Five key priorities for NATO after the summit in The Hague – and how to make progress

After an unambitious summit, NATO allies must return with laser focus to the key issues that were left off the agenda.

Expert comment Published 27 June 2025 Updated 16 July 2025 4 minute READ

Armida van Rij

Senior Research Fellow, Europe Programme

Kajsa Ollongren

Associate Fellow, Europe Programme

As the NATO summit in The Hague concluded, European leaders likely returned home feeling largely relieved. There was no major upheaval and Trump even seemed to have warmed to his NATO peers, saying during the closing press conference that ‘they love their country very much’. 

But the ambition for this summit was low. The agenda was shortened to minimize potential disruption, resulting in an equally short summit communique. Meanwhile, Ukraine was decoupled from the summit to prevent major public disagreements between presidents Trump and Zelenskyy, and the Netherlands – and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte – rolled out the red carpet for Trump. 

There was a sense that the other NATO countries and Rutte just wanted to make it through the less than 24-hour summit without any drama – and they succeeded. Indeed, for much of it, Trump seemed more focused on the aftermath of the US strikes on Iran than on NATO.

As expected, allies agreed to spend 5 per cent of GDP on defence, which includes 3.5 per cent on core defence and 1.5 per cent on resilience, cybersecurity and infrastructure. This increase will serve to meet NATO capability targets and ensure allies can service the new regional plans approved during the 2023 Vilnius summit. It will also start the process of shifting the burden from the US to Europe. Spain caused perhaps the biggest upset at the summit by stating it can meet NATO capability targets by spending only 2.1 per cent of its GDP. This will have implications for alliance unity and could cause resentment among member countries who spend more.

Getting through the summit is an important signal to Putin: a public fall out among allies in the current context would have given Russia further vulnerabilities to exploit. But this low bar for the summit is problematic given the external security environment. Now that the summit is over and the alliance remains intact, allies should return with laser focus to the key issues what were left off the agenda.

Five key priorities for NATO

The first priority is support for Ukraine. The language on Ukraine in this year’s summit communique was weak compared to last year. The issue of NATO membership was cast aside altogether and it is hard to see how this will gain traction again – although Rutte insists Ukraine is on an ‘irreversible path’ to membership.

But there were some positives for Ukraine at the summit. During a press conference, Trump suggested the US might consider selling Patriot air defence systems to Ukraine. This has been a constant and clear demand from Ukraine and is particularly urgent as Russia has ramped up its aerial bombardments of Ukraine.

European allies must prepare for the very likely eventuality that the US will halt further aid to Ukraine once the deliveries agreed to by the Biden administration have been completed.

However, European allies must prepare for the very likely eventuality that the US will halt further aid to Ukraine once the deliveries agreed to by the Biden administration have been completed. Investing directly in the Ukrainian defence industry – the so-called Danish model – is a simple and effective way to ensure continued and consistent support, but it is not yet sufficiently common. 

This model would see allies allocate a percentage of their budget to a fund that is directly procuring in Ukraine for Ukrainian-used capabilities. Such an initiative could be coordinated by the Ukraine–NATO defence contact group. An added bonus of boosting Ukraine’s domestic defence industry is that it will in turn help with Europe’s rearmament as Ukraine begins exporting its domestically produced drones.

The second priority is continuing the review of NATO’s strategic approach to Russia that was agreed at last year’s summit. This issue was shelved in the run-up to the Hague meeting as it proved difficult to get the US to agree that Russia is a threat at all, let alone how NATO should approach Russia going forward. Any recommendations towards future engagement with Russia should take into account eventual changes in Russian leadership, a stronger deterrence and defence posture for NATO, while managing relations with a nuclear-armed state. It should also build on NATO’s role in helping allies deter and respond to greyzone warfare.

Political dialogue with Russia will be difficult as long it is fighting its war in Ukraine. But where there are opportunities to do so, NATO should restart conventional arms control negotiations using instruments in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Dialogue in the Arctic Council may also offer opportunities to avoid instability in the region and preserve the Council’s work on climate change.

The third priority is preparing for US troop reductions in Europe. Although the US force posture review has not yet started, it is already clear there will be US troops reductions in Europe – potentially returning to pre-2022 surge numbers, possibly even lower. This should accelerate action by European NATO allies and Canada regarding troop recruitment and retention, but that is just the starting point. If NATO’s Article 5 is tested, rapid first response will be crucial. This requires sufficient troops along the eastern flank, supported by appropriate capabilities such as heavy armour and deep strike.

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Until the review has concluded, it is unclear what the impact might be on NATO command structures. But what is clear is that other allies must be ready to step in and take over responsibilities if necessary. There will also be an impact on capabilities based in Europe. The timeline for withdrawal matters greatly here as European allies will struggle to replace US strategic enablers – such as ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance), integrated air and missile defence and air-to-air refuelling – in less than a decade, if ever.

This brings us to the fourth priority: the need to build industrial capacity. Ukraine has shown the importance of having a pre-existing defence industrial and technological base to be able to innovate and scale quickly in the event of a crisis. Europe and Canada need to increase capabilities by approximately one third to service NATO regional plans but, accounting for redundancies, in practice this means about a 50 per cent increase. Improving access to finance across the EU to support defence innovation should continue to be a key priority.

Given the need make progress, the secretary-general should consider carefully whether next year’s summit is needed – or even wise.

The fifth and final priority is engagement with NATO’s Indo-Pacific Four (IP4) partners to help counter China. After three of the four IP4 heads of government skipped the NATO summit, the perception is that the relationship is cooling. Yet much closer engagement and cooperation is needed on advanced maritime domain awareness and joint undersea monitoring – a threat both NATO allies and IP4 countries face from Russia and China.

This NATO summit was about footing the bill for the return to collective defence and starting the process of shifting the burden from the US to Europe. But the real work begins now. The strategy has been set and the next few years are about planning, implementation and execution. Given the need make progress, the secretary-general should consider carefully whether next year’s summit is needed – or even wise. NATO cannot afford to take risks with President Trump, and European allies will not cower indefinitely.