John Kampfner
Good afternoon, everybody. Welcome to this Chatham House digital event from London. My name is John Kampfner. I’m the Executive Director of the still new initiative project we have at Chatham House entitled UK in the World. And it always brings a smile to my face when I think that Chatham House is very much seen as a quintessentially British institution, but has actually very – not for several generations had any project or programme that looks at Britain’s role in the world. And now with so much happening both in this country, but more particularly elsewhere, there’s never been a better time to do that.
We’re really delighted to be holding this event, assessing the UK’s role in and with Ukraine, relating obviously since the Russian invasion of February the 24th, but looking more broadly at what the UK has or has not done with Ukraine, more broadly over many years, and also with Russia and the broader Eurasian space. This is part of a running series of events that we are having as part of this UK in the World initiative, so thank you all for being there.
A couple of housekeeping notes for all of you. This is an on the record event and it is being recorded. We will be having a discussion with our guests, who will be introduced very shortly, then we will be having a question and answer session. Please use the Q&A function for that. You can also use the chat function, but that is simply for remarks that you would like to make, but the question and answer one must come from the question and answer button.
Some questions I may – for reasons of speed or clustering them together, I may read out, but if we also have time, we are going to be talking to or calling speakers from wherever you are around the world to be giving your questions. When you do that, please obviously ensure that you are unmuted and please keep your questions or observations brief, so that we can get as many in as possible.
So, that’s the introduction. I’m delighted that we have got, as you have seen from your invitations to this event, three excellent speakers, and we’re going to be calling them in this order. Orysia Lutsevych, who is Head of Chatham House’s Ukraine Forum and has been working flat out over the last many months, and Orysia has also been incredibly helpful to us at the UK in the World group, working on the expert comment piece that we wrote, and has been up for the last two weeks now on the Chatham House website and has evoked some considerable, we’re very pleased to say, response.
Stewart Wood, member of the House of Lords, who I have known for quite some years. A longstanding senior figure in Labour Party politics and particularly in foreign affairs. He was a prominent member of Gordon Brown’s Government, of Ed Miliband’s leadership campaign, and subsequently in the House of Lords, very focused on a number of issues, but specifically or predominantly foreign affairs, and Stewart is Vice Chair of Labour Friends of Ukraine.
Mykhailo Samus is Director of the New Geopolitics Research Network. He is speaking to us, as you can see with his Ukrainian flag, from Kyiv, and we are particularly delighted, Mykhailo, that you, in these very difficult times and very difficult situation, have found the time to be with us today. The New Geopolitics Research Network is an independent, non-partisan initiative, providing a think tank platform for researchers and academics. Mykhailo has been very involved in Ukrainian policymaking, but also more widely in the region, and we’re delighted to have you there.
So, as I say, this is also based on the assessment that I or we made of the UK’s role. I will just give you a few little bullet points, in – seen from my perspective, but talking to experts. A very strong UK response, particularly post the 24th of February, but also in the course of 2021, seeing the dangers perhaps more quickly than other countries. Politically, obviously, the British Government and the Ukrainian Government have been very close in this period.
I would offset that praise with serious question marks about the consistency of the UK’s relationship to Russia, over the last 30 years and London being renamed Londongrad, and very much the city above all else where Russian money has – and reputations have been laundered by British service industries. Chatham House did an excellent report on kleptocracy in London, not just Russian, but international, for some time.
Also question marks, very serious question marks, about the UK’s approach to Ukrainian refugees, a very poor record, as distinct from many Central and Eastern European countries and Western European countries, as well, and other question marks perhaps around the response to 2014. But I don’t want to pre-empt our speakers, those are just my introductory remarks. Orysia, over to you, and thank you.
Orysia Lutsevych
Thank you very much, John. You know, on the 24th of February, you know, the whole nation woke up to this horror of invasion that the country has been warned by both US and UK intelligence equally. But, you know, it’s one thing to imagine something happening, another one seeing it happening in such brutal and all-out way. It’s all-out war, and Ukraine is suffering deeply.
I am tuning in today from the Davos World Economic Forum, and I tell you that the Ukraine is not anywhere on the margins of discussions here with investors and policymakers, it’s right, front and central. And of course the whole world is concerned about, you know, the food crisis, the energy crisis, what this war, Russian aggression, will do to global economy, what it will do to the rise of right-wing populist movements, and how this can unsettle further our rule-based order.
And Ukrainians are, I would say, for the first time, listened more carefully and they are offering their response and answers how the whole world should respond jointly. And of course, we are looking at the UK specifically, and I must say, like, John, you say we never really focused on UK. I, for the last eight years, have been focused on Ukraine with the team and I our team was mainly looking at how Ukraine is transforming post-Euromaidan, and our approach was that we should not look at Ukraine through the Russian prism, through this post-Soviet space where Ukraine-Russia look alike.
And I must say UK share that vision in policymaking circles, that it’s – you know, Ukraine has a distinct path, and there was that understanding that always translated itself in support of European Union enlargement for Ukraine. And I’m talking, you know, in the 2000s, Ukraine wasn’t – UK wasn’t a strong supporter of enlargement, also supporter of NATO membership for Ukraine, because there was that understanding of a different destiny, and the keystone, I would say, of Ukraine’s security for a wider European continent.
Clearly, there was a good foundation going forward into the war, and as starting from the first Russian Ukrainian war, let’s not remember, for the first time, Russia brutally invaded Ukraine in 2014. This is the second Russian Ukrainian war, and at that time, there was a lot of ambiguity in the West, enabled by Russian disinformation, what this first war was about. Was it a civil war, was Crimea always Russian, aren’t there Russian speakers in Donbas?
