definitely taking our eye off the ball, in terms of nuclear proliferation and what it means and how we’re undermining the safety of the planet, in my view. You know, and we seem to have, I think – you know, Trump and, you know, and the North Korean leader, sort of, you know, boasting about how big their nuclear buttons are and then, you know, Putin saying, kind of, you know, “Let me get into the sandpit too,” you know, with his new video showing how wonderful his nuclear weapons are as well. We have all of this going on and there doesn’t seem to be any brakes being put on these guys, and I think that it clearly undermines the security of the world.
And so, I mean, I think that’s, kind of, a – I’m not avoiding the question of should it be 2% or 2.8%? But I, kind of, feel as though those are the discussions we ought to be having and it shouldn’t be boiled down to numbers. It should be – we should be looking, first and foremost, at what are the threats that we’re facing right now? And let’s be honest about it and let’s try and find a solution to it and then we can work out. Once we’ve worked that out then we can, you know, then we – you know, let’s work out the strategy first and let’s not just get hung up on, you know, the, kind of, the political baubles. And when we were saying about what – how do we have influence?
I think that we are a country that shouldn’t act unilaterally. I don’t think that we should be a country that says, “We’ll go in anyway.” I mean, leaving aside the fact that it’s not legal, I think that it’s not the way that Britain should act. I think that, by our very nature, we should be a country that works with other countries. I mean, that’s how we get maximum impact. I think that we are internationalists, and despite my jingoism at times, and I think we are internationalists and we should be proud of that. You know, an awful lot of international law was written by British Lawyers. So was human rights laws, so was the international institutions would not be in the form that they are without the influence of Britain, and I’m proud of that, you know, and I think that we need to work with others and, in the end, that is the safest way.
Dr Heather Williams
If you don’t mind, there’s just two last questions. I want to make sure that we get them in and then we’ll turn back and everyone – because I really do want to end and get people out on time. And so, thank you for your patience, yeah, you’ve got the next question.
Robert Foster
Robert Foster, member and Electrical Engineer. In the past, I’ve worked quite a bit on European framework programmes. I’d like to ask your views, how we can ensure in future European research collaborations, how we can make sure that UK expertise actually defines the programmes, as opposed to just participate, in these crucial areas, like cyber security, where the Russians and Chinese have an enormous programmes. And, yes, we collaborate with the Americans quite effectively in there, but we need to continue to collaborate with the French and other partners in Europe. And I’m very conscious, obviously, in the last few weeks, we’ve seen British contractors being told they may not be able to compete for either the large satellite programme, the Galileo, or one of the space programmes, and yet, that would be appalling if that happens in areas where we have real European leadership and actually, should be defining, not just following, others for our longer-term security.
Dr Heather Williams
Great, thank you and then, the last question goes to you, sir.
Peter Price
Peter Price, former member of the European Parliament. The speakers have pointed out the importance of working with others and, of course, that brings us back to the agreement that we will need to make with the European Union in this field and the speakers have also pointed out the difficulties that are likely to arise in that – those negotiations. They will culminate, in late October, with a vote in Parliament promised to be a meaningful vote, somewhere around the beginning of November. At that point, too late to have any major change in whatever has been agreed, will the Labour Party ensure that Parliament’s meaningful vote includes the possibility of remaining within the European Union?
Dr Heather Williams
I’m going to come to you last, I think. So, we’ll go Sophia, then Xenia, then Emily, for a final, yeah, just, kind of, closing up remarks, please.
Sophia Besch
Those were a lot of excellent questions and I’m going to pick and choose, because we’re running out of time. I want to talk about the European defence industry. So, I think we’re at a moment in time where basically the question is, are you an optimist or are you a pessimist? Did you get your heart broken over European defence efforts in the 90s? Or are you, sort of, fresh-faced and want to try this again and really think that this time we can make it work? Because, why am I saying that? Yes, I do think it’s a question of political will and I completely agree with you, that some of the big-ticket items that are currently being planned, like the French/German fighter jet, for example, we’re not sure if that’s going to fall under PESCO. They haven’t made any signs that it will. It’s also true that Germany isn’t a part of the tank development that we – the tank project that we see in PESCO, which shows protectionism on the German side.
