Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
Okay, I think we can get started. Thank you all for joining in person and also, online. My name is Dr Chietigj Bajpaee. I am the Senior Research Fellow for South Asia at Chatham House. Today’s event will be looking at Pakistan. Obviously, we’ll be focusing on the election, which is scheduled to take place later this week, fingers crossed. But we’ll also be looking beyond the election, to broader regional developments as they pertain to Pakistan.
And Pakistan, clearly, appears to be in the midst of a perfect storm of sorts. It’s facing a dire economic situation. As most of you will know, it’s in the midst of its 23rd IMF bailout. It’s facing a difficult security situation, with a string of recent terrorist attacks. Most recently, yesterday, we saw an attack in KP province, in which over ten – I think ten Policemen were killed. It’s facing difficult relations with its neighbours, as we’ve seen most recently with Iran. The country is also vulnerable to climate risks, as we saw with the devastating impact of the floods two years ago.
So, we’ll be addressing some of these issues in today’s event, and we have an excellent panel of speakers. Joining us from Lahore – from Islamabad, apologies, joining us from Islamabad is Dr Maleeha Lodhi. Ambassador Lodhi has served as Pakistan’s High Commissioner to the UK. She’s also served twice as Ambassador to the United States and most recently, held the position of Permanent Representative to the United Nations. And then, joining me here in person is Dr Adnan Naseemullah, who is a Reader in International Politics at King’s College London, and at the far end, is our Associate Fellow, Dr Farzana Shaikh. So, a lot of Doctors in the house.
So, we will start with a guided discussion for the first 30-40 minutes, led by myself, and then, we will open up to questions from the audience. So, on that note, let’s begin with Ambassador Lodhi, and I wanted to start with, perhaps, the foreign policy picture. So, Ambassador Lodhi, Pakistan’s relations with its neighbours, I wanted to get your thoughts on how do you assess that on the eve of the election? We’ve seen recent remarks by the Army Chief, Asim Munir, where he made some quite scathing comments about Pakistan’s neighbours, Afghanistan, India and Iran. So, my question is, how do you read this? Was this a warning shot to Pakistan’s neighbours or a signal to the next Prime Minister not to cross redlines on foreign policy?
HE Dr Maleeha Lodhi
Thank you. Thank you, it’s a great pleasure to be joining your panellists at Chatham House. I wish I could have been there in person, but I guess these days, you can be there in so many other ways. So, thanks to technology, here I am in Islamabad.
I think one needs to understand that the broad thrust of Pakistan’s foreign policy has remained very consistent. So, I think one should not expect any dramatic or substantial changes. Our relations, at the moment, unfortunately, in the neighbourhood, are very fraught. As you know, there were airstrikes by Iran on Pakistan territory and then, Pakistan responded, but I have to say, this was the quickest kiss and makeup session that I’ve ever seen between two countries. Because we had, then, the Iranian Foreign Minister coming and there was a spirit of reconciliation, because I think both countries realise that they have to do a better job at border management, because that’s what led to the strikes.
Iran has long claimed, just like Pakistan has long claimed, that there are armed groups on the other side of the border and that they need to do something about to contain them. So, you know, relationship with Iran remains – I would think that the airstrikes, or you know, the trading of air strikes, has damaged the relationship, even though both countries have sought to make up after that and are trying to put relations back on track.
Then, of course, we have the testy relationship, increasingly testy relationship, between Pakistan and the Taliban in Afghanistan. You know, two years ago/two and a half years ago, when the Taliban took over Afghanistan once again, there was this sentiment of this feeling in Islamabad that somehow, Pakistan would be able to secure its Western border, because the Taliban would be friendlier towards Pakistan, for obvious reasons. Well, that didn’t happen, that expectation was not realised, and since then, relations have been very strained between the two countries.
Largely, if not entirely, because of Pakistan’s insistence that the Taliban in Kabul do something about restricting, containing and in fact, you know, dismantling what is called the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan, the armed group which is outlawed in Pakistan, which operates from Afghan territory. And there has been a surge in these terrorist attacks after the Taliban took over.
In fact, the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee, UN Sanctions Committee report, even a recent one, in fact, has said that “The TTP has gained the most out of all the terrorist groups that are residing in Afghanistan from the return of the Taliban.” So, we have this relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan, as I said, which is strained, but clearly, it is Pakistan’s strategic imperative to keep that relationship in a stable – on a stable track.
And then, of course, we have our biggest neighbour, India. Again, relations plunged to a new low, although that has been the history of this adversarial relationship, but it plunged to a new low when India illegally annexed Jam – occupied Jammu and Kashmir in August 2019. After that – although dialogue had been suspended between the two countries even earlier, but after that, Pakistan then suspended trade and both countries recalled their High Commissioners. So, really, practical issues are still dealt with by the two countries at a junior, kind of, diplomatic level, but that relationship is – has – is frozen.
So, I think the next government has to come in and deal with this situation of fraught relations with three neighbours, and remember, you know, Pakistan’s security policy has always been predicated on trying to avoid a two-front situation, in other words, two hot borders. But now, the challenge that looms is dealing with a three-front scenario, as it were, even though they’re not all hot fronts, but still, as I said, they’re unstable relations with three neighbours. And given Pakistan’s overriding priority of – for any government coming in, whatever its political complexion, its overriding priority will have to be to get an economy that is in the critical ward out of that ICU.
