Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
Good afternoon, or good evening, or good morning, depending on your time zone. My name is Dr Chietigj Bajpaee. I am Senior Research Fellow for South Asia at Chatham House. Thank you for joining this event on relations between India and Pakistan, in the aftermath of the recent and ongoing hostilities between both countries.
It can be difficult to agree on the facts of what happened over the last month, given the propaganda war which has proceeded alongside the military conflict, but here is what we know definitively. 26 people, 25 Indian nationals and one Nepalese, were killed in a terror attack in Pahalgam in Jammu and Kashmir on the 22nd of April. Pakista – India blamed Pakistan for the attack and then responded with a military operation, Operation Sindoor, on the 7th of May, an early morning, 25-minute co-ordinated military operation, in which it reportedly struck nine targets inside Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir.
Pakistan then responded with its own military operation, Banyan Marsoos, and we saw a tit-for-tat escalation, with both countries essentially trying to hit each other’s military infrastructure. A ceasefire was declared on the 10th of May, following a conversation between both countries’ DGMOs, Director General of Military Operations, and this brought an end to four days of military hostilities between both countries. And it remains in effect, although we have seen some reported violations, but we have yet to return to the pre-22nd April status quo.
So, the punitive non-military actions that were taken by both countries note – still remain in effect, most notably, the Indus Water Treaty remains in abeyance, after India suspended the agreement following the terrorist attack. Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the Indian Prime Minister, gave a speech last week in which he noted that another terror attack would be considered an act of war. Both sides have essentially claimed victory, and in this context, one could argue that it’s not a question of if, but when, we see a resumption of hostilities.
So, to discuss where we stand now and how developments could in – evolve, we have an excellent panel of speakers with us today. Dr Anit Mukherjee is a Senior Lecturer at the India Institute, at King’s College London. I won’t go through his full profile, but I will note that he was formerly a Major in the Indian Army and an alumni of India’s National Defence Academy. Dr Ayesha Siddiqua, is a Senior Fellow in the Department of War Studies, also at King’s College London, she’s also served in Pakistan’s Civil Service and is Author of two excellent books on Pakistan’s military. And then, finally, we have Victoria Schofield, an award-winning Historian, she’s published more books than I can mention here, but I – for the purpose of this discussion, I will note that she’s Author of two excellent books on Kashmir.
So, we’ll start with a guided discussion for the first half an hour, or so, and then we’ll open up for audience questions. Please feel free to type your questions in the Q&A box over the course of the event, and I’ll direct the relevant question to the relevant panellist on your behalf. This event is on the record, and it will be posted on the Chatham House website.
So, let’s get started. So, there’s obviously a lot of historical baggage when we talk about India-Pakistan relations, although I don’t agree with President Trump’s claim that these two countries have been fighting for 1,000 years, but I would like to keep the discussion as forward-looking as possible. So, Anit, if I could start with you. The Indian Government and the press is reporting that this has been a win for India, in terms of the ability to repel Pakistan’s air strikes and hit terror and military infrastructure inside Pakistan.
But if I could play devil’s advocate for a moment, you know, the perpetrators of the terror attack on the 22nd of April have yet to be apprehended, and through the most recent hostilities, Islamabad has managed, to some degree, to rehyphenate the India-Pakistan relationship and it’s also managed to re-internationalise the Kashmir issue, so to new Delhi’s frustration. So, given that, was what we saw a tactical rather than a strategic victory for India?
Dr Anit Mukherjee
Thanks so much. It is really good to be here. It’s an honour to be a part of this panel. So, I think if you’re talking about how it has been perceived, not just India, kind of, internationally, since the nuclear test in, like, 1998, Pakistan has been under an illusion that nuclear weapons gives it enough leeway to wage sub-conventional war against India. And India has been facing the consequences of that assumption since 1990. We faced it with the Kargil War, we faced with the 2001 and 2002, kind of, crisis, we faced it with the 2008 attacks.
So, for the last 20 years, there has been a belief in Pakistan that because of nuclear war, because of international, kind of, pressure generated with nuclear conditions, there’s enough space to continue to bleed India. What 2025 did effectively was to puncture that myth. Was to say that the strategy that they are embarking on since the late 1990s of continuing to nurture terrorist groups, of continuing to support terrorist groups, and of continuing to build up the infrastructures of terror, will have costs associated on Pakistan.
And in that sense, whether it is re-hyphenation, I’m not sure if it is re-hyphenation, right? If you look at India’s economic story, if you look at Pakistan’s economic storyline, I don’t think any country that wants to do business anywhere in the world would choose Pakistan over India. So, I think – I don’t think it is re-hyphenation. I think on the other – I mean, on the other hand, the world is, again, refocusing on the concerns of, why are these terror groups continuing to operate, continuing to train, continuing to attack India? And I think, in that sense, it’s not re-hyphenation, it’s bringing the focus back on the fundamental problem that lies in the bilateral relationship, which is continued terrorism on India.
In terms of international support, I think the world would choose India over Pakistan on any given day. And in terms of terrorist infrastructure, I’d actually, kind of, go back to this idea of terrorist infrastructure, in part, because you did speak about my time in the army, and go back to stories, I tell stories these days, in part, because I have two small kids, so every night I tell them stories. But I’ll tell a – I’ll start with a really small story, this is about 2000 summer, this is a year after the Kargil War, the Jaish-e-Mohammed group had just come into existence, and Jaish terrorists were operating inside Indian Kashmir. Among the few encounters we had, we used to capture what were called, you know – they used to go around with goods, so we captured a diary of a Jaish terrorist. And one of the diaries said – alleged about a so-called partnership between the Hindu-Christian-Jewish alliance.
