India: the next global superpower?

Ben Bland

Welcome, everyone who’s joining us today in person and online, and my name is Ben Bland. I’m the Director of the Asia-Pacific Programme here at Chatham House, and it’s great to have you all with us, virtually and especially people who’ve taken the time to travel on this very cold London lunchtime. So, thanks again for being with us. We’re going to be talking about a really important subject today, which is India’s global role. It’s been a big year for India, as Chietigj, who’ll introduce in a second, keeps reminding me. G20 Presidency, India’s become the world’s most populous nation. It’s now the fastest growing major Asian economy and had a successful lunar mission, and we’re going to be talking about whether or not India can be the next global superpower and what that might mean in practice.

We’re really lucky to be joined by four great experts and practitioners today. Joining us virtually from New Delhi is Ambassador Shyam Saran, author, thinker, former Foreign Secretary of India and Chairman of India’s National Security Advisory Board. His other great distinguished achievements and books are all online, so you can look them up yourselves. Next to me we have, in person, Louise Tillin, who’s Professor of Politics as the India Institute at King’s College London. Next to Louise we have Chietigj Bajpaee, my new colleague, our new Senior Research Fellow for South Asia, who’s done a great job getting up to speed in his first few months, at a very busy time for India and the world. And last, but not least, we have Kevin McCole, who’s the Managing Director of the UK India Business Council and a former British Diplomat in India.

So, thanks again. The way this is going to work today, I’m going to ask questions to the panellists for about 35 or 40 minutes on a range of topics, then we’re going to open up to the floor for your questions. In person just raise your hand later on, catch my eye and I’ll come to you. If you’re online, please put your questions in the Q&A box and I will read them out on your behalf, if they’re appropriate and interesting, and yeah, questions, not statements, later on.

But for now, let’s get straight into it, and I want to come to you first, Ambassador, just to ask, yeah, this big question that we’re here to talk about today. I mean, do you think India can move from being a serious regional power to a global superpower in the foreseeable future?

Ambassador Shyam Saran

So, let me try to give you a, a) Indian perspective. As far as India’s macro impact over the global landscape is concerned, it is certainly expanding, but in terms of the domestic metrics of development, I think those are changing very slowly. So, on the one hand, India is, in terms of GDP, today the fifth largest – fifth ranking economy, but its ranking in Human Development Index is abysmal, at 122 out of 191 countries, and progress has been very slow. So, this creates almost a, kind of, a schizophrenic approach to external relations. On the one hand, India is a demander of global public goods to promote its own development, but at the same time, it aspires to be what is known as a global high table, you know, precisely because of its very, you know, large and expanding global footprint.

Now, there will be issues on which India will behave very much as part of the Global South, though certainly not in the great power or even superpower category. But there will be other issues, like, for example, climate change, where India has, in fact, a very major role to play. It would, in fact, be, you know, on – in a sense, regarded as a key player and so, it is very easy to see that there is a, kind of, a contradiction between these two facets of India’s, you know, foreign policy.

So, you would also see that generally speaking, India is seen as a good partner in bilateral relations, but sometimes, it is that adversary when it comes to the multilateral fora, you know, and this is – you always see, for example, in India’s relations with the US. So, this is why I said that when we are looking at the possibility of India being the next superpower, I think you have to take into account these, you know, contradictions. In a larger perspective, I could certainly say that given the size of its population, the scale of its economy, the fact that it has, no doubt, a great economic potential, it has a very sizeable pool of scientific and technolog – technical, you know, manpower. A reference has been made to India’s, you know, successes, for example, both in nuclear energy, as well as its space programme.

So, I think it certainly has the potential to catch up what is pure power, you know, since the closest rival, which is China, to catch up and perhaps even exceed, go beyond, China in various metrics of power. Whether it will actually do so is, of course, another question altogether. To me, it is not only the possibility that India may emerge as the next superpower, but to what purpose it actually ends up using that power? Will it be a selfish power, as China seems to be increasingly becoming, or will it stand for something other than itself, as, you know, the first Indian Prime Minister, Nehru, spoke about.

So, the political trajectory that India will traverse in its pursuit of power will be as important in whether or not it appeals, in fact, that status and that finally, includes the health of its own plural democracy, as well. Thank you.

Ben Bland

Thanks. Thanks for that, and Louise, I might come to you, then, on this question, sort of, what India wants and particularly, I guess, what’s – I mean, what does Prime Minister Narendra Modi want? What is his, sort of, particular flavour when it comes to India’s place in the world? How do you think he sees India’s role in the world, and what are the issues where he thinks India should be playing a decisive global role as opposed to just a regional one?