Now, for that, Pakistan needs a peaceful neighbourhood. The last thing it wants is to be distracted by what is happening on the borders. So, this being the most overriding strategic objective for any government coming in, I think we will have to wait and see how Pakistan is able to, then, deal with relations with these three neighbours.
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
Thank you, Ambassador Lodhi, and we will come back to Pakistan’s relations with each of these countries. But perhaps before we move onto the domestic politics, I wanted to come back to the issue of Iran, because it was quite a unusual flare-up of tensions between Iran and Pakistan. I mean, they characterised their relationship as a ‘brotherly’ relationship. So, I wanted to ask you, I mean, was this really – was it just a flash in the pan moment, ‘cause they renormalised relations relatively quickly, or is this a sign of potential instabilities from the Middle East spilling over into South Asia?
HE Dr Maleeha Lodhi
I think what happened came as a big surprise to Islamabad, because relations, in fact, between the two countries had been improving very steadily, especially after the rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which had opened up greater diplomatic space for Pakistan to forge greater economic ties with Iran. And some of these new agreements did go into play – did get into place after that.
So, this was a big surprise why Iran took this action, and I think the fact that very quickly, the two countries were able to, you know, diffuse tensions very, very fast. And the Iranian Foreign Minister coming here after their National Security Council took a decision that they must improve relations with Pakistan, mend ties with Pakistan, I mean, that may have been an acknowledgement of the error, or the mistake, that Iran had made. Don’t forget that at the same time, Iran, oh, you know, launched these – this airstrike, it also launched strikes against – in Iraq and Syria. So – in Iraq and – well, one of the coun – yeah, I think it was two other countries. So, three countries at the same time, for them to do.
I think, you know, a flash in the pan? Look, relations, even at the best of times, between Pakistan and Iran have been mired in suspicion, there’s no doubt about that. The surprise was that because the last couple of years, relations had moved beyond this trust deficit between the two. And Iran’s suspicions about Pakistan date to the Islamic Revolution, because from then on, the Iranian regime has somehow felt that Pakistan is too closely aligned with the West, especially with the United States after 9/11, and therefore, you know, Islamabad was viewed by suspicion from Tehran’s point of view.
On the Pakistani side, I think, also, Pakistan felt that the Iranians, you know, initially, after the Islamic Revolution, tried to export that revolution, ‘cause Pakistan has a very large Shia community. Of course, that never happened, but the suspicion was there. So, there is a history of mutual suspicion, but I think the important thing now is that the two countries have stepped back from what could have been a very, very dangerous escalation in the crisis, and the crisis was very short-lived. But, as I said before, their relationship really does need to be mended, because it has been damaged, there’s no doubt about it.
When one country attacks another through airstrikes, it – and goes into the other country’s territory, I mean, sure, that really doesn’t – I mean, it doesn’t – it can’t be repeated again. I think that – Pakistan has sent very strong messages to the Iranian leadership that it will not sit back if Iran was to try something like that again. So, that’s where we are right now.
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
And we will come back to the foreign policy issue, but perhaps, well, I can turn to you, Farzana, at this point, on the elections which are coming up in a few days.
Dr Farzana Shaikh
Hmmm hmm.
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
Maybe you can set the scene for us. I mean, how did we get here? How did we get from, say, April 2022, when Imran Khan was removed from power, to where we are today, and how do you see secur – the situation evolving? Is another Sharif Government a foregone conclusion? What about Imran Khan? He’s obviously barred from standing in the election, but we’ve seen candidates from his party, the PTI, have continued to campaign, using social media, have continued to use AI-generated speeches from Imran Khan.
Dr Farzana Shaikh
Uh-huh.
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
And then, you know, the elephant in the room, what role does the so-called establishment, the Military and Intelligence Services, play in this election?
Dr Farzana Shaikh
Well, it’s received – thank you. Thank you all for being here and thank you, Chietigj, of course, for chairing this meeting on Pakistan just days before the country goes to the polls. I mean, it’s received – the country and its polls this week have been widely covered in the media, and I’m sure that most of you in this room will be broadly familiar with the outlines of, you know, how we got here.
Basically, in April 2022, Former Prime Minister, Imran Khan, was controversially ousted from office. Though legally, through a parliamentary vote of no confidence, the report suggested that, you know, much of that had to do with the fact that he and his government fell out with the military establishment, particularly over military appointments, over which Imran Khan wanted to have some say. But to cut a long story short, relations between the two sides, once extremely rosy, deteriorated sharply after that.
And so, you know, in that sort of climate of hostility, then, we had Imran Khan, as I said, removed and replaced with a coalition government, that lasted about a year, before elections were finally called. A coalition government headed by Former Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif’s, Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz), and the Pakistan People’s Party. They stepped down and, you know, were replaced by a caretaker government, headed by Caretaker Prime Minister, Anwaar-ul-Haq, who are now overseeing a process towards elections.
Now, Pakistan, of course, as we all know, goes to the polls on the 8th, on Thursday, and despite widespread speculation that the outcome has already been decided, there are many, still, who hope that of the 128 million registered voters, that, you know, the majority will still be given a chance to decide the results of these elections.