Now, this is a worldview that was perpetuating in 2000 – in the year 2000. I laughed at it then, I was a very junior Officer, I was like, “What Hindu-Christian-Jewish alliance?” Well, seven/eight years later, the 2008 attacks, the attacks on the Chabad House, as well as the attacks on Daniel Pearl, actually bought us this worldview into being. And I think the Indian argument is simple, we do want to have good relations with Pakistan, we have no enmity against the people of Pakistan. But we cannot have that as long as what Hillary, kind of, Clinton has called the “monsters,” as long as the monsters continue to perpetuate and attack India.
And so, it was not just the 2008 attacks, and you see that, sort of, ideological worldview, that is not just dangerous for India, because we are facing the direct price of that. It’s dangerous for Pakistan, it’s dangerous for the world at large, and I think if we can focus on how do we cut – shutdown the infrastructure of terror, then the – then, you know, the Indian Prime Minister went to Lahore, the Indian Prime Minister gave access to Pakistani Investigators to the Indian Air Force Base. No other Prime Minister historically has done that.
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
Hmmm.
Dr Anit Mukherjee
I do believe the Indian – that India itself wants peace with the people of Pakistan, but not as long as these infrastructures of terror continue to exist. Thank you.
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
Thank you, Anit. Ayesha, if I could turn to you. You know, before the 22nd of April, the Pakistani Military appeared to be on the backfoot. So, following a string of attacks, terrorist attacks, that we’ve seen inside Pakistan, most notably the attack on the Jaffar Express in Balochistan in March, this plus the, you know, the arrest and conviction of Imran Khan and the purge of his party, the PTI, it appeared to have, I think, undermined the image of the Pakistani Military to some degree within the country. To what degree has the recent conflict helped to revi – reverse some of these trends and revive the image of the Pakistani Military?
Dr Ayesha Siddiqua
Right. Thank you so much, and delighted to be here at – you know, for this event. But let me, kind of, step back for a second and just insist on two things, which I think that are important to understand. Firstly, I don’t think that Pakistan, or Pakistani decisionmakers, are even bothered about coming close to India economically. Yes, General Asim Munir has been talking about Pakistan becoming a “$1 trillion economy,” and all of that, but, you know, we in Pakistan never looked at it – the claims very seriously. And I think when, you know, Anit talks about “hyphenation” of Pakistan, I don’t think that Pakistan at all has focused on hyphenation of India and Pakistan in terms of which is the more, kind of, performing economy, performing country.
And in fact, you know, if you were a Pakistani General, you would be looking at the situation and say that, “Look, if a war is started, war may not get started because India, as a more successful economy, would also begin to, at some point, calculate the cost of warfare for itself, for its economy.” So, it’s not necessarily from Pakistani GHQ seen as India’s strength, rather than a shortcoming, I mean, a concern that would stop war. So, it’s not just the nuclear issue which would, you know, keep India back from escalating, but also be mindful the damage it can do to Indian economy. So, that hyphenation, I don’t think Pakistan Army is bothered about it.
The other thing is that the hyphenation where it happened was that Donald Trump, Pakistan is no longer the frontline state for the United States, yet between the first term and the second term, first term, he – Donald Trump mentioned it once. This was after Pulwama-Balakot crisis, that, you know, “I can sort out the Kashmir issue.” And he was told very gently by Delhi to, kind of, keep quiet, and he did. This time around, he’s mentioned it several times. So – and I don’t think that, you know, India would allow that even this time, but Pakistani Generals, Pakistani audience is thoroughly enjoying it. That’s been six/seven times that he’s mentioned, so there is that hyphenation. So, we may not be a successful state, but the fact that we are talked about in the same breath as India is success enough.
The other thing which I think is important for the army, you know, is that, firstly, I think that the anti-army sentiment was always skin deep. It was, basically, about bring Imran Khan back, bring the right leadership back. Now, what a war did, what a conflict did, and I think nobody – the problem in India is that Indian observers, Pakistan observers, definitely even at the highest level of diplomacy, do not have enough knowledge of their neighbourhood and definitely not Pakistan, so they’re generalisations that they, kind of, jump on.
So, yes, Imran Khan is the popular guy, people were unhappy, there was unhappiness in the army as well, but when you throw a war at them, that’s when people come together. Now, that does not necessarily mean that the Baloch insurgents are going to be – become – turn friends, but then the Baloch themselves are a smaller number of population in Pakistan, as compared to the bulk, which is Punjab and also Sindh. Sindh and Punjab, which makes the two plains of Pakistan, there, you know, there is – there was a lot of anxiety, initially driven by this whole debate about, you know, the Indus Water Treaty being held in abeyance and then the war itself.
So, the war is actually – and I think one thing which is important for Pakistan is that, you know, when you were reading out the list of where – what – the successes, you know, kind of, diplomatic, political – geopolitical successes for Pakistan in this conflict, you know, that Kash – that Pakistan has been hyphenated, Kashmir has been internationalised. But I think another major thing is that terrorism has not been condemned and talked about, whether be it the international media or – I mean, yes, there has been sympathy for India, for the attack in Pahalgam. Yet the, kind of, pressure that would come to Pakistan – in fact, what I learnt from this event was that actually FATF, Financial Action Task Force, in some ways had become ineffective and, you know, it had done its – you know, what it had to achieve and then no more. Because, you know, why start with Pahalgam? In fact, in the last one and half year, there have been consistent attacks in Jammu. So, the learning was that, you know, actually, you know, the international community doesn’t, kind of, get together.