Professor Louise Tillin

Yeah, I mean, look, this is a period in which India has developed a much more muscular and assertive foreign policy, and in which Narendra Modi’s attempt to counter or change global perceptions of India has played both internationally, but also, very importantly, domestically, as well. So, this is a foreign policy agenda that is very intimately shaped by the BJP’s political project at home.

Of course, India, for a long time, has sought change in the institutions of global governance and for good reason. It doesn’t have a seat on – a permanent seat on the Security Council. Its requests/demands for reform of the Bretton Woods Institutions, you know, are longstanding legitimate claims for recognition on the world stage. But I think Narendra Modi has gone beyond those demands for recasting the institution as a global governance and making space for India within a, kind of, liberal world order, to asserting India’s status as, in itself, a civilisational power and one which has status ambitions that rival those of other claimants to civilisational great power status, China in particular, but not only China, of course.

And so, what does that mean? I think it means in some instances, and we’ve seen that very recently, for instance, in the tensions with Canada, a more uncompromising willingness to defend India’s interests to disrupt a, kind of – what Modi would – and his – and the BJP regime, I think, would see as a somewhat cosy liberal consensus about what India was or is. To present what the foreign – India’s Minister or External Affairs, Jaishankar, described in London just a few weeks ago as a “more authentic vision of what India is.” And, of course, with that, a willingness to assert India’s identity not only as a civilisational power, but as a Hindu civilisational power. And, of course, you know, alongside that, an effort to both, yeah, both hard politics, but also, soft power politics, as well. You know, that India has a lot to offer the world. Modi uses the term ‘Vishvaguru’, Teacher to the world, that India is not – you know, is a, you know, is an aspirational rising power with claims to offer a lot to the world, as well.

Ben Bland

I think we’re going to come back to the question of Canada-India relations, which I guess many people thought wasn’t a subject of great interest until relatively recently. But I want to, sort of, stick with this question of, sort of, what, sort of, India wants in the world, ‘cause I think much of what you were talking about, Louise, was really about, sort of, projecting India out onto the world in a more, sort of, authoritative, assertive way. But I mean, Chietigj, if I come to you, is there other things that the Modi Government wants to change in the world, global norms that they want to change? Are there ways in which they want to change the global system that aren’t just as Ambassador, sort of, Saran was saying, you know, to protect India in some specific way, but to actually promote a different way of organising our world?

Dr Chietigj Bajpaee

Well, I think, you know, first and foremost, Indian foreign policy, like foreign policy of any country, is driven by national self-interest. So, you know, whether it be its position on the conflict in the Middle East or the War in Ukraine, it’s always self-interest that lies at the heart of that.

That being said, I think there are three key facets or characteristics of Indian foreign policy, which it’s trying to project on the world. One is this position of lang – longstanding position of strategy autonomy or multi-alignment or omni-alignment or whatever we want to call it. So, that means engaging all major poles of influence in the international system. And in that contact – context, it’s a somewhat more benign worldview than that being offered by China. So, although Chin – India’s offering a non-Western world view, it’s not an anti-Western or an overtly anti-Western worldview.

Related to that is being this so-called voice of the Global South, and we very much saw this during its G20 Presidency, and the admission of the African Union reaching out to over 120 countries in the Global South. And also, you know, trying to put forward a, sort of, Indian solution to global problems, whether it be issues related to climate change, digital public infrastructure, global health. And then, I think that brings us to the third point, which Louise has alluded to, is that India is, you know, presenting itself as a civilisational state and it – essentially, again, as a visual guru offering Indian solutions to global problems. So, I think those are some of the, you know, the key facets of, sort of, the Indian worldview and what it seeks to bring to the table on the foreign policy front.

Ben Bland

And I might come to you, Kevin, on the, sort of, the economic question, because here, clearly, in terms of, yeah, overall size alone, India is becoming more and more significant. Its ability to deploy key technologies, obviously, as Ambassador Saran said, a lot of, you know, economic inequality within India. But I think India’s economic rise is often treated, sort of, in the UK and in the West as, sort of, an unrivalled good thing, but is it clear to you that that’s the case? I mean, is it naturally a great thing for the UK, or do you think, you know, as India grows economically, it’s actually on economic question, as well, going to want to have a different way of doing things that may not necessarily be, you know, in the advantage of the UK and other free market, mostly free market economies?