So Russia did a lot on purpose to muddle the waters, and I think UK, from that very onset of the first Russian Ukrainian war was very clear that it was an act of aggression, that there was disinformation, and that there was a lot of effort put into countering that narratives. And I would say it was very forceful support of also how Ukraine saw this first invasion. And then it further developed in the post-Brexit Britain in a strategic agreement between the two countries, where of course, UK was looking for its purpose in a wider world, and Ukraine was one of those, you know, opportunities where UK could, in a way, be quite effective partner, not lost in, you know, a waste of global geopolitics, but here specifically focusing. And it was possible, because there was also an alignment of understanding of the Russian threat.
We – despite all this, you know, penetration of Russian money, you talk about real estate, city, all the enablers that helped Russian oligarchs to find safe havens in London. At the policy level, there was an understanding that Russia is a strategic threat, and the policy review again identified Russia as that challenge and threat to the United Kingdom.
So, we have seen UK, right after the beginning of the war, clearly saying, and it was Boris Johnson who was the first to say, that “Putin must fail.” I mean, it was quite forceful statement where everybody else was still sitting on the fence, and then from then on, we had from “Putin must fail” to that “we must push Putin out of Ukraine’s territory,” it was Liz Truss statement, that speech. And also, Ben Wallace’s essay that was actually even before the invasion, that was picked up in Ukraine as very significant, it was published in January 2022, when he was basically debunking those Russian narratives about NATO enlargement being the reason for Russia’s invas – future invasion on Ukraine.
So, all of this means that in a geopolitical sense, a geostrategic sense, Ukraine and UK are aligned in how this war must end, and I think this is key that this bilateral understanding remains, because we have to do a lot of work also in Continental Europe, with the French, with the German allies, within the NATO, and in – with the leadership of the United States, to ensure that there is action that is backing up that exactly outcome. Because if again Ukraine is stuck somewhere with their uncomfortable settlement, like it was in 2015, in the grey zone, where Russia is allowed to consolidate its territorial gains, we are likely to see the third war in the European Continent, allow – we should not allow Russia to remilitarise and upgrade its military force, and that is why, you know, there has to be a strong assessment of how Ukraine can be assisted now.
So, I would say that military aid from the UK came fast and quite substantial and was critical in that battlefield around Kyiv. I would say on the sanctions side, UK also pulled its act together quite fast and is moving towards more sanctions, with a large number of Russian oligarchs, but also decoupling from Russian oil, closing a capacity to use its ports, that was very significant, basically cutting off Russia from technology, and on Ukrainian side, helping Ukraine financially, that is key. UK is, if you look at the military and financial assistance, number two after the United States. That is significant, then European Union would come collectively as number three, and then all other countries. And even as percentage of GDP, UK is number six, where Estonia, Latvia and Poland is number one, so you could see substantial assistance.
And I finish here by just outlining the upcoming challenges because there’s a bit of complacency now saying, well, you know, Putin didn’t achieve his objectives in Kyiv, now it’s just the battle for Donbas. Let’s remember that Putin did not change his objectives to subjugate Ukraine to – you know, if he cannot subjugate to simply wreck it, that is why we must continue this coalition strengthening. And UK has a strong role to play here, to focus on the Black Sea, to focus on the North, especially Belarus, what will be happening there, to provide Ukraine financial assistance, and finally to enforce those sanctions forcefully. And we see some actions taking, whether – particular oligarchs now in Ukr – in the UK-based who are trying to bypass sanctions, and because Russians believe this unity will, you know, start falling apart, and this is the moment for them. We must not allow this to happen, and UK has a key role to play in this. Thank you.
John Kampfner
Thank you very much indeed, Orysia, for setting out the context and the perspective from Davos, the international perspective, and how it is being seen by senior figures around the world.
I will – when we come to the future-looking, the military side, and what happens from now, Mykhailo is going to take us forward from that, but first to you, Stewart, from a British parliamentary perspective, what’s your take on it?
Stewart Wood
Well, thank you, John, thank you for inviting me, and it’s a pleasure to speak alongside Orysia and Mykhailo, particularly. I’m just going to say a few things about the British response and the British approach, and start with I’m a Labour Politician and despite that, I think one of the most extraordinary things about the response has been the political unity across the spectrum, which has been incredibly good to see.
But let me start with the positives, and then I’ve got four reflections, not exactly criticisms, but reflections maybe on more ambiguous sides of our response. The positives are pretty clear. The UK, I know from Ukrainian friends and colleagues, is incredibly popular on the streets of the Ukraine, and Boris Johnson is, let’s be honest. A vocal critic of Putin, he was first out of the bloc, British military intelligence has been extremely useful, continues to be useful for Ukraine.
A friend of mine from Kharkiv had the following quote, he said to me, he said, “There are small countries who share our pain: Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, there’s the USA who we constantly have to nag and be wary of about pro-Putin factions, and then there is Boris’ UK Government who are always first to help, and more than pull their weight,” and I think that is a fair assessment of the last two months in particular. Although, as Orysia said, also Ben Wallace, intellectually I think, was making the case before that.