And one last point which I’d like to make at this point in time, is that, you know, that the way things evolved had to come – you know, had to, kind of, play out this way. Primarily because the – of the realisation that definitely, Indian Military has an – or India has a numerical asymmetry with Pakistan, but not a qualitative – qualitatively, there is a symmetry. And therefore, the pressure that these attacks were supposed to do, you know, the results they would – you know, they were supposed to have, didn’t come about. And if – in fact, if you compare it with Kargil, between Kargil and 2002, you would see that that’s when India could actually deter. I mean, General Musharraf, either honestly or dishonestly, however you may, kind of, go into the details of his actions, but he did try to, kind of, curb – you know, close down a lot of these militant camps, madrassas, etc., etc., he did make an effort. He was deterred, that’s where India’s deterrence worked.
Now, this time around, India’s deterrence, despite its larger economy, despite that, you know, the Indian audience would not like to see this hyphenation, actually, this deterrence hasn’t worked. These groups are still there, in fact, there’s a tighter embrace. There will be a tighter embrace between the military and militants, primarily because there is no international pressure, and when there was that pressure, when India could deter General Musharraf, that was part of – India was part of the story. The other part of the story was that the international community at that point in time, after 9/11, was so concerned about terrorism, about, you know, global terrorism, about these jihadi groups, so these two pressures had come together to deter him. This time it didn’t work.
And so, what we have now is cessation of hostilities, but not end of hostilities, because both sides are measuring, both sides are looking at – and, you know, from Pakistan’s perspective, the military has just gained, I would say, 70 points. There’s not a single party, political party, not a single political party, including the newly emerging leftist parties, who are – I mean, they’re all clapping for the military. They’re, like, “We’re there, whatever you tell us, we’ll do it,” from People’s Party to PMLN, there’s not a single party – and PTI as well. PTI has differences, but the recent statement which Imran Khan issued from his jail cell, it’s, basically, saying, “I always told you Modi was a bad guy, I always told you India didn’t intend to have peace, and yes, I’m with you.” I mean, he’s trying to play it to his advantage in a different way, to make himself popular amongst the military, so he becomes acceptable, but that is not the breaking point for the military anymore. I’ll stop here.
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
Thank you, Ayesha. We’ll come back to the point of the, sort of, the international response and reaction to what happened, but Victoria, I wanted to turn to you on the issue of Kashmir. So, before the 22nd of April, I think the Indian Government had been, you know, touting the return of normalcy to Jammu and Kashmir, you know, following the decision to rescind the territory’s special autonomous status, Article 370, in 2019. And then we saw elections last year, which were relatively peaceful, with a high voter turnout, we’ve seen a surge in tourism inflows.
So, my question, and maybe it’s a two-part question, you know, one, is, you know, what is – what – how do you see the future of Kashmir after the most recent period of hostility? And then perhaps as a follow-up to that, are there any potential de-escalation pathways from what we’ve seen? So, whether it be the return of statehood to the territory, you know, some form of enhanced autonomy for Jammu and Kashmir, short of, you know, obviously reinstating Article 370, or for instance, a reinstatement of the Indus Water Treaty.
Victoria Schofield
Thank you so much, and I’m delighted, also, to be part of this panel. I think actually, listening both to Anit and Ayesha, this is all very depressing, because we’re very much talking about India-Pakistan and we’re – we don’t seem to be thinking about the people who live in the region. And what actually has happened is you’ve had a very, very serious, brutal terrorist attack, which has suddenly put in train a potential war between India and Pakistan. But that’s certainly not getting us anywhere towards “resolution” of the issue, and what we really must say it’s resolution of the Jammu, Kashmir issue. It’s not just the Valley of Kashmir we’re talking about, we’re talking about the state, and it’s the state which remains the – what you like to call the “core issue,” the “bone of contention” between India and Pakistan, and which has contributed over these past 80 years to their poor relationship.
And I think, listening to Anit and saying dismantling the infrastructure of terror, we’ve got to look at dismantling, what causes that terror, what causes that disaffection, what causes that resentment. Why have people picked up arms? Why have they perpetrated these terrible acts? And, of course, it’s a pattern that we’ve been seeing. When I published – you very kindly said I’ve written on Kashmir, and I have, I’ve been working on Kashmir for over 30 years, when I published my first book on Kashmir, I was ending it with the terrorist attack in Pahalgam in 1995, and, you know, this is cyclical. There’ll be a terror attack there’ll be a reaction to that terror attack, then there’ll be a drawback and some face saving. Both sides will, sort of, feel that they’ve achieved what they want to achieve. I think, Anit, you talked about punching Pakistan’s bubble, bursting the bubble here in 2025. I think it was probably burst in 2019, when for the first time since the 71 war, India crossed into interna – in – crossed the international frontier. It didn’t just operate into Pakistani-administered Kashmir.
So, what I think we really have to focus on is not so much dismantling. I mean, you can hit one terror camp, it’ll move to somewhere else. You’ve got to dismantle the ideology. I mean, we in the West saw the problems of the “War on Terror,” so to speak, in Afghanistan. You’ve got to eliminate the causes, because what we really have found is that groups of individuals, whether it’s, you know – however it’s sponsored from the Pakistan Army, the Pakistan Intelligence Services, they’re using this Kashmir cause as a totem, in a way, to perpetrate acts of terror. It’s not helping the Kashmiri people, and you’ve only got to read the latest accounts from both sides of the line of control, the suffering that this “Four-Day War,” so to speak, has caused on their people to make you weep. And I think that’s where we’ve got to look at it.