Now, at play will be three main and many lesser parties, but only two: the Pakistan Muslim League, led by Former Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, and the Pakistan People’s Party, under the joint Chairmanship of Asif Ali Zardari and young Bilawal Bhutto, will be in with a chance of forming the next government.
The other convincing frontrunner, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, led by Former Prime Minister, Imran Khan, has been barred, if not, effectively, banned from campaigning freely. That, too, has received widespread coverage in the press, both at home and abroad. It faces restrictions on access to the media and most recently, has also faced the wrath of the Courts through a controversial ruling, which stripped the party of its election symbol, the cricket bat. Forcing the party’s candidates to contest these elections not as candidates of the PTI, but as independents.
And I think what needs to be underscored and emphasised here is the significance of this ruling and its power to cause confusion, especially in a country where almost 48% of the population are illiterate, and where many rely on election symbols to guide them to candidates of their choice. The PTI’s leader, Imran Khan, of course, meanwhile, has been barred from contesting the polls. He is currently in jail, where he was sentenced last week to extended prison terms for corruption, for breaches of national security and most recently, for having contracted a marriage in breach of Islamic rules.
Now, despite these draconian measures against the PTI and despite the many restrictions placed on it, many people still understand that the real battle this week will still involve the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz), led by Former Prime Minister, Sharif, and Khan’s PTI, with the electoral field, as we have seen, decisively skewed against the PTI.
Now, much of this trouble will be concentrated in the powerful province of Punjab, which has lion’s share of seats in the National Assembly, where both parties are expected to hold their ground. And many expect Sharif to use the support of pro-military parties, who are backing him, and the backing of so-called ‘electables’, these local notables with significant vote banks at their disposal, in Punjab and Balochistan, to try and offset, as it were, the PTI’s popularity, especially in provinces like the northwestern province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
Now, of course, both parties are likely to use their support across these provinces to boost their claims to represent the only two genuinely national parties in Pakistan. By contrast, the Pakistan People’s Party, despite a spirited campaign mounted by Bilawal Zardari, is really not expected to make significant gains much beyond its native province of Sindh, risking its relegation to the status of a provincial party.
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
So, could I just add? So, as of now, it seems like the most likely outcome is, obviously, the PTI being sidelined, a weak coalition government led by one of the Sharif brothers, and a power sharing arrangement with the establishment. And if so, how sustainable or stable is that arrangement or situation?
Dr Farzana Shaikh
Well, we will just have to wait and see, and I think much of that, really, will depend on turnout.
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
Hmmm.
Dr Farzana Shaikh
And why does that matter? Because I think a fairly low, an uncomfortably low turnout of, let’s say, 41/44%, would certainly put in question the representative credentials of any new government. And that would certainly not bode well for the stability of any such government, with or without the support of the military establishment.
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
Adnan, if I could turn to you, and maybe it’s a bit premature to be looking beyond the election, but we will see that the term of the current Chief Justice of the Supreme Court end – expire at the end of this – I think it’s November of this year, and then, the Army Chief’s term also, the following year. So, given that these changes that we’re about to see, do you see any prospect for Imran Khan’s eventual rehabilitation, similar to what we’ve seen with Nawaz Sharif over the last few months?
Dr Adnan Naseemullah
I think that there – and so, we should remember, actually, that Nawaz Sharif was being treated very badly by the judiciary and implicitly by the military in 2018, when the military was really supporting – oh, the establishment was really supporting Imran Khan against the, sort of, the, kind of, the – Nawaz Sharif’s – the PMLN.
There seems to be a major difference between the situation in 2018, where Nawaz Sharif got rehabilitated and is likely to become the next Prime Minister, and Imran Khan. Imran Khan crossed a couple of very key lines in his relationship to the military by, for example, mobilising within the military, claiming that he represented the military’s – the rank and file of the military’s interests better than the military leadership. Now, of course, that, sort of, challenges the, sort of, feigned cohesiveness and coherence of this very powerful institution.
The other thing he did – and if any of you here are, sort of, fans of Trump World, there was a very similar, sort of, insurrection, if you want, in May 2 – 2023, just at the moment in which Imran Khan was worried about getting arrested, called his supporters out to the streets and they clashed with the Police, which, of course, political parties do. But then, some of those supporters actually attacked military establishments and rooted and committed arson in the Lahore Corps Commander’s residence. A three-star General had to jump from the back wall to, sort of, escape this mob.
Now, of course, that seems to be, like, a big, sort of, challenge to the military’s authority within its own bailiwick. So, I think that Nawa – Imran Khan is possibly being understood as more dangerous, partly because he also has continued this, sort of, campaign against the military and the military – the estab – the, sort of, leadership of the establishment. In a way that Nawaz Sharif has always – has been on the wrong side of the military more than once, in 1999 and 2018, but has a, sort of, a more established sets of relationships and ways of being and doing with the military, relative to Imran Khan, who is, sort of, the one man, kind of, charismatic, but also somewhat messianic, sort of, figure. And, sort of, a classic populist, who’s, sort of, mobilising those who are being unrepresented by the system, but in so doing, challenging, sort of, the institutional configuration of the country.
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
So, given the likelihood of some sort of weak coalition government, I wanted to ask you, Adnan, about the politics of patronage, which is obviously very prominent in Pakistan, and the challenge of balancing austerity measures which will be required as part of any IMF bailout with the need to appease these patronage networks. And how do you see this playing out in the context of another government which is likely to be weak and then unstable, potentially?