That being said, though, the initiatives that are currently being planned haven’t actually come into force yet, right? And the EU is trying two angles to make this work, the carrot and the stick. On the one hand, the EU once to spend money and incentivise/bribe member states to work together on capability co-operation and development. And whether that’s going to happen, we don’t know yet because this is a debate that is currently ongoing about the next multiannual financial framework for the EU. So, will the next financial framework, from 2020 on, have an EU defence budget where the EU can actually take money out and say if you are three – at least three-member states, at least three companies that work together on a capability project, we’ll finance X% of it? That might help. That could be a positive development.
And then, on the other hand, the stick, and we do have some EU defence regulations. At the moment, we have a transfer regulation and a procurement regulation. They haven’t done a whole lot, so far, because the Commission hasn’t tried to enforce them yet. Right? So, technically, if you tender for a capability project, you have to tender to all of the EU. No-one is doing that because everyone is fighting national sovereignty security concerns. But, the Commission now, for the first time, has actually initiated a process of going against those member states that are not following these regulations and this is where it gets interesting for the UK, right? Because, so far, the UK has actually been one of the most acting [inaudible – 57:45] member states, when it comes to following these regulations, when it comes to opening competition up, but…
Emily Thornberry MP
Make a rule, we’ll always stick to it.
Sophia Besch
But if there is, and I’m slightly controversial now, but if there is an economic downturn after Brexit and if there is a more protectionist sense in the UK of potentially strengthening domestic defence industries, well, how can the EU rely on the UK still following these regulations in the future? And that’s, of course, where the ECJ comes in and where this question of how can the UK guarantee regulatory alignment comes in? And then, just really quickly, on US – UK expertise defining research programmes in the future, I think that’s an excellent question and the space example that you bring up, the Galileo contracts that are managed by the European Space Agency, that’s the first time, I think, and there’s going to be many other examples, where we really see the potential fallout that Brexit can bring. So, this is a contract that is managed by the Space Agency, which is not an EU agency, but paid for, largely, by the Commission. So, this is EU money, which is why the Commission is saying – and it’s a contract that includes sensitive information, which is why the Commission is saying, “We keep the right that as soon Britain is out, any company, any British company that has bid for any of these contracts might no longer be able to actually fulfil it.” And that’s dramatic for the UK, it can be – there are things that you can do to go against this. For example, with an information sharing agreement and with finding a way of plugging into the EU’s defence industrial programmes, either in a, sort of, pay-for-play, kind of, model where the UK pays to be a part of certain programmes, or with an overall agreement, which allows there to be a third member state to the ESA or to the Defence Fund. We’re getting very techy here, but I think, yes, it’s an issue. There are ways that you can hedge against it, but it’s going to be a challenge for both sides.
Dr Heather Williams
Great, thank you. Xenia.
Xenia Wickett
I will be quick. I’m only going to answer one question, the comment that somebody, and apologies, I forget who asked the question about referring to Bolton’s, you know, “If you want to make peace, make ready for war, if you want peace, make ready for war.” And I’d just like to really make two very quick points on that. The first is actually picking up very much what Emily was saying and agreeing with her wholeheartedly, is all too often we see, in the United States, but also here in Europe, people go straight towards the military as the solution to problems. And if you ask, actually something like the last four or five American Defence Secretaries, where they think more money needs to be put, they will tell you the State Department. And so, you know, the first thing I would say, and I think that this is an error that Bolton makes when he makes a comment like that is, there were all sorts of tools in the toolbox, you know. Sophia said, you know, defence is the last one we should be coming to, we should be trying everything else and unless we strengthen the other tools, that’s not going to be the case. Most of the times those tools actually cost a lot less than those military. Which, kind of, also gets to the question on military spending about the UK, that would be my view, there are other tools.