The return to normalcy, yes, the Indian Government has been trying very hard to make everything better for the inhabitants of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, mind you, while continuing to claim that area which is administered currently by Pakistan, not only the small strip of land which Pakistanis call “Azad Jammu and Kashmir,” Indians call “Pakistan-occupied Kashmir,” but also Gilgit-Baltistan. So, there’s a whole raft of issues which have to be discussed at the negotiating table, but equally, you have to work out where is this resentment coming from that people will perpetrate these acts of terror? And meanwhile, what can be done for the inhabitants living in the region, which is continually a type of battlefield?
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
Thank you, Victoria. I can see that Anit and Ayesha have both raised their hands, so I will let them respond. But I wanted to actually just make sure that we keep moving forward, Anit, I wanted to also pose a question to you. You can respond to that question, as well as whatever points you have. So, you know, we see that both countries appear to be moving up the escalation ladder, both in terms of the targets that were hit, that went beyond Indian and Pakistan-administered Kashmir into both countries’ heartlands, and also in terms of the type of military platforms that were, you know, sort of, employed. We saw the extensive use of drones, for instance.
So, under the Modi Government, there seems to have been a clear momentum towards moving up the escalation ladder, so from 2016, the surgical strikes, 2019 air strikes, and then last week’s Operation Sindoor. My question is, is it actually working in deterring further acts of cross-border terrorism? And perhaps just as a add-on to that, there have been reports, although denied by both governments, that, you know, Pakistan’s Nuclear Command Authority had convened, that India had struck the Nur Khan and Kirana Hills Air Base, which raised the risk of nuclear escalation. And then, of course, last week’s speech by Prime Minister Modi noted that India would no longer tolerate “nuclear blackmail.” So, where do these developments leave the credibility of both countries’ nuclear deterrence postures, as they move up this escalation ladder? So, over to you, Anit, please go ahead.
Dr Anit Mukherjee
Thank you so much. This has been a fascinating talk so far. So, very, very quickly, to Ayesha’s point, if India’s wealth is a problem, I’d rather take that problem on any given day. In fact, with each day, with each year, with each month, as India continues to grow wealthy, you might think it might actually have more to lose, but the wealth will give its other advantages in terms of other capabilities that would come in helpful, and it has the side effect of making our people live better lives.
Trump as a mediator, be careful here. I think Trump made a rookie mistake on that on that particular trip. I’m pretty sure that the US administration knows the deals that are at stake here, it knows the choices that it’s going to make. Just give it a couple of more months and you might hear a different tune from Trump.
In terms of the qualitative symmetry, I’m not sure I would agree that there is a qualitative symmetry in between the two armed forces. If you look at the targets that the Indian Armed Forces hit, not just the nine terrorist camps, which are different from the Pakistan Army assets or the nine specific terrorist camps, but also subsequent escalation where it hit Islamabad and other important air bases. I think in terms of qualitative and quantitatively, I think it’s a very different capability, in terms of not just bringing down the Pakistani attacks, but also, I mean, implementing and targeting its own attack.
Last – on the fourth point was a “tighter embrace,” now this is something that is really concerning. If your argument is that this crisis has – will lead to a tighter embrace between the Pakistan Armed Forces and these terrorist groups, yes, it is concerning, but it’ll – but here, where I agree with you to a certain extent is perhaps the international community has looked away on this for far too long and is just thinking about hyphenation. And here’s where, again, I would imagine that it is our met – our – India’s job to actually show that this “tighter embrace,” that you called it, would actually create major, major cost, not just for India, India would have to deal with the costs, but for Pakistan itself. It’s – the attack on the Pak Army School in 2014, it’s not a very different strand of Islamist fundamentalism than that is animated on Kashmir.
On Victoria’s point, I think the root causes argument, you got to be a little careful with that, right? Finsbury Mosque there was somebody in Finsbury Mosque at the turn of the century espousing hatred. That hatred, which talks about a Hindu-Christian-Jewish alliance, that ideological strand, cannot be appeased. That ideological…
Victoria Schofield
Can I just…?
Dr Anit Mukherjee
…strand…
Victoria Schofield
Can I just say, Anit, what – this has to be marginalised. It has to be got rid of for…
Dr Anit Mukherjee
Unless the states have got…
Victoria Schofield
…all sides, because…
Dr Anit Mukherjee
Unless…
Victoria Schofield
…otherwise, it gets oxygen, and I think this is where it’s so…
Dr Anit Mukherjee
But the oxygen is coming from the Chief of Army, of the Pakistan Army, talking openly about an ideological cleavage that divides the two countries, right? Here’s where I think the structural issues in Pakistan, where the Pak Army is unfortunately driving the destiny of the country is what is at the root cause? Now here, you and I and nobody has any control over that, and the structural issue of the domestic politics, where the most popular person is locked up in prison, right?
So, I think the structural issue, kind of, holds it back. India has tried every strategy, it has tried counterterrorism, it had – it has tries, you know, bridges of friendship, whether in Lahore or whether subsequently, it has tried to appeal to the international community post-2008. The 2008 attacks were the first when it was a clear targeting of Jewish targets on Indian soil, ever. Well, where did that come from? Ten gunmen trained and bought in by the Pakistani state. Now, which other state has actually held itself back for so long? And here’s where I think when we talk about “escalation ladder,” and I’ll go to your point, Chietigj…
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
Hmmm.