Dr Adnan Naseemullah
Well, one of the things that I think is worth noting is that established parties, like the PPP in Sindh, the PMLN, especially, in Punjab, have very, very developed and established networks of patronage, of the provision of basic public goods for their supporters, that have developed over time, and in which the recipients of the patronage, citizens and voters, are actually quite assertive in relation to the government about what they need. To the point where, you know, a party might nominate, or seek to nominate, sort of, a local notable and the local – the, sort of, the local community and the local party workers might actually just reject him.
Now, the problem with the PTI is that the PTI doesn’t really have any party organisation. It’s, sort of, Imran Khan as a, sort of, sole figure, but the PTI is representing a very powerful and now politically activated population among middleclass, especially middleclass urban Pakistanis, quite conservative, but are not, sort of, situated within these established patronage networks.
Now, the one exception to a, sort of, an urban patronage network, which was the Muttahida Mohajir Qaumi Movement, the MQM, has, sort of, been disestab – disassembled by the Security Services, actually, around about 2017/2018. So, in some senses, there’s representation without patronage with the PTI and then, with the other parties, you have patronage without representation.
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
I can see several questions already coming in on the chat and unsurprisingly, they’re focused on foreign policy. So, perhaps I can turn back to you, Ambassador Lodhi, on the broader regional and global environment. And my first question here is that Pakistan seems to have lost some of its strategic significance in the West following the US and NATO withdrawals from Afghanistan in 2021, and yet, the country, obviously, remains strategically important. It’s the world’s fifth most populous country, two things of whom are below the age of 30. Pakistan obviously matters from a security standpoint, given its nuclear weapons capability and the fact that it holds the world’s sixth largest military – and, of course, there – the flashpoint with India. And we saw the Army Chief, Asim Munir, travelling to Washington, to the US, in December, where he met with several key US officials.
So, my question to you is, how do you assess Pakistan’s relationship with the West and perhaps the US, more specifically, at present and going forward, following the election?
HE Dr Maleeha Lodhi
Well, I think one has to look at what the broad parameters of Pakistan’s foreign policy objectives are. Pakistan’s overriding, sort of, priority is its strategic relationship with China. So, I think we need to keep that in view as we examine Pakistan’s relation to the West.
With the United States, you are absolutely right. After the US Military withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan’s value diminished in Washington’s eyes, and therefore, since then, the relationship actually has been in a state of flux, it’s in a tentative phase. The US, still, of course, has intense engagement with Pakistan, but because Afghanistan was the main common element between the two countries for almost two decades, if not more, the bilateral content of the relationship over that period was actually very weak, or very narrow. And therefore, I think both countries are looking towards, after elections in both America and in Pakistan, at the possibility of a reset in the relationship.
And that reset would have to, sort of, take into consideration and find space between two other relationships: Pakistan’s strategic relationship with China and America’s much closer and strategic relationship with India. So, it’s between these two relationships that space has to be found for the Pakistan-US relationship, because, as you know, and so does your audience, that for America right now, its overriding priority is containment of China. And therefore, because Pakistan is unwilling to be part of any kind of anti-China coalition, it does reduce the space for the relationship between Pakistan and the United States.
Now, the West is not just the United States, ‘cause you’re sitting in London, and you know that better than I do. And therefore, Pakistan’s, I think, relationships, multiple relationships with several European countries, remain very strong. The EU is Pakistan’s largest trading bloc. Of course, the largest export destination still remains the United States for Pakistani goods. So, I mean, there are multiple relationships. I mean, with the UK, for example, the relationship is very strong. It is, you know, sort of, underpinned by historical, sort of, ties, as well as by greater commercial ties between the two countries.
But with the US, you know, because that’s how you started your question, I think what – we will have to wait and see how the two countries are able to find, explore new areas of co-operation, because there are many areas where Pakistan and the United States can mutually – you know, can co-operate for mutual benefit. Counterterrorism remains a key area, but also, because Pakistan still has a significant position in the OIC, in the Muslim world, it’s an important Muslim country, and then, of course, as you, yourself, stated, it’s one of the world’s few nuclear weapons states. You know, there are many areas that the two countries can explore.
But for now, I think, you know, as I said before, it’s really the Pakistan-China relationship. China happens to be now Pakis – the biggest investor in Pakistan. Pak – the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is the pivot of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which, as you know, is the biggest and the most ambitious economic enterprise of the 21st Century. So, you know, Pakistan’s, sort of, traditional strategic relations with China have now been augmented by a very strong economic dimension and therefore, I think the US-Pakistan relationship will have to be worked around that.
That doesn’t mean that Pakistan sees its relations with either China or the United States in a zero-sum way. But, as I said earlier, the space is circumscribed somewhat, because America does – I mean, America’s in the – is now, it’s rounding up countries to join anti-China – its anti-China containment policy.
The entire Indo-Pacific strategy of the United States is designed to curb China’s rights as a global party, even though China has already risen, but to contain it. And therefore, you know, that, kind of, limits what Pakistan can do with the United States. I mean, take the Indian Ocean, for example. I think some of the, sort of, Cold War dynamics that we see in the South China Sea are now being injected into the Indian Ocean, you know, which is part of the Indo-Pacific strategy of the United States. And that is compelling Pakistan to also enhance its naval presence in the Indian Ocean. So, there are many security implications, also, that are flowing now from America’s contain China policy, which are impacting on the bilateral relationship.