Boris’ visit also – Prime Minister’s visit was also extremely important I think for that. His unambiguous opposition to Putin’s Kremlin, and of course it’s very easy to burn bridges when your existing bridge is almost burnt anyway, but nevertheless, that it was an important absolutist position. And military assistance has become very important, impactful, iconic, the NLAWs, I know, the anti-tank weapons in general, Brimstone, NLAWs, the armoured vehicles, an extraordinary package agreed just two weeks ago again of GPS-jamming night vision devices, a set of military assistance, which is suitable for the next phase of the war, the Donbas, sort of, obliteration village-by-village and the fight that is going on. And, as I say, intelligence has also been very important, and I think actually, from a UK perspective, the success of the intelligence in spotting what was happening has been very important from the – which John will know a lot about in the sort of recalibration of our intelligence community after Iraq in particular, a long time ago as it is.
So, all those are good things, and I think there’s been very quiet, good work going on in the UN, increasing the frequency of meetings on the Ukraine and the Security Council, trying to isolate Russia more in the General Assembly, kicking Russia off of UN agency boards. And in general, the UK has been very important playing a part in making sure that the West’s response was, from a Putin point of view, surprisingly tough, determined, and swift. All that’s very good, and if you like your rhetoric very strong, Liz Truss is your Foreign Secretary, rejecting the idea of offering Putin a safe way out, talking about international criminal court proceedings, etc. So all that I think to be said.
But four things. Again, I don’t mean all these as criticisms, some of them are, but some of them are just reflections. The first one is a criticism and it goes back to John and Orysia’s research notes that you can read on the website, on the humanitarian response. I mean, it’s really been very, very poor. The initial response was pathetic, actually, only – you can only apply if you have family.
Then the Homes for Ukraine scheme has been brought in, and I think William on the comments has already said that other countries have problems with refugees, and that’s certainly true, but the UK scheme is notoriously like pulling teeth. It’s full of pitfalls, it’s administratively very complex, significant delays in processing. Matching process is now done much more through informal Facebook mechanisms, which a lot of people are concerned about the safety consequences of, the UN Refugee Agency is concerned about it, the volume of Ukrainians coming in as more families have been divided. It really is not a shining example of practical help for Ukrainians, despite our political and military support. That’s the first issue.
On Londongrad, I won’t go into too much detail in the second issue of the Londongrad problem. Just to say, as I’m sure – and John has said in his note, as well, that the important thing about Londongrad is the divorce, that British policy for so long divorced our political diplomatic isolation of Russia from commercial and economic closeness. These two worlds were separated. In fact, that’s been a general characteristic of British foreign policy across the piece, and this is an area where, there’s no doubt about it, that surely gave encouragement to senior Russian people, that the consequences of going further than 2014 would not come home to roost at an economic level.
Having said all that, though, on sanctions, the UK has been on industrial financial architecture and Central Bank sanctions, it has been in the lead. On individual sanctions, without going into details, it’s been a bit more foot-dragging, there’s currently – you know, for example, the Canadians have a very different view of Lebedev Senior than we do, for example. There’s all sorts of individuals, I think, who the UK could be much stronger on. I think there’s a broader issue, which is the EU and the US seems to be the main axis for the sanctions discussions, and the UK is a bit of a spectator on that apart from issues to do with the city of London.
Two – but two last reflections. The – and this is a difficult one to discuss because, as someone who founded Labour Friends of Ukraine, I’m very keen on us being shoulder-to-shoulder with the Ukraine through the whole horrific set of events that’s going on, but I do worry about Liz Truss and the UK’s Government’s rhetoric sometimes on this. I do feel that it could be more cautious and calibrated. At times, it feels to me like the Foreign Secretary is acting as a public lobbying voice within the NATO family about what the NATO position should be, and I’m not sure that’s to NATO’s benefit.
There are starting to be voices emerging about whether Putin should be allowed to lose completely, and I’m sure from a Ukrainian perspective, when you hear Kissinger’s remarks and others, it’s quite frightening, but there is an interesting and important, surely private, debate that needs to go on about this. And I wonder whether Jonathan Powell, Former Advisor – Foreign Policy Advisor to Blair, when he was Prime Minister, was right, when he said in The Financial Times, and I quote him here, “British Ministers are out competing each other to expand Ukraine’s war aims through aggressive rhetoric, calling for complete victory. This may be satisfying, but it is irresponsible. We appear dangerously close to being willing to fight to the last Ukrainian, but this is not our war. We are not fighting, and we don’t decide when it ends.” And I think that’s the important thing, that sometimes this rhetoric looks as though we are putting ourselves in the seat of judging when the right time to move towards negotiations is rather than being supportive of what Ukrainians want.
And at times, I do feel that the UK Government is almost having its own war aims,. It once briefed the Mansion House speech, in fact, as the UK’s war aims, rather than part of the NATO family of war aims. And I think this is all – this is a matter for debate, but one area where the rubber hits the road on this issue is, it’s a long way off, but when we get to a point, if we get to a point, when very, very un – messy discussions have to happen about how to emerge from this conflict, when the Ukrainians and Russians start to engage in that down the line, probably a long way down the line, when – can the UK play a part in this, given the absolutism of its rhetoric? I think that’s an interesting question from a very parochial UK point of view.
Last point, and this is really a broader point about UK foreign policy, which is I think one of the things that this conflict has thrown up from a UK point of view is the way in which the UK, under this government, is trying to animate the Global Britain agenda with a very different idea of British engagement in the world. And one way to think of it is, it’s trying to animate new coalitions of the willing, it’s doing it in various ways.
There’s lots of ideas floating around from speeches coming out of Government Ministers about the G7 becoming an economic NATO, the refloating of the D10 idea, which was the G7 plus Australia, South Peru, and India, which got a resounding thumbs down at the Cornwall G7 meeting, but it’s back again. There’s lots of ideas of having a sanctions committee of the G7 or of NATO, network of liberty idea, all sorts of new alliances building on alliances that Britain remains a central part of after Brexit, a part of the architecture here.