Dr Anit Mukherjee
…I think while we might say this is the Modi Government strategy, I think the – like, the opposition party are united behind the strategy. I would say that this is the new normal. That will not just happen whenever there’s a change of government in India. This is the new normal wherein nobody in India, no opposition party in India, is condemning these strikes. Nobody in India would see this as saying that “Look, enough is enough is enough,” that you could have said restrained in whatever – in, kind of, Kargil, which was denied as a war, right? I mean, you were there, Victoria, you wrote the book in 1995, you were there when they said, “These were not our soldiers.” That was a blatant lie, right? I mean, you were there, kind of, subsequently.
India has held itself back for the last 20/25 years. This is a culmination. Some would argue that this is too little, too late. We should have done this not just in 2019. We should have started imposing the cost way before that. And here’s where if there is even a modicum of – well, to put a lipstick on a pig, if we have to take one good takeaway is that the costs of indefinitely bleeding India through this tighter embrace is just going to be borne by the – by unfortunately, the state of Pakistan. And here’s where in case that can change, we can talk about the moon, but because Indians are really interested in making themselves better for its own citizens.
And here’s where it goes back into your last point, the Kashmiri people are suffering, I totally agree with you. And here’s where, at least in the last couple of years, with the economy taking off, with tourism taking off, the Kashmir people actually are really mad about the Pahalgam attacks. That for the first time you’re seeing a condemnation of this continued form of terrorist. Now, who are these terrorists who are coming and killing innocent people? They are not representative of any ideological form, but Pakistan.
Victoria Schofield
This is what the Kashmiris said 30 years ago…
Dr Anit Mukherjee
Right.
Victoria Schofield
…“Who are these people coming?”
Dr Anit Mukherjee
Exactly, and here’s where I would agree that for the betterment of not just the Kashmiri people, but of everyone in the subcontinent, the first step is stop this sort of tighter embrace that they’ve gone down on. I don’t know if it’s possible, thank you.
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
Thank you, Anit. Let me turn to Ayesha. She’s very patiently had her hand raised, and maybe if I could just supplement your – whatever…
Dr Ayesha Siddiqua
Sure.
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
…points you have to make, Ayesha, with a additional question. I wanted to ask about the role of ideology in the ongoing hostilities. Asim Munir, the Army Chief, has been referred to as “Pakistan’s first Islamist Army Chief since Zia-ul-Haq.” And he made this much quoted speech a week before the terror attack where he referred to Pakistan as – Kashmir as “Pakistan’s jugular vein.” So, my question is, to what degree do you think ideological considerations make it more difficult to de-escalate tensions between both countries, in the way that we have been able to de-escalate during previous periods of hostility? Please go ahead.
Dr Ayesha Siddiqua
Thank you. Let me get back to the comment I wanted to make, which is about – a couple of comments, very quick comments. I think in some ways, Indian Government lost an opportunity to, kind of, resolve the Kashmir issue, to – much to its advantage. Article 370, Pakistan was definitely disturbed, Kashmiris were concerned as well, you know, but, kind of, peace in the valley continued through use of force, through other means, but, you know, it was – it turned out to India’s advantage. Then 2024 elections, I mean, let’s not forget that for the first time in history, 58% Kashmiris came out to vote.
So, things were calming down, and I think where India had an opportunity to actually completely grab the issue and silence it for good was actually move very swiftly soon after the 2024 elections and, you know, revive statehood. That would have, kind of, silenced things. And I think I would also like to remind you that prior to, you know, this spiral of hostilities, the last Army Chief, who was eager to solve the issues on a permanent basis was General Qamar Javed Bajwa. Now, Bajwa’s insistence was actually this, that, a) you know, I’m happy to – you live with your Kashmir, we live with ours, but a couple of things which we expect. One was reviving – the revival of statehood, and the other was not allow a demographic shift in – you know, so it’s article – it’s not Article 370, but Article 35A…
Victoria Schofield
35A, yes.
Dr Ayesha Siddiqua
…which they had an issue with they were pointing out. Now at that point, and couple of times, I think when peace has been talked and much more constructively, so, the General Musharraf period, that’s when Musharraf came out and said, you know, a “four-point formula,” etc., came – you know, went to India, after having done Kargil, you know, not, kind of, as a Pakistani, as an Analyst. Not, kind of, ashamed or not saying that this didn’t happen, and Pakistan Army was not responsible for Kargil, it was. But having learnt that, he reached out and, you know, the Indian right-wing, Mr Advani and all, you know, kind of, pushed him back at Agra. And so, the talks collapsed there, he returned without actually doing a deal, and then, you know, there was no turning back. I mean, India and Pakistan historically are great nations in terms of they get their moments, when after violence, after hostilities, there is this moment of peace, or moment – these windows of opportunity, which then, they, for different reasons, find it difficult to, kind of, grab that.
The same thing happened with General Bajwa. I mean, Bajwa, I would say that I had an issue as a Pakistani with his statement, you know, when he said that, “Look, we don’t have money to run tanks and trucks. We have to bury the hatchet.” He was doing more than just signalling to his institution, he was signalling to the to the country. And yet, I think what he expected from the other side was this signalling that, alright, you know, we’ll restore statehood, we will, kind of, review 35A, and, you know, it would’ve been a gentle signalling to the Pakistan Army that, “Look, this is what you wanted, so we’ve found – here is a quid pro quo, let’s move on.” And we would have gone back to Musharraf formula.