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
So, as you mentioned, a key component of Pakistan’s relationship with China and the United States is India, and that this is a question that’s actually come up in the chat. And it’s interesting to see, of all of Pakistan’s neighbours, it seems that relations are actually the most stable with India at the moment, if – looking at Afghanistan and Iran, where you’ve – you actually, you’ve seen more open frictions.
But my question is, does the potential of a Nawaz Sharif Government in Islamabad raise the prospects of a potential rapprochement in the relationship with Delhi, given that relations have historically improved when Sharif has been in power? You’ll recall the Lahore past diplomacy that happened back in 1999, and Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Pakistan on Nawaz Sharif’s birthday, I think it was in 2015. So, I think, do you see prospects for a potential improvement in relations under another Sharif Government?
HE Dr Maleeha Lodhi
Well, that’s a big question because of what you have just mentioned, which is that relations warmed when Nawaz Sharif was last in power, and that he had, you know, a relationship, I think, that he was able forge with Prime Minister Narendra Modi that helped in easing tensions between the two countries. But here’s the problem, because, you know, it takes two to clap and two to tango, one will have to wait and see how Delhi responds to a new government in Pakistan if it’s led by Nawaz Sharif. Because in recent years, Delhi has shown absolutely no interest in re-engaging Pakistan diplomatically, in resuming the dialogue, the formal dialogue between the two countries, and in fact, its actions in occupied Kashmir subsequent to its formal annexation have only made the situation much more fraught between the two countries.
I think the challenge is going to be whether and how the two countries can, you know, re-engage, resume the peace dialogue, when India refuses to even talk about Kashmir. It’s just, sort of, struck it off the negotiating table and said, “No, we resolved the issue, and we resolved it on our terms.”
Now, that’s not accepted by Pakistan, because the international nature of the dispute remains, it’s still on the agenda of the UN Security Council. There are UN Security Council Resolutions, just like there are on Palestine, but as we’ve seen on Palestine, they’ve been flouted – you know, the way they’ve been flouted is, you know, shocking.
In recent months, as we all know, what has happened in Gaza, but similarly, in occupied Kashmir, too, the Indian Government has just completely ignored what UN Security Council Resolutions call for. For example, its action of August 2019 flew in the face of several Security Council Resolutions that say, very clearly, that “Neither party to the dispute can bring about any material change in the ground situation.” And clearly, the ground situation has been changed by India’s action.
So, I mean, I mention all of that because this will have to be addressed in some way, and then, other than these longstanding disputes, there’ve been more irritants that have been injected into the relationship in recent years. For example, one of the treaties which have been the most successful between India and Pakistan, which is the Indus Water Treaty, which governs the sharing of waters between the two neighbours, which has really stood the test of time since it was forged in 1960.
There have been differences between the two countries, in fact, but India’s the one that said, “We want to change the dispute resolution mechanism which this treaty provides, and we want to replace it with something else.” And that is also, you know, emerged as a new irritant in the relationship, because if this treaty unravels, and I think it won’t, but it is – it, you know, India’s new action, if you like, or new position, did raise this, sort of, fear that this treaty could unravel in some form, which would hardly be in the interest of either country.
So, I think, you know, some of these issues, these are big challenges in the India-Pakistan relationship, but let me go back to my original point. Pakistan’s Government, whichever one is elected on – day after tomorrow, will have to deal with the economy first and foremost. If the economy continues to be in the most severe crisis that it has ever faced in all of Pakistan’s history, then I’m afraid all foreign policy is besides the point, unless Pakistan is able to deal with its economic policy through wide-ranging reforms, and structural reforms, not just bailouts.
And remember, the new government, I know this – you didn’t ask me this question, but it’s so related to what I’m talking about, by April, Pakistan’s standby agreement with the IMF will be over. So, the new government – one of the first tasks of the new government would be to negotiate a longer term IMF programme, which in turn, will require structural economic measures, which will be painful, but which a new government would have to undertake if it is to get the economy back on track and on a path of sustained economic growth. Because inflation is running at a record high and at the moment, the cost of living crisis, which, you know, Farzana was also, sort of, alluding to, you know, it is really taking its toll on people.
Now, given that, you can imagine, you know, the priority of any government would be domestic, a domestic priority, economic challenge, and then, of course, you know, the foreign policy part, especially the neighbourhood part.
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
Farzana, you wanted…
Dr Farzana Shaikh
Yeah, I just…
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
…to come in on that?
Dr Farzana Shaikh
…wanted to pick up on some of these points with relation to the next government, assuming, as we all assume, it’s likely to be led by Former Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, whose party manifesto emphasises closer relations with India, peace with its neighbours, but also, strengthening relations with China. And I was just wondering, you know, how precisely he is going to balance this, on the one hand, have closer relations with India, but at the same time, strengthening relations with China.