There’s an interesting question here, I think, about whether the EU recognises these new bodies, plays ball with them, or just – or doesn’t, and whether it undermines Britain’s role of engagement in existing multilateral institutions, in particular the UN. And I speak as the Chair of the United Nations Association, the UN has not had a very distinguished last two months, although I think it’s getting much better and more engaged now. But there’s a really interesting question about British thinking on the structures, and one big issue coming up, and I’ll finish on this note, where this could really be important is the NATO strategic concept discussion in Madrid, and I think that that discussion is obviously going to be very, very different to what was envisaged three months ago.
And one question is, will the British be in favour of a much more European identity within NATO emerging, or – which it traditionally has been very sceptical off? But all the pointers are towards more energy in that direction now, and that’ll be a test, I think, of whether Britain’s going to be an ally of intellectual imagination in ideas that perhaps it hasn’t supported in the past. I’ll stop there, thanks.
John Kampfner
Stewart, thank you very much indeed, there’s lots of questions that I’ve got and also the questions are beginning to come in. So without any further ado, over to you, Mykhailo, in Kyiv, and thank you very much.
Mykhailo Samus
Thank you very much for inviting me and it’s absolutely honour and pleasure to be here, to participate. Actually, it’s my first Chatham House event, so I’m really happy, and topic is very important.
I just want to remind you, of course, the – my colleagues talked a lot about the UK role and actually UK-Ukraine support. I just want to say thank you for United Kingdom, for people of United Kingdom, for all your support because it would be very, very difficult for Ukraine to stay against this absolutely crazy Russian aggression what they started in full scale on 24th of February. I just want to remind that in some case, in 2020/2021, when United States, it was – looked like a little bit out of the European issues and Ukraine felt like a little bit without fore on the legs, I mean, on the Western support, UK supported us, and I could – Orysia told a little bit about the UK support historically, but I’d like to underline it exactly.
In 2021, UK supported us on a Navy issue, and they – UK gave us £1.7 billion loan, especially for development of the Navy. In this programme, we’re, like, building – joint building of eight small missile ships, which is absolutely crazy important for Ukrainian Navy. And unfortunately, we didn’t get it on the practice together with another two smaller ships and two naval bases, and just it was a historical decision because we never built – after the collapse of [inaudible – 27:01], we never built a real, modern naval bases for Ukrainian Navy. And I personally, as I was very deep involved in development of Ukrainian Navy since 2005, and in the process of designing a force to Ukrainian [inaudible – 27:18], I remember that I was happy that UK was a leader of the process of, let’s say, rebuilding of Ukrainian Navy on the new basis.
So, UK exactly was a leader and driver of our Ukrainian support and military, especially naval and naval issue, and of course the – what I’d like to say now, I’m not talking about the military support, UK military support is the absolutely integral and critical now. And you know that compared to our – and other partners like Germany, which is now – is more joking in Ukraine, unfortunately, about the effectiveness of German support in military sphere. But UK making its calm in silent, but very effective, and I really like it because we found UK support on the frontline, not on the medias, on – talking about it, but exactly on the Ukrainian soldiers. So I think it’s absolutely effective.
One more issue what I’d like to say about geopolitics, so if we’re talking about the Ukrainian victory, let’s say it like this, Ukrainian victory could bring to our wider region absolutely crazy changes. And I think that sometimes, it looks like our partners in Germany and France, they started to understand that it could be dramatical changes in the economical and actually geopolitical model they had built for decades, actually, since even before collapse of Soviet Union, for example, Germany energy model, based on Russian gas.
Can you imagine if Ukraine win? It means that everything change, everything changing in economical and of course in geopolitical sphere. UK, Poland and Ukraine, of course, together with our Baltic brothers and Romania, for example, could change a lot, if we have a – our not only military, but I would say military, political, economical, union or something like framework, which actually started before 24th of February. And maybe you remember that Prime Minister Johnson arrived to Kyiv together with Prime Minister of Poland and they – Morawiecki, and they made a statement about the new trilateral framework for Ukraine and Poland and UK to provide not only military, but absolutely wider development for free nations.
And for Ukraine, it’s a critical important, because Ukraine is absolutely – especially if you’re talking about NATO and EU, of course we have a constitution that we are going to be a members, but looking at the effectiveness of NATO now, I’m sure that it’s not the highest level of possible, let’s say, effectiveness of this organisation. If you’re talking about the Ramstein coalition with 47 countries now, it’s – maybe it’s a future framework for security structure for – to support the European and maybe a little bit wider region to support security, stability, and maybe supporting each other.
So I think I will stop here. I saw some questions about the UK foreign policy, what is the actually objectives when UK supporting Ukraine? I think it will be a great question to discuss because, really, why UK should support Ukraine? Why UK should sacrifice something for Ukrainian people? Because Ukraine is pretty far from UK and traditionally, it’s actually the area of Russian interest, soviet interest, Russian and [inaudible – 31:34] interest, so why UK should care about this huge territory with – of course with a lot of problems that you remember this period of 30 years of Ukrainian independence of the course of Soviet Union.
It wasn’t absolutely great period for – if you’re talking about the ideal development of Ukrainian nation, we had a lot of problems, we have a lot of problems, but I think that our values, our democratic values, we should remember about it. Sometimes, in Ukraine, we think that our partners in Europe trying to forget about it. And of course, last sentence about some publications and synthesis from Europe that maybe we should sacrifice something, I mean, Ukrainians, and to give Putin some territories to stop this war, do not change the whole framework and model for economy, which we had for decades, and do not allow these problems in the military issue to make it energy, food crisis, etc. And so I think these voices, they are pragmatic voices, they – of course they are pragmatic, but Ukrainian decided to fight.