Now, the point is that, yes, you know, when – I mean, Anit can get – and many in India can get very excited and say that, you know, we have the qualitative and quantitative edge. No, I mean – and a quantitative and qualitative edge militarily is supposed to produce results, and they didn’t produce results of deterring. That is an important – I mean, if somebody in India is willing to look seriously, this should be a takeaway, that they did not deter because there wasn’t that edge. Your very good partners, even in the United States, understand it, that militarily, it doesn’t have the edge.
I mean, he talked about striking 11 air bases, of course, a matter of great concern for Pakistan and Pakistani planners, but it’s also a fact that if you look at a, you know, a commonality between 2019 and 2025, Pakistani Air, you know, Air Force did perform. I mean, Indian media went into hyperdrive to hide the fact that four to five, at least, Indian Air Force jets had been shot down. So, as far as feeding the audience is concerned, and sending a signal is concerned, Pakistan is saying, “Look, you can’t push me back, decisively. You don’t have that edge to impress me with your military might, even with your economic might, I can survive. I can” – because whatever wars we’ve had a since 2000, since Kargil onwards, Kargil I’ll put in a different category, but, you know, 2016 was the first surgical strike, but Pakistan said, “Didn’t happen,” India said, “We made gains.” 2019, there was a str – a surgical strike which was more visible. Pakistan responded immediately.
And 2025, again, atta – you know, a surgical strike, response, immediate response. So, despite our multiple problems, the issue is that India still doesn’t have that military capacity to decisively push Pakistan, to impress Pakistan to say, “You cannot respond, there will be greater punishment,” because wars are going to be limited, as well.
Now, your question about ideology. Of course, you know, it’s not just about religious ideology, it’s about nationalism and what we know is that General Asim Munir is insistent on creating, restrengthening, you know, a new system of governance, a new – well, it’s not a new ideology. But piecing together what has been Pakistan’s ideological basis historically, and strengthening it and saying it – equating it with – and bringing the focus back to where it was prior to General Bajwa. I mean, Jar – General Bajwa had – it was in – you know, even, you know, from India’s perspective, it was an amazing initiative that they didn’t capitalise on. General Bajwa was taking his – the state and his military away from the traditional way of looking at India, by saying, “Let’s bury the hatchet, economic, let’s focus on, you know, on strengthening our economy, let’s focus on the economics of war.”
And this is something which he would actually, you know, during his visits to United Kingdom, he would tell the Generals that, you know, his aim was bring down defence spending, you know, strengthen Pakistan’s economy, etc., etc. Now, for General Asim Munir, who’s a traditionalist and definitely an Islamist, but he, like General Zia-ul-Haq, can actually have a good conversation with the West, as well. So, it’s not that when you propagate him as an Islamist that he’s – he’ll be unable to hold that conversation. And in fact, it’s very interesting that while, you know, there is this anxiety regarding Gaza-Israel, etc., Pakistan has also been slowly and gradually having its conversation with Israel on the side. Saying, you know – perhaps saying, “Don’t bother with the general public, but, you know, we are in conversation with you.”
So, he’s a man who is very insistent on – General Munir is a man who’s very insistent on building that traditional, you know, ideology-laced nationalism, also, because he understands – his understanding, also, is that if India is going to be building the same, kind of, nationalism, laced in religious ideology, then to strengthen, he needs to insist on doing the same. You know, both in their spaces are, kind of, going in similar direction.
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
Thank you, Ayesha. I can see several questions have come in. So, in the interest of time, let me move onto those, although I had 101 more questions of my own, but I’ll leave that for another time. So, several questions have come in on the status of the Indus Water Treaty. So, this is the 1960 World Bank brokered agreement which has managed to survive several periods of hostility between both countries. It survived the 1965 war, 1971 war, 1999 Kargil conflict. I mean, I think the agreement was already unser – under some degree of strain, following the 2016 terrorist attacks. Modi had noted that, you know, “Blood and water cannot flow together.” India has requested – have sent a formal notice to try and modify or review and modify the Treaty, and I think Pakistan has also accused India of shifting waterflows downstream through its hydroelectric power project. So, how do – and maybe I’ll pose this question to Victoria, how do you see the status of that agreement in the context of the current hostilities?
Victoria Schofield
Well, I think it’s very problematical and, you know, we are talking about water, we’re talking about livelihood. And as you rightly pointed out, the Treaty has been under strain, mainly because both countries are running out of water. Not so much because of climate change, but also because of the fact that their populations are growing and the requirement for water is considerable.
But quite frankly, putting it in a larger context, it’s another reason why both countries, at both government levels – I mean, we’ve heard a lot already this afternoon about, you know, who gained and who – which army has, sort of, improved its reputation etc. But the bottom line for the whole of South Asia, and as Amit said, for the entire inhabitants, not just of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, but for the entire inhabitants of South Asia, is that they have to resolve their differences. They have to – they might not like each other, you know, at the moment, the current governments don’t like each other, and this is percolating down to the people not liking each other.
This was not how it used to be. You know, they’ll always be neighbours, they’ll always share the same land space, and they’ll share, to a degree, the same resources. So, I couldn’t emphasise more strongly from my very comfortable position in London, where I’ve got plenty of water, that it’s essential to bury the hatchet, however it’s done, because otherwise, it continues for generation. The baggage of an unresolved relationship, effectively, is what we’re talking about, is handed onto the next generation. And you get the next generation indulging in the rhetoric and the propaganda that we’ve seen on the media.