So, that – you know, I mean, I, sort of, anticipate turbulence there, but more importantly, and of course, this would hark back to some of the earlier experiences of a Sharif-led government, and that is, you know, the relations with the military when it comes to foreign policy. I mean, I think it’s no secret that, you know, relations with Pakistan’s immediate neighbours, India and Afghanistan, have been jealously guarded by Pakistan’s military as its prerogative. And just a couple of weeks ago, we had General Asim Munir send out a very clear signal, and spelt out in these terms, that “There can be no reconciliation with India because India has not reconciled itself to Pakistan.”
And I wonder whether that message was intended as much for India as it was to a new Sharif-led government, whose eagerness and willingness to pursue rapprochement with India is well-known, not just on issues like settling the dispute over Kashmir, but also because, you know, the Sharif Government has let it be known that Pakistan’s economy, if it is to advance and to strengthen, will depend on closer trade relations with its neighbours. And so, you know, many of these circles remain, as it were, to be squared and it’s not obvious how it’s going to happen.
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
Yeah, no, yeah, exactly. I’m conscious of the time, and…
HE Dr Maleeha Lodhi
Can I just come in – can I just respond very quickly to one of Farzana’s points? I think we have to also keep in perspective the historical facts. One of the longest period of, let’s say, diffusion of tension, sustained peace process, sustained dialogue between India and Pakistan, was actually under a military government, under President Musharaf. So, I think one has to be careful in saying that the military is there just to be a spoiler in any process of relations – of building relations between India and Pakistan.
And I think one can’t also take the India factor out. As I said before, it takes two to tango. We will need to see – irrespective of what the Pakistani Military may think or may not think right now, we need to also see, once the Indian election is over, because nobody’s – in Delhi is going to move before the Indian election, but let’s assume that Narendra Modi returns to power. We will still have to wait and see what his stance is towards some of the hard issues that have to be dealt with. And I think one should – another, sort of, recent historical fact which has to be kept in view is that under the previous Army Chief, General Bajwa, he was very much in favour of resuming trade relations with India. And it was, in fact, Imran Khan’s Government which said, “No, we can’t do this right now because of the dispute over Kashmir.”
So, I think we need to be very clear and not, you know, create these dichotomies, which sometimes are, you know, in a way, belied by the historical experience. So, I think we have to wait and see how the two countries will square up, and I don’t think there is any tension between Pakistan’s continued close relationship with China. And if it was to open up, let’s say, dialogue with India, I don’t see the contradiction there. India itself has a huge trading relationship with China. You know, you’re able to deconflict many of these things when you carry on. This is not – you know, you can carry on certain kinds of relationships with a country while, you know, being reticent about other aspects of relationships.
So, I don’t see that really coming in the way. It didn’t come in the way before, because the Pakistan-China relationship is not breaking news. It’s been around for a very long time. It’s been the cornerstone of Pakistan’s foreign policy for almost six and a half decades, if not more. So, therefore – and we’ve had periods of, let’s say, rapprochement, if I can use that word, with India in the past, and as I said, one of the longest, most sustained periods was under a military dictator.
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
I’m conscious of the time. I do want to open up to audience questions, but I have one ques – last question for you, Adnan, on – and that is building on something that the Ambassador mentioned on the economic side. You know, at present, we have three countries in South Asia that are in the midst of IMF bailouts. We have Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Pakistan. But unlike, say, Bangladesh, where the opposition is virtually non-existent, or Sri Lanka, where you have a high degree of, I think, cross-party consensus on the kind of reforms that need to be implemented, Pakistan’s highly confrontational politics makes it, you know, very difficult to pass any meaningful reforms or any consistent reform agenda.
So, my question here is, again, going back to the domestic politics, implementing some of these difficult austerity measures that the IMF will require in the context of its domestic or divisive political environment, how do you see that, potentially, playing out?
Dr Adnan Naseemullah
Well, I suppose I’m a little bit less foc – I’m a little – to be diplomatic, I mean, I think that there is a, sort of, a narrative of reform, austerity. You need to – I think that Pakistan’s political economy is unsustainable, because there are a lot of very powerful groups who want resources. And the way that In – that Pakistan has funded that is through, essentially, relying on, essentially, geopolitical rents from neighbours to provide, sort of, the Gulf countries and Saudi Arabia, China, the US during the Musharaf years, huge amounts of money. Which essentially, created a situation of what, in economics, is called ‘Dutch disease’ where people moved into, sort of, making – doing domestic instruction and malls and, sort of, consumption, as opposed to, sort of, investment in export industries, like textiles and things like that. That’s been hollowed out.
So, actually, what Pakistan needs, as much as it needs structural reform, is investment. People need to get interested in and excited by the, sort of, opportunities and potentials of the Pakistani economy, which is quite significant, and actually, those assets are relatively cheap relative to India, for example, and other things. But I think that there is a, sort of, instability that’s, sort of, been, sort of, absorbed into the, sort of, international investment community, with the exception of China and the structures.
So, I mean, I think that this is a much longer conversation. I mean, I’m sure we could do an entire week on the Pakistan economy, but it’s not just, okay, well, you take the medicine and then, you’re better. It’s more like, what is the future of Pakistan’s economy, especially in the situation where we’ve had, sort of, that deglobalisation, right, where all these blocs and trade is much more, sort of, complicated. But anyway, so…
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
Thank you for that. On that note, let’s open up to questions. Please do raise your hands if you’re in the room. If I call on you, please state your name and affiliation and please make it a short and sharp question, not a longwinded statement, if you don’t want me to cut you off. So, yes, please, go ahead.