It was obviously – in 24th of February, it was even surprise for a lot of Ukrainians, that Zelenskyy told [inaudible – 32:56] fight here. It was really something new for Ukrainians for this news history, but in fact, we are fighting for three months and I think we will continue, and it’s – maybe it’s – for somebody, it’s bad news. Even not only in Russia, but in unfortunately – but it’s pra – yeah, it’s pragmatic point of view, it’s normally for somebody in Europe, of course. So I’m stop here and I hope for a great discussion because the topic is very interesting. Thank you very much.
John Kampfner
Thank you very much indeed, Mykhailo, that was excellent, and, yes, the question that Duncan Allen had posed, which is, “What is the UK’s strategic policy, what is its goal, and what should it be?” Let’s come to that, let’s help that frame this next general part of the conversation. We’ve also had some very interesting specific questions on specific areas of policy that we’ll come to, as well.
But Orysia, I wanted to come to you first on a couple of things that Stewart had said in the latter part of his remarks, which is the European element and the EU element of all of this, where you are in Davos, and obviously a lot of European, a lot of global players, but with the – talking about the strategic concept discussion in Madrid of NATO, the UK being outside the EU, the Americans very much looking at EU-NATO alignment on so many areas.
To what degree is that playing – one hears one side of Brexit, which is it gives Britain more flexibility, more – it allows it to be more fleet of foot, but ultimately, whenever the war comes to an end or there is a suspension of some form, and a new and hopefully more optimistic Ukraine emerges from it, its absolute top priority is membership of the EU. And that is the very organisation, institution, that the UK has chosen to leave, and whatever the fractures of relationships with Germany and France, they’re the key players in the EU. So, could you just, sort of, explain to me how you think that will playout, particularly with reference to how the UK will play this in the next period?
Orysia Lutsevych
Well, John, obviously Brexit was viewed with a lot of bewilderment in Ukraine because it was exactly the drive for this joining the club of European prosperous nations that Ukrainians, you know, were waving European flags and probably being the only European nation dying under the flag of the EU stars on Central Square of Maidan in 2014, let’s remember that. And that is why, when Putin attacked Ukraine, for that aspiration, for the country to depart from the Soviet space of autocracy and, you know, this kleptocracy exactly where Putin is ruling through the oil money-making deals, controlling the politics through his influence of, you know, corrupt deals with his senior Politicians. Ukrainians wanted a clear break from that.
Of course, fast forward to today, it’s significant that President Zelenskyy applied for candidate status for membership with the European Union, and Mykhailo will just confirm that in Ukrainian psyche, one of the component of victory of this war is a full-fledged membership in the European Union. That means also giving a better chance for Ukraine to rebuild Ukraine within their rule-based law, you know, being part of the largest market, and interestingly, of course, that is – this is no clarity yet what kind of decision will be taken in June by the commission.
There are again two camps: one is mostly Baltic states, Eastern Europe, you know, countries that understand why that membership perspective is important, and then you have French idea of this political union, circular, different circles. Kyiv is very clear, we don’t want to fudge it, you know, they say, “We will not accept anything other than candidate status.” Okay, maybe it will not be fast-tracked, I think actually it was a bit of a mistake to plug in that word because it gives an argument for opponents of the candidate status to say it cannot be fast-tracked.
So, Ukraine will do everything possible. Ukrainian civil society and governments are now talking to policymakers, especially in France and in Berlin, to basically say why that is needed. And I said, for my perspective, it is needed for any future peace settlement, and that will be viewed in Ukraine critical to have that candidate status, and second one, it’s one of the best insurances that you can have for its reconstruction investment in Ukraine.
And I think of course UK being outside, it’s not – it doesn’t have a immediate influence, but as part of the discussion on the reconstruction of Ukraine, rebuilding of Ukraine, UK will be a big donor. And at that donor discussion, UK should say that EU membership is exactly a good insurance for that, and that will make Ukraine compatible with the common European market. So I think it’s – this is how – the dynamic now, there’s still battle about that candidate status going on.
John Kampfner
Let’s – thank you, let’s get to the – that question that Duncan posed, which is, “What is the British strategy?” Stewart, you were talking about, and we’ve seen it so clearly, the very sharp rhetoric that Liz Truss uses, which of course is seemingly – and I was talking to a very senior Defence – UK Defence Official yesterday, causes some quite discomfort in some places, along with obviously a certain amount of political clarity, particularly when it comes to the next stage of negotiations.
Stewart, what do you think the policy from now, as the war is – as all wars do, they enter new phases and people are thinking about the summer and the autumn, and they’re thinking also, sadly, about a potentially very protracted, slow war, what should the policy now be?
Stewart Wood
Well, I think there’s – I think it’s two or three things. I think personally, it should be supporting the Ukraine and Ukraine Government’s ambitions. I think we should stick as close as possible to Zelenskyy and to the extent Zelenskyy represents the country, and I think he does still very much. So the Zelenskyy’s intransigence when he says it and hints at compromise when he says it, and that’s my – that was what I was trying to hint at earlier. I think sometimes our positioning puts us on the other side of things where Zelenskyy – as he did very early in the conflict, when he talked about reconciling Ukraine to reality on NATO, for example. It puts us in a slightly different position on that, so that’s the first thing.
