Tensions in the Middle East have waxed and waned over the last few months. They reached a particularly dangerous point in October when Israel and Iran were in a attack-counter-attack cycle. For a long time, Iran’s nuclear programme has been a point of contention between the two states.
Various Israeli officials have said over the years they would rather try to eradicate Iran’s nuclear programme through military means than let Iran acquire nuclear weapons. Israel maintains that a nuclear-armed Iran would be too dangerous for its own security and for the region. While Israeli concerns about Iranian nuclear weapons are justified, US intelligence estimates do not believe that Iran has made the political decision yet to build a nuclear weapon.
Threatening military strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities is an option that enjoys popular support in Israel. This is because the Israeli public is highly opposed to Iran acquiring nuclear weapons and concerned about Iranian intentions. Proponents of this option believe it would deal a serious blow to Iran’s abilities to develop nuclear weapons. However, this is unlikely.
Iran has been investing in its scientific abilities for years; its scientific community would be able to reconstitute a nuclear programme fairly quickly in the event of a strike. Also, several nuclear installations are underground, making it difficult for Israel to guarantee success with its military strikes. As Iran would probably see an attack on its nuclear facilities as a significant escalation, it is questionable whether the trade-off is worth the risk of an all-out war.
Facing up to history
Israel also has an important historic lesson to consider. In 1981, Israel’s leadership was weighing a similar trade-off with regards to Iraq’s nuclear programme which was far less developed than Iran’s is today. Iraq accelerated its nuclear programme in the 1970s in response to the oil crisis, wanting to develop a nuclear energy option. At the same time, Iraq was monitoring Iran’s nuclear programme, worrying whether Iran was pursuing a nuclear weapons option.
By the late 1970s, Israel was also anxious about Iraq’s nuclear programme and was pursuing a strategy that will sound familiar: targeting Iraqi nuclear scientists for assassinations and trying to sabotage Iraq’s nuclear facilities to impede its nuclear programme.
Unintended consequences
When these steps proved not to be far-reaching enough, Israel conducted airstrikes in June 1981 against what was at the time a civil nuclear programme still far from being able to produce nuclear weapons. The attack destroyed the Osirak reactor and killed several Iraqi nuclear scientists. But instead of eliminating the programme, it accelerated the state’s attempt to develop a fully fledged nuclear weapons programme and drove the development underground, making it harder to monitor.
Details of the resumed secret programme only came to light after the 1991 Gulf war as Iraq had taken care to ensure its new facilities were better concealed to avoid another Israeli attack. Evidence now also suggests that Iraq’s civil nuclear programme in 1981 was not in a position to provide sufficient nuclear material for weapons production. Iraq complied with International Atomic Energy Authority and French inspections which would have made it difficult to divert nuclear materials for a weapons programme. In other words, Israel’s actions resulted in a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Prior to Israel’s attack, no clear instruction existed for Iraq to develop a nuclear weapons capability. Though Iran’s efforts to develop a nuclear weapon today are significantly further along, it pursues a similar hedging strategy. Politicians like to threaten Iran’s ability to produce a nuclear weapon, and a domestic debate about whether Iran now needs nuclear weapons for deterrence purposes has intensified after Israel’s strikes in October. Despite this, there has been no political instruction to produce nuclear weapons yet – presumably in an attempt to use the nuclear breakout capability for diplomatic leverage.