Josh Gould
Thanks so much. Josh Gould, I work for a political consultancy firm. I’d just like to pick up on your – actually, the last point about Pakistan investment. Where is the, kind of, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor currently at to, even, like, kind of, security situation in the South-West, and has that, kind of, slowed down investment from China, going forwards?
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
Ambassador Lodhi, would you like to answer the question…
HE Dr Maleeha Lodhi
Yes, okay.
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
…on the status of CPEC?
HE Dr Maleeha Lodhi
I think there has been a perception that CPEC, or the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, work on that slowed down, and that perception is correct, but the slowdown occurred during the COVID years. Subsequently, it’s picked up, economic activity has picked up, and we are now in the second phase of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, and Chinese investment is very much on the uptick. So, I think things are moving, and they’re moving in the right direction, but of course, the overall macroeconomic framework does impact on investment from anywhere, including from strategic ally, China.
So, Pakistan, if it wants, really, to quicken the pace of the Corridor itself and all the activities that come under that, it needs to address its macroeconomic crisis, which will continue until Pakistan is able to embark on a broad range of comprehensive structural economic reforms. Which will give confidence, then, not just to investors from China or from the West, but to investors at home. Because unless the business community in Pakistan itself has enough confidence to invest, we’re not going to see a great deal of FDI coming into Pakistan. So, that’s the biggest challenge in my mind for the next government.
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
Please, go ahead.
Nisar Ali Shah
Shall I – now is better or is it…?
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
Yeah, it’s here.
Nisar Ali Shah
Thank you very much for your dissertation. The entire leadership…
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
And your name?
Nisar Ali Shah
…of the Paki – sorry?
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
Your name?
Nisar Ali Shah
Oh, yes, my name is Nisar Ali Shah. I’m a journalist by profession. The entire leadership of the Pakistan PTI has been imprisoned, not only Imran Khan. His former Ministers, Officials and all those people are either left the party or they do not want to participate in the party. So, my question is that Pakistan keep returning the same family time-after-time, either in Zardari or in Nawaz Sharif party. So, this actually – what is the purpose of this election, because the military has already decided which party shall win? And I think it’s going to the Nawaz Sharif Party.
The diaspora in the UK and USA, Middle East and every other country where Pakistanis are settled, they support Imran Khan’s PTI Party. Do the Pakistani overseas have a vote for election or not?
Dr Farzana Shaikh
Well…
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
And either of you.
Dr Farzana Shaikh
Well, I’ll respond to that very quickly by saying that, yes, I think it’s no secret that we’ve seen the harassment and hounding of a party that is believed by many to be the most popular party in Pakistan. But let’s also be clear, I think there are many who also believe that elections by themselves will not guarantee stability. What elections do is to provide some kind of legitimacy for a government. They are necessary, but not a sufficient condition for instability, and – for stability. And really, to my mind, the only way in which one can advance the programme of stability in Pakistan, which is now arguably, in one of its most polarised states that I can recall, one real genuine way forward is really to be able to reach some kind of political settlement involving all parties.
Now, what I’m talking about here is some kind of national consensus, and as implausible as that may sound, in the polarised circumstances that we face today, there is a precedent. In 2006, the Pakistan People’s Party and the Pakistan Muslim League, led by Sharif, otherwise, you know, daggers drawn and hardened foes, signed what was known as the ‘Charter of Democracy’. Which, amongst other things, permitted both sides to settle and resolve their differences amongst themselves, without approaching the military, in order to tackle their rivals.
So, you know, I mean, I really feel that it’s that kind of landmark achievement which is – which holds a particular relevance at this time, when, you know, Pakistan is once again mired in allegations of military interference in its politics. When, once again, Pakistan is mired by allegations of political parties acting as the enablers of the military by looking to it to oust its rivals.
Now, you know, I really do think that we need a reckoning, a fresh reckoning, along those lines, because without it, Pakistan is likely to be doomed. Doomed to remain in the state of what can only be described as cyclical dystopia, characterised by another meaningless election, another debilitated government, another divided house, and round and round we go.
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
Thank you for that. I’ve seen two questions that have come up on the – online, which are on the same issue, and this is about “Imran Khan’s outreach to the Middle East” and “the extent to which this will – can be continued or rebuilt under a future Sharif administration.” So, Ambassador Lodhi, would you like to comment on that?
HE Dr Maleeha Lodhi
I don’t know what outreach the questioner means. Actually, Khan’s foreign policy left Pakistan’s relations with many countries in a state of disrepair, including our key strategic relationship with Saudi Arabia. So, I think the question, then, is, what will happen in the future? I think if we look at that without really going into what Imran Khan did or didn’t do, then yes, I think Pakistan’s next government will continue to strengthen – want to strengthen its strategic and economic ties with Saudi Arabia, with the UAE, an important strategic economic partner of Pakistan, and, of course, with the rest of the Middle East.
And, you know, on Gaza, as you know, Pakistan has taken a very strong position, in line with what its public want its government to do. So, they’ve been – I mean, the government has been very clear, although it’s an interim caretaker government, but they have reinforced and reiterated Pakistan’s traditional policy. Which is to say, you know, that the Israeli occupation should end and that this war should be brought to an end as soon as possible, and that a ceasefire is the need of the hour. Which is why Pakistan has voted consistently with the rest of the Muslim world in UN General Assembly Resolutions.