Kevin McCole

I think as Chietigj said, the – you know, India’s foreign policy, like others, has got to be, you know, India centric, it’s put your own country first, and it’s up to the UK, I think, to find ways of aligning its interests with India’s interests. Long gone are the days, if it ever existed, where India would act in other countries’ interests and put them first.

And I think the, you know, the Ambassador, posed it as a question, you know, “Will India be a selfish superpower?” I think we’ve heard from Louise and Chietigj that that’s not the case, and I would agree with that. And I think India’s supp – you know, engaging with the Global South and developing nations, but it’s much more broader than that, I think, and I – someone mentioned Mr Jaishankar at the UN General Assembly, and I – if I can quote some of the things that he said. He said, “The goals we, India, have set ourselves will make us different from all those whose rise preceded ours.” So, they do want to take a different path from China or the USA. And then, you know, “From an era of non-alignment, we have evolved a Vishvamitra, you know, a friend to the world, and engage with a broad range of nations to harmonise interests.”

So, I think that array of nations they engage with, Global South absolutely, but also, the developed world, as well. If you look at the FTAs India has signed and negotiated with Australia, UAE, and negotiating with the UK and the US, India playing a prominent role in the BRICS and again, Mr Jaishankar describes BRICS as “independently minded,” and that’s – so, that’s five different independent minds there. And then, announced at the G20 was the India, Middle East, Europe economic corridor, you know, a stru – who’s that? India, Saudi, UAE, Germany, France, US. So, all of those elements are with the developed world and then, as Chietigj said, there was the, sort of, the “voice of the Global South Summit” bringing this – the African Union into the G20 as a permanent member and having development partnerships with, like, seven to eight different countries. So, India is trying to be friends with people who will be its friends.

Ben Bland

And Ambassador Saran, I might come to you on this question, ‘cause I mean multi-alignment or omni-alignment sounds good, being friends with everyone, but presumably, if you want to be an ever more assertive strong power, you’re going to have to take some tough choices that upset a lot of people. And, you know, even if you don’t, other powers, and not least the US and China, but others, are going to be pressuring you to take choices on all kinds of decisions. So, do you think it’s realistic for India to, kind of, take a bigger role in the world and still maintain the, sort of, omnidirectional alignment, or do you think there will have to be some tougher choices in the years to come if India wants to deploy its power more effectively?

Ambassador Shyam Saran

If I look back upon much of my diplomatic career, I think much of that history is of very consistently annoying our partners. So, you know, whether it is the United States of America or whether it is our European friends, I would say that we are annoying them much less today than we were during our non-aligned days. So, I think one should look at this in a way that – in a somewhat longer-term perspective.

But is India being assertive? Well, it depends upon, you know, what one means by assertive. Was India not being assertive, for example, in the 60s and the 70s of the last century? I think it was. I mean, look at the, kind of, position that India took, say, on the Non-Proliferation Treaty? I mean, was willing to stand alone, lot of criticism, lot of pressures.

So, I do not think that one can say, “Oh, India was not assertive before, but it has become assertive now. I think the manner in which India has been projecting its foreign policy is perhaps somewhat different in style from what it was before and I think Louise has explained, you know, the domestic drivers of that particular posture that India is taking. But I will go back to what Chietigj said, that, you know, we are really talking about a certain remarkable consistency in Indian foreign policy, from the word go, which is that, you know, on issues which are of vital interest to India, those decisions should be taken primarily in the Indian capital itself and not be outsourced to somebody else. That has not changed.

Now, as far as the Global South is concerned, it is, to some extent, similar to the non-aligned movement of the past, but in other respects is very different. Why? Because the non-aligned movement was essentially a grouping of relatively weak states, you know, whether militarily or whether economically. Today, you are talking about a Global South which has several, you know, emerging – strong emerging economies, India being one of them, having greater agency in terms of foreign policy, which they did not have before. So, if you look at, for example, you know, South Af – Saudi Arabia and Iran engage in a certain – you know, détente between them, and not necessarily with reference to say, the United States of America.

So, you see these countries maybe not coming together as a movement, but certainly today, recognising that they have greater capability, greater power and are willing to exercise it. So, India is not an outlier in that respect, I would submit.