The other thing I would say, and I’m just – I’ve got to put it out there, there is an argument, there is a possibility that the approach that Donald Trump, supported now by, to some extent, Mattis, but certainly by Bolton, certainly by Pompeo, of being really aggressive is actually going to work. I mean, it could be an effective deterrent to North Korea or to Iran or to Russia or to someone else. Now, an awful lot of us sitting here, kind of, go, “Yeah, but it risks an awful lot if it doesn’t work,” and so, I think most people will, kind of, go, “I’m not willing to take that risk.” But that is a reasonable chance that that is going to be the right strategy and that level of deterrent, which we, by the way, here, have forgotten how to do, is actually the right strategy, it just – there’s a huge risk associated with it.
Dr Heather Williams
Great observation. Emily, you get the last word.
Emily Thornberry MP
Yeah, so Donald Trump’s going to meet Kim Jong-un, what could possibly go wrong?
Xenia Wickett
I’m not…
Emily Thornberry MP
It’s going to be great. I personally am not, you know, not going to bother with being on a diet for a while. Who knows if we will meet again. Okay, so going back to Brexit, there are two stages, so we, in the Labour – and all I can do is give you the Labour Party, you know, and what the Labour Party thinks, ‘cause who knows what the Government thinks. But what we’ve said is that, quite clearly, you can’t negotiate everything before the divorce. Clearly, we can’t and, frankly, we’ve had 21 months since the Brexit vote and the Government still has no clear idea, in my view, as to what is that it wants to achieve, so how is it going to achieve it? We need to have an interim period, during which the status quo pertains. We have said that. We’ve made that clear, you know, at least two years, frankly, probably longer. The – and so then, the question is, what’s the nature of the divorce? And I think that if past evidence, in the last, kind of, few months is anything to go on, it’s going to be a blah, blah, blah divorce. It’s not going to actually make any decisions. It’s going to continue to kick things down the road. You know, and that, we don’t seem to have, kind of, come to any difficult decisions at the moment.
So, the difficulty’s going to be with a meaningful vote in October, which we have secured, is that what is it that we’re going to be agreeing on? So, you know, we have our six tests. If you hold up blah, blah, blah to six tests, you’ve probably passed it. And then we leave the European Union and then we’re in the status quo, so then we’re, kind of, as we are now, and during that period there has to be a negotiation for what our contin – what final relationship will be. I just hope upon hope that we have a general election in the meantime and, frankly, that the grownups turn up and we’re able to do the negotiations, but who knows. And my other hope is that they don’t do any lasting damage to our country in the meantime and so that I do hope we have a blah, blah, blah divorce, without any, kind of, you know, decisions, proper decisions being made and everything being, you know, “Oh, well, this all subject to our final agreement,” and it’s like a divorce, you know, like a decree nisi, as opposed to a decree absolute. I mean, I think that’s probably where we’re going to end up, and that’s the optimist in me.
Dr Heather Williams
Well, just to very quickly wrap up and make an observation, there was a fair bit of doom and gloom in all of your remarks, but also, every one of you ended with some, sort of, optimism. And one big takeaway, I think, for all of us is that you’ve identified really important opportunities. Is this an opportunity for leadership? Is this an opportunity for rethinking with the EU and NATO or actually, all about? Is it also an opportunity to decide individually, as a collective, as well, what is the vision for Europe? What is the vision of the West? And something that Xenia said really struck me, is that despite all these changes, the fundamentals do remain strong and so, how can we take those fundamentals and those first principles and the shared values, to the extent that they exist, and build upon them? And I think that’s something that, hopefully, this panel demonstrates, whereby you can have a mix of Government and think tanks and academia and working collaboratively on these efforts. So, I want to thank you all for your really thoughtful and insightful questions. On behalf of WIIS UK, thank you so much for coming, and if you’d please join me in thanking our great speakers [applause].