I think it has to make clear – I think Russia has to – the UK position has to be that we need to be part of a Western, in fact, international coalition that shows Russia that the costs of landgrabs are so high that they shouldn’t be contemplated again. And that’s quite a high bar because we know that Putin has been doing this not just in Ukraine, but in Georgia and elsewhere, and – but I think that has to be – the costs of this outrageous act need to be reinforced, and I think that’s where international unity is so important.
I think there is a much more parochial UK aim, which is I think – and I’m – and this is by far nowhere near the most important thing, but I do think the Foreign Office and the UK in partic – the UK Government wants to be a player in the emerging events, in international events around the war and the settlement of the war. And I think this is where the – I don’t want to be one of these people that says that Brexit has caused problems in this, it’s got – I think it’s a mixed set of consequences, to be honest.
But what is interesting is, as Orysia just said, so much of the central ambition of Ukraine is with regard to the European Union, and a lot of the problems that are emer – that will emerge in the cracks, and hopefully they’re not more than just slight cracks, in international coalitions, are within the EU. For example, on Hungary, the severity of sanctions, the grad – the strategy to wean the EU off of dependence on Russian energy supplies. We are spectators on those issues, and that, I think, must be hugely frustrating for the UK, MoD, and Foreign Office, because they are integral to the set of institutions and incentives that are going to be part of an ultimate settlement, and are part of the navigation of the Western approach to this.
One remark in passing, when I used to – when I worked for Gordon Brown, what was clear – when I was looking at the interim, one of the people who led on the relations with the United States, what was clear was the United States thought of the European Union fundamentally as a security thing. Its primary importance to them was a security force. The UK, of course, Brexit was partly motivated by the – not wanting the European Union to be anything other than a purely trade organisation, but one of the paradoxes is that the Ukraine crisis has made the European Union much more of a security body than it ever has been before.
And there’s all these ideas knocking around, for example, about having a European Union Security Council, partly to have more of a security presence, and incidentally, partly also to have discussions with the UK and other NATO members, I think. These are unproblematic and a lot of smaller countries hate that sort of idea, but the EU is getting into the business of thinking of itself as a security player, irrespective of the acquis communautaire being not part of that thinking. Events are making this happen, and I think that that for me is one of the most interesting ambitions for UK policy, is can it establish new ways of working with the EU in particular, but not just with the EU, which enable this ambition for a strong Western alliance to be not just daily statements, but actually institutionalised?
John Kampfner
Thank you very much. We’ve got a whole welter of questions coming in, and I think, for reasons of speed, I’m going to re – pick a few and read them out rather than going to the questioners, if you would forgive me, questioners. To you, Mykhailo, a specific one, “How can the UK help better to protect Odessa and keep port and shipping routes open through the Black Sea?” and we’ve got the wider global question now of grain and food instability and food poverty. This is an absolutely crucial question, naval access.
Mykhailo Samus
Well, thank you very much for question. I think it – this question is, of course, the – connected with previous discussion, and I would say the problem of NATO and EU before 24th of February, unfortunately, from my opinion, was the lack of the let’s say, leadership and responsibility, or trying to be responsible for – not only for internal affairs in NATO and EU, but a little bit beyond. And we had a lot of discussion with our NATO and EU partners, and we are talking about the Black Sea.
I always personally told that, for example, NATO should issue responsibility and leadership finally on this region. If you’d like to stop Russian dominating here, because we told that our – like, five years ago, three years ago, and especially a couple of years ago, we’re told that finally Russia bec – Russia make – made, from the Black Sea, it’s a Russian lake, and it’s total dominance. We don’t have NATO at all here, we don’t – of course, it’s – we could say about the visiting Konstanz Odessa, we could say that the – some joined exercises, but it’s not enough to stop Russia, to prevent Russia to make it Russian lake.
Unfortunately, NATO didn’t make any step, concrete step, to be a leader on this region, to create, for example, at least joint command in Konstanza or some permanent unit navy – naval unit in Black Sea for NATO. I would say that to make it contingency plan, what if, if Russia, for example, make a total blockade of some not even Ukrainian port, of course, it’s – Ukraine is not a member, but, for example, Konstanz, or a separate island, separate island. It’s a critical point, not only for Ukraine but for Romania, for Danube, and now we have all these problems on the table, and unfortunately, NATO doesn’t have any solutions.
Talking about the – what could be the real solution, practical solution, to how to help Ukrainian ports of Odessa to provide some food and other supply in commercial communications and navigation, I think from my point of view, unfortunately, I have only mix of military and diplomatic way. First of all, Ukraine needs to have anti-ship missiles. Neptune made – Ukraine missile Neptune made a great job to show that Ukraine is ready to destroy and hit Russian naval ships, and missile crews [inaudible – 46:26] is the first example of Ukrainian naval brave to stop Russians and it was a very nice signal for Russian at all. I mean, maybe since Second World War that somebody killed they ship in Black Sea, it was kind of absolutely crazy situation for them, mentally.
Now is the situation that I think that Ukraine has some nettles, but kind of several doses. We need hundreds of [inaudible – 46:58] missiles to provide military threat for Russians, and maybe after this, we could ask UK or maybe other – our partners and friends to provide some maybe support, naval support, and diplomatic support to secure the ships, commercial ships, from Odessa to straits to have a navigation. Because any – from my opinion and my experience, any agreement, any deal with Russians now on diplomatic let’s say corridor, it will be a disaster. It will be blackmail for Russian side, and it will be – I’m sure it won’t be effective anyway because Russia will use it to – even to make even more dominance in Black Sea rather than try to solve the problem. This is true and this is our experience, unfortunately. Thank you.