Ben Bland

Thank you. I want to drill into a few key bilateral relationships and maybe we can start with China. You know, we know that, you know, relations are not good, that’s clear, but I do wonder, Chietigj, and I know you’ve – this is something you’ve written about, and you think about it a lot, I mean, do you think we’re actually in a new paradigm on India-China relations, this deterioration? Has a big shift been set in motion, or you know, do you think we could see a rapprochement and something, you know, akin to the Wuhan, you know, team meeting between Modi and Xi? Is that feasible and that’s something that could be back on the cards, or do you think this realignment in India’s relationship with China, which obviously affects India’s relationship with other key powers, including in the West, is a change that’s here for good?

Dr Chietigj Bajpaee

So, it depends whom you ask. So, I think in Beijing in – you know, Beijing’s preference would be to return back to the status quo that existed pre-2020, pre the Galwan valley clashes. I think from the Indian point of view, I think we’re in a new normal. So, what existed, essentially, from 1988 to 2020, where there was a, you know, a consensus to shelve the border dispute and work on other aspects of the bilateral relationship, I think the Indians have clearly moved away from that. There’s also been of – a shift away from the rules of engagement, the non-use of force along the border. We saw the first casualties in 45 years back in 2020.

So, I think from the Indian point of view, the relationship is in a new normal. I think if there’s a silver lining, if there is any, is the fact that both countries are highly – heavily focused on domestic issues, China on its domestic economic situation, you know, India moving into elections next year. And also, both countries have a high level of economic interdependence. So, despite efforts by India to try and decouple or de-risk in strategically important sectors, impose restrictions on investment, banning Chinese apps, India – China remains, you know, India’s second largest trading partner. And in particular sectors there’s a high level of interdependence, pharmaceuticals, for instance.

So, I think that that is, to some extent, going to limit the level of tension or friction, but I also think that as these two countries continue to rise as increasingly important global powers, they’re going to encounter more tools and platforms to interact with each other. And that means you’re going to start to see a spillover effect. So, not only are you going to see tensions along the Sino-Indian border or in the domain of their trade or economic interaction, but potentially on issues of global governance. So, for instance, we saw President Xi Jinping joining the G20 Summit this year. We’ve seen on climate negotiations, and Ambassador Saran, I think, would have some insight on this, that over ten years ago China and India were working very closely during the COP negotiations in Copenhagen, for instance.

Increasingly, they’re pursuing their own separate climate discussions. On issues of debt sustainability, as well, there are potential areas of friction. And then, of course, it’s how the, you know, how the relationship plays out in other regions, South Asia most notably. So, I think we are going to increasingly see a spillover effect as these two countries continue to rise as regional and global powers. But in terms of conflict, I think it is held back, to some degree, by the level of economic interdependence that exists between the two of them.

Ben Bland

And Ambassador Saran, I know you’ve also, sort of, written and thought a lot about India and China. I was interested to see a piece recently by Raja Mohan, who was, sort of, arguing that unlike America and Australia and Europeans, you know, “India shouldn’t seek some sort of cooling of tensions with China, because India’s in a much stronger position these days vis-à-vis China.” I mean, what’s your sense of how should India handle the China relationship from here on out?

Ambassador Shyam Saran

You know, it has been – for the last several years, there has been a, kind of, you know, co-operate where your interests are convergent and resist, too, where you need to resist. So, the change has come about because those mechanisms which actually kept the, you know, possible conflictual situations that arise at the border within limits, there were border personnel meetings, there were meetings at the diplomatic level, right up to the CMC level, the Central Military Commission level. And they were quite successful in dealing with incidents which took place at the border.

What has changed over the last several years is that that, sort of, spirit of accommodation. When situations like this arise that has been, you know, becoming thinner and thinner, but certainly on the Chinese side. Mainly because I think the Chinese feel that they’re a much stronger power today. They keep reminding India that “Our Indian friends should realise that we are now five times your size, things cannot remain the same as they were before. There is another element which has come in, which is looking at relations with India through the prism of its own rather tense confrontational relations with the United States. So, India is seen as having, you know, sort of, lent over, you know, to the US side and therefore, must be brought in lines somehow.

This is likely to persist because I cannot see a very early, sort of, lessening of tensions between the US and China. Although recently some moves have been made in that regard. So, as long as China continues to look at India through that prism, it is very difficult, really, to come to some kind of a, you know, common ground with regard to how we look at our respective interests, certainly in Asia. Because as Chietigj was saying, there is a certain kind of a overlap of peripheries, both in the Indian Ocean, as well as in the subcontinent, and this is likely to, in fact, become worse as we go forward.