And so, whether this is done – again, we talk about nobody wanting Trump to facilitate, mediate, you know, or no-one wanting international mediation. If international mediation is not required, then the responsibility is for both governments, at whatever level they start, whether it’s military, whether it’s at Prime Ministerial level, whether it’s at Foreign Secretary level, to say, “We don’t like each other, but what’s going on is far too dangerous for all our population, for both populations.” And that Indus Waters Treaty, it’s the lifeblood. I mean, suspension, currently it’s very difficult to suspend it. You can’t just – it’s not like you just, you know, suspend a treaty that’s not geographical. This is geographical, and you’ve got a large body of water flowing, you’ve got cubic metres. It could be diffi – more difficult for Pakistan in the dry season, in the wet season, less so.
But I mean, does one really want to resort to that after 80 – nearly 80 years of being separate countries, to deprive one country of water? I don’t think so, and I don’t actually think the population, if questioned, would like to see one population being deprived of water. It is, indeed, the lifeblood far more than weapons are. So, I – as I say, I can’t emphasise enough, we’ve got to look at the bigger picture. We’re concentrating on one military encounter for four days. The bigger picture, both countries just simply have to resolve that we want to live in peace. There has to be a peace dividend. At the moment, we’re giving away to the military dividend. It suits both armies, they get funding, they get weapons, they can try out their weapons. But the bigger advantage for both countries is if they could live in peace, and one of the questions was, “What needs to be done?” And it has to be done at the negotiating table. It’s not going to be done through a military encounter. Wars never resolve issues, we know that.
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
Yeah, building on that point, I mean, this was the other question that was raised. I mean, Marco Rubio, US Secretary of State, has tweeted that both sides have agreed to, and I’m quoting him here, “start talks on a broad set of issues at a neutral site.” But it appears to me at this point, you know, political dialogue is a dead-end, I mean, both countries are essentially talking past each other. India wants to focus on – and Modi mentioned this in his speech last week, focus on the issue of terrorism and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. While India – well, Pakistan will obviously want to focus on reviving the Indus Water Treaty and Jammu and Kashmir, India-administered Kashmir.
So, I mean, the last time we saw any, I think, credible momentum on terms of any peace process or dialogue, it – and correct me if I’m wrong, it would’ve been the Composite Dialogue Peace Process, which was over a decade ago, when there was talk of some, sort of, four-point formula which was reached between Manmohan Singh Government and the Musharraf Government. How do you – I mean, if – maybe turning to Anit, Ayesha, Victoria…
Victoria Schofield
Can I just say…
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
Oh, yeah, please go ahead, yeah.
Victoria Schofield
Just very quickly, this has been the pattern of Indo-Pakistan relations, talks about talks, and this is where they’ve gone. I mean, you go back to talks with the Benazir Bhutto Government, with Rajiv Gandhi, this is – they’ve got to look seriously at what the talks have been in the past. Why have the talks always stalled? So, you’ve got to avoid talks about talks and want to have meaningful talks, which is why it has to come from the individual governments, that they actually want to resolve it. At the moment, we don’t see that they do actually want to resolve it. It has to come from the heart and so far, you know, it hasn’t.
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
Anit, Ayesha, would you like to…
Dr Anit Mukherjee
I just want to shoot…
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
…weigh in on this? Yes, yes.
Dr Anit Mukherjee
…very, very quickly and I’m going to take over the mandate of the devil’s advocate from you, just for this brief ten minutes that is left. Which is, I would agree on the need for it, on the necessity for peace, but I would also say – I mean, here it goes back into the structural issue, right? Pervez Musharraf four-point peace formula, make borders irrelevant, talk about trade, you know, and we could’ve talked about that in 2006. But I think the fundamental problem would then come down to who does India talk to? Does it talk to Shahbaz Sharif?
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
Hmmm.
Dr Anit Mukherjee
Does it wait for Imran Khan to come out of jail? Because he’s the most popular man. And if it does talk to Shahbaz Sharif, he’s not the real boss, it’s General Asim Munir. Does it wait to reach out to General Asim Munir? And I think, you know, while we sitting in London might want this for the subcontinent, I think we should be open to the idea that this is going to be a very long summer, and that there should – there would not be any movement. And I think we are underestimating how much 2008 was like a collective national trauma for India, right? For four days, Indian people watched this attack on its financial capital play out in slow motion.
And I would agree with Ayesha and Victoria here that, you know, we as, kind of – like, the neighbours have turned away from each other and it is happening successively per generation. How do we undo that? I think the Indian ask is simple. I mean, the, kind of, restoration of statehood, well, as it has happened, Amit Shah has admitted to that, the Supreme Court wants that to happen, that will happen, but I think the Indians are hoping that will be a part of an overall peace deal, right? If the Indians were to be more to, kind of, talk about a restoration of statehood, then would the Pakistanis claim that as a victory? Can they spin it as a victory for themselves? I’m not so sure. I mean, they are saying bring back Article 370 and nothing else. So, I think there is a genuine desire on India’s part to move beyond this issue that is, in some ways, starting to hobble it, but the Indians are also calculating enough that they can deal with it.
In terms of deterring the attacks, I’m not sure that the Pakistanis actually calculated how much would India escalate with this attack. But 2000 – like, the Pahalgam attacks, whosoever did it, wherever it was planned, itself, I’m sure they did not really think through the consequence of that attack. The problem now becomes that with each such terrorist – and – but – and – which is why I go back to my original point, you know, you could talk about IWT, Indus Water Treaty, staying together, but that was done in the spirit of good neighbourliness. Here, as we can very clearly make out, the two countries, the two people, are not interested in good neighbourliness right now, and no country would ever admit to losing, right, I mean, at any point of time. So, I’m not surprised that it has been spun in a different way, about Pakistan, about air attacks, about deterrents.