Orysia Lutsevych
John, do you mind if I just chip in to explain the current – I mean, one of the – Ukraine is trying to take as responsible position on the food supply globally as possible, while Russia is trying to blackmail the world by saying, “Lift the sanctions then and get our grain,” and Russia steals Ukrainian grain, trying to sell it, you know, to – shipping to Egypt, Egypt refused to take the tanker, they parked it in Syria.
So we’re having some, you know, outrageous things going on, but the effort is now, and Russians obstructing this effort, to get some of the Ukrainian grains through the bridging of Danube River through to Romania and that bridge is being constantly bombarded. So you see what Russia does is trying to hold the world hostage to hunger and put pressure exactly on Western coalition to crack on Ukraine, to start lifting some sanctions in order to solve the problem.
And this is maybe what Stewart said, referring to Jonathan Powell’s open in the FT. Clearly, it’s not – the West should not fight to the last Ukrainian, but it – I agree that Ukraine and its Western alliance should closely co-ordinate the ending of this war on the terms that again will increase security of Europe, not decrease it. Because already we see the high cost of Ukrainian lives, economy, you know, infrastructure, global cascading effect, so this is not perhaps our war, like the way it sounds from the West, but unless that Putinism as a doctrine that allows for these landgrabs, and, Stewart, I don’t know what kind of cost we have to inflict on Russia to stop it. Frankly speaking, very little. I think the only way to stop it, what Mykhailo says, is the military power, where Putin will have to be – Putinism will have to be contained back to Russian territory and let them run Russia the way they want, without inflicting so much damage on the rest of the world.
John Kampfner
Let me ask all of you this question, interesting one from Paddy Quake, I think it is, if my pronunciation is correct, and apologies if it isn’t. He lists the mistakes that have been made, in terms of strategic assessments, Russia’s and the West’s, in terms of the prosecution of the war until this point. But he predicts that a long and protracted war is more and more inevitable, and what are the chances of the West, which is already splintering in its support, in the face of the cost of sanctions?
And it’s a strange question to come to you, Mykhailo, in Kyiv, you have much more urgent questions to worry about than thinking about British, French, German, consumers and residents, whose oil and gas and heating bills have doubled, trebled, quadrupled, but it is a fact. And the concern I think we all have is that come the start of autumn and winter – this war is already coming off the front pages or the lead story in many European and American publications as other things emerge and wars have a habit of going on a long time and just fading from our memory, how great is that concern that the pub – that public opinion, opinion polls, will be pushing both Johnson, who’s in a difficult situation, facing all kinds of negative publicity that we’re all aware of, but also separate questions in other European countries, we have Joe Biden and the midterms in America, that’s there just going to be – even if it’s not spoken, it’s going to be a tacit pressure on Ukraine from other countries to stay – to say, “Oh, come on, guys, can’t you just cut a deal?”
Mykhailo Samus
Absolutely, thank you for question. To be honest, in Ukraine, a lot of people, they don’t understand this. They think that, like, in Europe, we have only friends and brothers, and they actually – they wake up in the morning and are thinking about Ukraine, and very often, I like to explain then, that absolutely not. If – in Paris, they are thinking about the French national interests, in Berlin about the German national interests, and they don’t care actually about Ukraine as well like Ukrainians, and I’m asking, “Are you remember the – do you remember the Balkan Wars actually in 1994? Have you remembered that Ukrainians care about the Bosnians or, I don’t know, and other nations?”
So crazy, like, for example, UK and other European nations care about us, and for Ukrainians, it’s surprising, they – we think that we should be a leader of the process of fighting. Talking about the – of course the trying for – trying of the Russian and of, like, Putin regimen and trying to – of course they prolong this process in trying to blackmail European partners, especially in energy, and of course on global level of food issue. Because, to be honest, when I look at the Germany now, I cannot see the practical steps how to change the energy dependence on Germany in reality, because I see it from Poland, I see it from – even from Balkan states, I see it from a Czech Republic, Slovakia, of course Baltic states.
Every day we have a practical news that they change these, that they build a new interconnection, they build new pipelines. From Germany’s side, I didn’t see it, and I suspect that they expect something different, like 2014, September, something like this. So, unfortunately, it’s my, like, I don’t know, feelings that a lot of people in Europe, they think that Ukraine will stop to fight, and Russia will change this situation, and trying to make Ukrainians military way, like in September 2014, to sign something, to sign any agreement, to stop the global war, because a lot of, I would say, large businessmen in Europe started to understand, if Ukraine wins, it will be absolutely crazy global changes. Global everything, global model frameworks, links, whatever.
Even China understood. China are sitting calm now because they understood that one way one belt strategy now absolutely get rid of if Ukraine wins. So, for the – I would say now, like, for German oligarchs, it’s a huge challenge because of – if Ukraine wins, it’s absolutely crazy, and that’s why I think that, unfortunately, for Ukraine now it’s a critical role of Ukrainian armed forces on the battlefield, changing geopolitical situation and geopolitical picture globally. This is true. So we are – all depends on the Ukrainian armed forces, how they successfully defending Ukraine against Russian aggressors. Thank you.
John Kampfner
Thank you. Stewart, to you we – yesterday, today’s front pages were all about our little local difficulty with too many parties in 10 Downing Street, and with the bigger question of the cost of living crisis and the government responses to that. How do you – what is your answer to my question about making sure that UK involvement with Ukraine, and insofar as we have influence on others, that it remains as sharp now as it did on February 24th?