So, you know, Middle East is not just Saudi Arabia. Middle East is a very big region, and I think Pakistan, you know, with its relationship with Iran, as you had asked earlier, in a state of – I think it’s still in a state of disrepair. It’ll have to focus its attention on, you know, how this relationship can be mended, particularly by getting some kind of a agreement on how to manage the border. Because that is the root cause of the recent tensions between the two countries, as I said, both countries accusing the other of providing sanctuary, whether, you know, by default or by design, to armed groups on their territory which carry out cross-border attacks.
So, I think, you know, the Middle East is a huge region and it’s a area of great priority in Pakistan’s foreign policy. But I think of all the countries in the Middle East, it’s the Saudi-Pakistan relationship which will remain the centrepiece of its Middle East strategy.
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
I can see that we have one more question, but I’m – I want to ensure a degree of gender balance in the questions being asked. So, is there – are there any women in the audience who’d like to ask a question? Yes, please, go ahead.
Member
I’m – sorry, I work for a strategic communications company in London, and my question is, why does Pakistan treat its threat from Iran, its border with Iran, differently to how it treats the threat from it – the border it shares with Afghanistan and India?
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
Ambassador Lodhi, is this some – would you like to…?
HE Dr Maleeha Lodhi
No, no, I don’t know what really – I don’t know what you mean by that. I think any cross-border threat, Pakistan treats in the same way, but there is no parallel. I mean, keeping India aside, there’s no parallel to how the TTP has been attacking Pakistan and Pakistan Security Forces, over the years, but particularly in the last two years, from its safe haven in Afghanistan. You can’t compare that to some of the groups that are residing in Iran, in Iranian Balochistan. I mean, the two threats are of a completely different order. So, I think – and Pakistan has responded appropriately to both. It has made it clear that any cross-border threat is going to be something which will be taken very seriously by Pakistan.
But I don’t know how this applies to India, because I think that the relationship with India is of a completely different kind and a different order, as we all know. But I don’t know how much you want to go into that, so I’ll leave it there.
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
I think, yeah, one potential differential that comes to mind is the issue of sub-nationalism when you have a – you know, they say the tensions with Iran are tied to the Baloch separatist insurgency in Balochistan. But I see there’s, yeah, one last question here. Sir, go ahead.
Iqbal
I’m a member of the Chatham House, name is Iqbal. I support that gentleman’s views, but my question is for Dr Adnan. I mean, Quaid-e-Azam said that “The military or army should be under the control of public representatives,” and that’s a very, you know, accepted statement by him. So, why does some people have to cross the redlines of the army to fulfil the dream and the statement of the founder of Pakistan? So, why you think that PTI, under Imran Khan, is breaching the redlines? The redlines have to be breached to fulfil the main objective of Quaid-e-Azam.
Dr Adnan Naseemullah
Yes, I mean, well, indeed, Quaid-e-Azam, his dream of Pakistan is very different from the Pakistan that we have at the moment. So, all I meant was these are the redlines that the army has which led them to act very differently in relation to Imran Khan. I will say that I think that there has been, over time, a, sort of, sense that the military has that they’re more loath to actually get involved in overthrowing governments, as we saw with Musharaf and others. I mean, this is – now, we’re talking about the fourth election, right?
Dr Farzana Shaikh
You mean they’re averse to a formal military takeover?
Dr Adnan Naseemullah
A formal military takeover. So, the idea is that there’s – in any country, and this is true in Latin America, this is true in lots of different contexts, in which the military is a powerful institution and has lots of resources and lots of political power, which is just the reality. It’s not something I wish, it’s not that a normative, sort of, goal. There needs to be some kind of an arrangement, as Farzana was saying, a, sort of, a political settlement, which allows a civilian government to exercise their own authority internal to areas in which the military is not very worried about. And the military is mostly concerned about internal security, foreign policy and defence.
Iqbal
All of them are privileges.
Dr Adnan Naseemullah
They are privileges, indeed, but they’re privileges that, just objectively, that they have at the moment. So, the issue with Imran Khan is that he was coming in not with the resources, not with the very organised political party, the very – the entire country behind him, to tell the military to stop. But rather, coming in and calling his supporters out onto the streets to prevent him from being arrested. And part of the dynamic, I think, at that point, is that the military gets very, very worried that there could be more chaos, right? And so, as a result, I think he’s acting very, very differently in the – so, I’m not saying that this good, but I am saying that it is a way of thinking about how the military thinks about these things.
Iqbal
And if you bring both change…
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
I’m sorry…
Iqbal
…and then, you’ve raised another point.
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
…we’re going to have to wrap up.
Dr Farzana Shaikh
We just…
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
We’re already over time, so – but you can continue this…
Dr Farzana Shaikh
Yeah, ‘cause it’s…
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
…conversation afterwards. But on that note, like, thank you all for joining us today.
Dr Farzana Shaikh
Thank you.
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
We will be doing more work on Pakistan and South Asia, more broadly, so please keep an eye on the Chatham House website, and if you would like, please sign up for the Asia-Pacific Programme newsletter, and please join me in thanking, or giving a round of applause to our panellists [applause].
