After three years of an inward-looking German government preoccupied with infighting, new chancellor Friedrich Merz has promised that ‘Germany is back’ – both in Europe and on the international stage. His first days as chancellor were set to emphasize this ambition, with visits to Paris, Warsaw, Brussels and Kyiv, the latter together with the leaders of France, Poland and the UK.
The new government’s coalition treaty promises a stronger, more integrated German foreign and EU policy, enabling it to play a bigger role in European security and deterrence against Russia.
But the vote to formally appoint Merz as chancellor was much more dramatic than anticipated. He was the first chancellor candidate in Germany’s post-war history to fail to get the required absolute majority in the Bundestag, despite his CDU/CSU–SPD coalition holding such a majority.
Although Merz won a second round of voting on the same day, the message is clear: his domestic power base is fragile and old certainties about the stability of German politics are gone.
Strong domestic pressure
For Germany’s partners, this raises the question of how much room for manoeuvre Merz and his government will have in foreign, security and defence policy. There are three key domestic constraints.
First, the coalition between his CDU/CSU and the SPD is, as Merz publicly acknowledges, a ‘functional coalition’ (‘Arbeitskoalition’) without a major political project. In contrast to previous iterations of the so-called ‘grand coalition’ – bringing together the two major parties that have dominated Germany’s post-war politics – the current coalition has a razor-thin parliamentary majority at below 52 per cent. Their main motives for working together are a lack of alternatives and a sense of responsibility, but they have significant differences when it comes to priorities and policy positions.
Second, in a politically fragmented Germany, the new coalition lacks a majority in the second chamber, the Bundesrat, which is composed of the regional executives. Although all regional governments are (for now) headed by either the CDU, CSU or SPD, there are 12 different formations that include smaller parties from across Germany’s political spectrum, except the far-right extremist Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). Although less important for foreign policy, most major laws in Germany including on issues like migration requires the approval of this diverse Bundesrat.
Third, and most notably, Germans have little interest in a honeymoon period with the new government, with falling approval ratings even before formally taking office, especially for Merz and the CDU. In contrast, the AfD keeps rising in the polls, topping some of them as the single largest party ahead of the CDU/CSU with up to 26 per cent.
This puts extra pressure on Merz, who – although more right-wing than Angela Merkel – represents traditional conservative thinking within the CDU and firmly rejects any form of cooperation with the AfD at any level. Even with the next general election four years off, continued high polling for the AfD would put tremendous internal party pressure on Merz (and, to a lesser degree, all democratic parties in Germany), as a regional election somewhere is always around the corner.
Which policy areas will be most affected?
For Germany’s foreign, security and defence policy, these domestic pressures mean that Merz will have to work hard to keep his coalition together. Maintaining cohesion within his own party is likely to be particularly challenging, as the CDU now stretches from the more liberal wing of Angela Merkel’s reign to more conservative parts. Its internal cohesion will also be continuously tested by the AfD.
Consequently, the new German government’s room for manoeuvre will differ across policy lines, depending on the cohesion (or lack thereof) of Merz’s party and coalition, whether the AfD is managing to exploit public resentment, and the government’s constitutional decision-making powers.
Based on these criteria, there will likely be little or no change to the traditional pillars of German foreign, security and defence policy: its membership and support for the EU and NATO.
Given recent fluctuations in US policy, there is broad support within the new coalition and with the German public for taking on more responsibility for European defence, including strengthening the European pillar of NATO and increasing support for Ukraine. Meanwhile, the recent change to the ‘debt brake’ gives the government the fiscal space to increase defence efforts without needing opposition support.
There is also broad coalition support for Germany’s close relationships with European partners and revival of the partnerships with France and Poland, as well as the planned UK–Germany friendship treaty.