Stewart Wood
Yeah, well, it will obviously get more difficult, but UK public opinion is incredibly solid. I mean, you’ve still got 60%, you know, very strong support for the government’s actions on this, it doesn’t seem to be going down. There is obviously huge anxiety about cost of living issues, today’s politics is all about that, for example, but I don’t actually see the trade-off yet. I’m not saying there won’t be stresses and strains.
For me, I think I’ll quote the three cracks in the coalition that Mykhailo was talking about, which I think are worth looking at. I think that what’s happening is that there is a – there’s a settling of a view here in the West, and particularly in the UK, that we’re now into this phase of, sort of, the Donbasisation of the war, that essentially you’re having this, sort of, village-by-village, town-by-town, you know, brutal, but Russian attempts to take, you know, yards or even, you know, half a mile at a time, and that that’s the phase of the war we’re in. And the risk of that is that if it goes on like that week-after-week, as you say, it goes down and down the news’ agenda and people stop seeing the trade-offs.
But I think a few things might break that. One is the grain crisis, which we’ve talked about, I think the grain and food crisis is going to require an international collaborative action. Mykhailo talked about the Black Sea side of that, you know, there’s only so much that rail diversion can do. That will also – if anything does emerge, and I know there’s huge discussions going on at the moment internationally, UN and of course bilaterally and multilaterally, if anything does happen, Britain’s going to be a key player in any naval action of course in that. So that will be a, sort of, accelerator or a change of things. But in terms of cracks in the coalition, the two – the three things to look out for, in my view, one is tensions between Hungary inside the EU, not just Hungary, but nations that have – are queasy about isolating Russia so fundamentally.
Secondly, Germany. I mean, John, you and I know Germany quite well, I guess. I look at Germany one day and I think it’s extraordinary how far they’ve come in two months, and I look at Germany another day, and like Mykhailo, I think, “Well, you know, is – really, are they really going to not do more?” And I don’t quite know how to feel about Germany. I think, from a historical point of view, it’s amazing the shift that Olaf Scholz has brought about in energy and military engagement, but there’s a long way to go, and I think German nerve holding is really important. And I imagine that Macron will be doing lots of peace envoy, sort of, intimations, as well, which go down in a mixed way, I know, in Ukraine, he does that, so there’s EU cracks.
But the third thing to look out for, very briefly, is the United States. See, in the United States, and Kissinger is obviously not close to the Biden administration, but there are people like Bill Burns who are saying things, which are not Kissingeresque, but Bill Burns has said, you know, “Putin cannot contemplate – cannot afford to lose,” and it’s only one step from saying he cannot afford to lose to saying, and therefore we need to meet him in some way.
And I think there are probably voices inside the Biden administration that are at least starting to think about, not giving up at all, no way that, but what the, kind of, plan B is, in terms of negotiated outcomes. Actually, I’d like to think they are thinking about that, I hope they don’t talk about it, but I want them to be thinking about those things, as well, and – but I – the question is whether American isolationism starts to tip towards those voices becoming more sceptical of continued engagement. At the moment, the $30 billion package or whatever it was last week, sorry, was it more than $30 billion? It was $300 billion, wasn’t it? It was huge, it was – I mean, that’s a gr…
Orysia Lutsevych
40 billion, Stewart.
Stewart Wood
Oh, 40, excuse me, it wasn’t 300, my zero’s out of place, 40 billion. I mean, it’s an extraordinary sign of commitment. So I wouldn’t worry about this yet, but I think in the – over the next few months, that’s the one to watch out for, I think.
John Kampfner
Yeah, I’m afraid it would take us another hour to talk about Germany, but we – we’re not able to do that, and in fact we are up against time, so final word to you, Orysia, on these points, but also just – and we have to be very brief, so just in a minute or so. If there’s a single one thing the UK can and should do from now that would help Ukraine’s cause, what might it be?
Orysia Lutsevych
Well, I would say something we didn’t mention is the Budapest Memorandum, and the key role for UK in Ukraine’s security. Sorry, I’m leaving it for the third, but let’s remember that commitment, and let’s contemplate how we can reframe that commitment today. I mean, we see more UK’s involvement and Sweden and Finland, I think those two countries’ membership in NATO will change also Ukraine prospects for possible NATO membership. And here, UK also has a role to play, and immediately, I think, Ukraine needs a much longer range, artillery missiles, armed vehicles, and I subscribe to what Mykhailo said, that of course we need quite succ – good success on the battlefield to have the best possible negotiated outcome.
And finally, in Ukraine already and here in Davos, people are talking about rebuilding Ukraine. That will be billions of, you know, pounds, dollars and euro, and I think UK has an incredible role to play in bringing innovation in governance, because I think, despite all the Home Office disasters with the visa issuing, there’s still a lot in good governance in the UK, in technology. And having a stake in Ukraine’s economy through investment, I think this can really cement our bilateral relation, and it’s time to start thinking about those things, as well, because there’s always hope in the dark, that’s what I personally believe.
John Kampfner
That’s a brilliantly succinct, but also optimistic way to end our discussion. Thank you all very much indeed. Thank you to the Chatham House Events Team and thank you very much to all of you who have attended, who have asked questions, apologies to those questions that I wasn’t able to address, and particular thanks to our three speakers: Stewart Wood in London, Orysia Lutsevych, who’s currently in Davos, and Mykhailo Samus, who is in Kyiv. We wish you all the best, we wish Ukraine the best for the next period. I certainly have learnt a lot from this session, and I thank you all very much indeed for participating in it. Thanks very much and goodbye everybody.
Orysia Lutsevych
Thank you, John.