But I think the dan – the more dangerous part is that because of this instance of this particular terrorist attack, there will be enormous pressure on India to respond accordingly the next time there is a terrorist attack. And which is why the terrorist groups cannot operate the way they do unless they have state support, which is why – what Dr Ayesha Siddiqua said before, that these attacks would create a “tighter embrace,” for me is the most worrisome outcome of this particular, kind of, crisis. Because here’s where it will not just affect India-Pakistan, it will affect Western targets, as they have been targeted in the past, too. Thank you.
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
Can I just ask there? There’s been, I think, several questions on…
Dr Ayesha Siddiqua
Sorry, you can’t…
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
Sorry, go ahead, Ayesha.
Dr Ayesha Siddiqua
Yeah, just wait just a minute.
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
Yes. Can you hear me?
Dr Anit Mukherjee
Yeah, I can hear you now.
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
Yeah, go ahead.
Dr Ayesha Siddiqua
You know, very quickly, you know, there is no excuse that can be made for lazy politics. You know, we can’t – I don’t think that in an environment where you have the threat of conflict, and you can’t sit back and say, “Yeah, we will do things at our own – in, you know, space and time.” And I think, I mean, I would seriously suggest, Anit, to have a look that an opportunity, you know, for India’s own sake, forget about Pakistan. After 2024 elections, you know, perhaps the Indian Government should’ve moved faster.
Now, post-conflict is a different scenario. If it comes, it will be seen as more as a response. And the fact of the matter is that this conflict has, in a way, benefited Pakistan, because Pakistan – I mean, Kashmiris, especially in the valley, they had – prior to that, they’d looked at Pakistan and said, you know, “These guys can’t – probably can’t do anything.” Suddenly, you know, Pakistan is, in terms, back in business, so you know – which increases the threat level.
But going back to water, and I – and it’s important that we understand that, that water is something which will generate sympathy, you know, for military’s position, for, you know, the groups, etc., so, one has to be thoughtful. And the other thing is that, you know, I’m sorry, you know, instead of making it sound like India’s generosity, that, you know, as bigger neighbour came together, the two countries got together in the 1960s, worked out this deal, which was, you know, with the World Bank, kind of, helping both. And there is actually no clause to get out – for either party to get out of this agreement.
And there is a larger issue here as well, which is that while Pakistan is a lower riparian in India’s case, India is a lower riparian in China’s case. And let’s not forget that while, you know, Donald Trump can have a rookie moment and we can completely ignore what he’s saying, you know, there is China, a bigger neighbour sitting there, which has contributed in terms of helping Pakistan with technology. And, you know, politically when there is – when the tension on water, kind of, increases, you know, it may get a bigger role to play.
Now, my argument here is that post this war, this conflict, I don’t see in the short to medium-term anything exciting happening in terms of talks or peace. I mean, unless – the problem right now is that both countries – the only country that, you know, in both India and Pakistan, tend to take a bit more seriously in terms of talks is the United States. And if in India the perception is that it’s Donald Trump’s rookie moment, it also indicates that Delhi may not be too eager to take this opportunity to get the US to help and, kind of, put pressure on Pakistan and say, “Let’s talk about this issue, both issues, all issues, including terrorism, including Kashmir, and the rest of it. Get you guys to sit on the table.”
So, I think in the short to medium-term, there is no opportunity for peace, and both countries will be headed in a direction of greater conflict. And I think one of the takeaways from this particular conflict is that there is a performative dimension to it, where medias have tried to sell their own respective story. They have, kind of, been, you know, been mouthpieces of their governments, instead of, you know, a more independ – taking a more independent position, very few. And silencing, a very deliberate silencing of voices from the other side.
So, in that, kind of, a situation, when the emphasis is on the performative, “I need to look good in front of my own public,” I think that’s where a calculation of strategies will not happen, and that is where – what I find damaging. I mean, on Pakistan side, for example, I mean, if I focus just on Pakistan, you know, all Politicians, from Mim – you know, Maryam Nawaz, the younger generation, to Bilawal Bhutto, you know, they’ve all, kind of, signed onto the military perspective. It’s the performative, you know, what – how do I benefit from this conflict? Rather – so the market for peace has reduced, and one hopes that, you know, both sides get a sense that there is seriously a need – the region does need a peace and it can’t afford conflict.
We can’t be irrelevant for each other, you know, we have to negotiate and work things out. Perhaps wait longer, when we do get to another moment, you know, this time around, be more ready than before to capitalise on that moment and find a solution.
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
On that very, I guess, somewhat depressing note, we will need to call this event to a close. There are 101 more questions that I could’ve asked, and I can see there were several more questions in the chat. I was quite curious to know, for instance, the role of China in the recent hostilities, other countries beyond the usual suspects, such as Turkey, what role they had to play. And we – and often when we talk about Kashmir, we often forget about the other Kashmir, the Pakistan-administered, so-called “Azad Kashmir” and Gilgit-Baltistan. So, that discussion tends to somehow fall off the radar when we talk about Kashmir.
But as I said, yeah, we will continue to monitor the situation with analysis and events at Chatham House. If you’re interested in the work that we’re doing on Asia, please do keep an eye on the Chatham House website, or you can sign up for the Asia-Pacific Programme newsletter, but please join me in thanking our excellent panel of speakers, Dr Anit Mukherjee, Dr Ayesha Siddiqua and Victoria Schofield. Thank you all, have a nice day.
Dr Ayesha Siddiqua
Thank you.