So, for India, the real challenge is how do you hold the line, safeguard your borders? And I think, you know, despite the gap in capabilities, India did a reasonably good job in terms of, you know, holding the line on the border, although it is not in a position – does not have the capability to try and push China out from the areas which have been occupied. But certainly, it has demonstrated the capability of being able to deploy rapidly enough and on scale to be able to, you know, forestall any further incursion by China.

And it is also my sense that in fact, the argument that sometimes is made that, you know, India should not provoke China by going too close to the United States or, you know, getting into very strong security arrangements, for example, in the Quad, quite the opposite. I think what constrains China in its relations with India is precisely that India has those networks of relationships, and I think that is precisely what is at play here. So, I would imagine that what we are seeing today is a situation that is likely to persist.

Ben Bland

Thanks, Ambassador, and it seems, obviously, that that shift has been quite instrumental in the realignment of Western policy towards India, as well, the sense that, you know, the West’s needs friends in the competition with China, but Louise, I want to ask you about, this, sort of, this question of democracy, ‘cause it’s – while, you know, our foreign policy may be driven by these narrow interests, we like to dress it up as being about, you know, great democracies coming together. But we know that in India democracy has been under pressure, pressure on minority rights arising, Spirit of Hindu, nationalism, pressure on independent think tanks and Journalists and the like. But do you think in a general sense, before we get onto some of the specifics, does this democratic backsliding, does that affect India’s place in the world and how the West sees India, or is this just something that, you know, governments are all happy to live with and look away, basically?

Professor Louise Tillin

Well, I mean, I think you’ve set out the contradiction there very nicely, which is that India has a commonality, a set of common interests with many Western countries in developing a counterweight to – or becoming a counterweight to China, and yet, at the same time, is diverting from standards of liberal democracy. This makes it harder, of course, for Western friends to publicly criticise the evidence of democratic backsliding in India. And India itself is very bullish in both guarding against, you know, criticisms from the West, given, you know, the, kind of – what’s happening to democracy in the West, but also, in pointing to India’s own indigenous democratic trend – traditions, which perhaps ought to be judged in a diff – you know, with a – with the different set of lenses.

I think it’s also interesting to ask the question about how – the concerns about democratic erosion, which are very substantial. I mean, you’ve outlined some of them there, but, you know, serious decline in press freedom, in media pluralism, in the protection of minority rights, violence against minorities, the suspension of democracy and a curtailment of internet access in parts of the country. I mean, Freedom House not only downgraded India’s status to partly free in its democratic rankings, but it downgraded the status of Jammu and Kashmir, for instance, to not free.

So, there are very real concerns and evidence to suggest that there is something very serious happening to the quality of Indian democracy, and yet, at home in India, there is also a very vibrant electoral scene. We have had nothing approximating events, for instance, in the US or in Brazil, where an incumbent government has sought to prevent a rival taking office, and, you know, there continues to be rotations of power, both at the state level and at the national level. We’re just, you know, this week, awaiting results from a key set of state elections, which, you know, in some ways tell us that democracy or electoral – the electoral side of democracy is still alive and kicking. We can get deeper into, you know, whether there is a level playing field within that, you know, that system of electoral democracy.

But I think all of that makes it harder for the critique of democracy and human rights to become a impediment to India’s foreign relations and yet, it is likely to be an ongoing irritant. And, you know, we may see in this country, with a – the potential for another government to come to power next year, a somewhat different line, you know, towards some of those human rights questions.

Ben Bland

And drilling into the specifics, Chietigj, I might ask you about this. I mean, we know that there was – you know, the Canadian Government has said that the – India has been involved in an official level in the assassination of a Sikh separatist, and the US now saying that there was an Indian Government involvement in an attempted assassination of a Sikh separatist. I mean, obviously, from a Western respect vis-à-vis the, sort of, extraditial – extrajudicial, extraterritorial assassination attempts, as I say, it seems to be – ought to be a big problem, but do you think it is actually going to be a problem for the bilateral relationship? It’s obviously a problem for our human rights in various countries, but is it a problem for the bilateral relationships with India, do you think, or in the end, on both sides, is there, sort of, the Bismarckian realpolitik going to win the day while we turn the other cheek?

Dr Chietigj Bajpaee

Yeah, I mean, it’s interesting to see the, you know, the contrast between the Canadian approach to this issue and the US approach, and the US has tried to handle it all, you know, far more discreetly. So, I think in some ways, that reflects the level of importance that they place on the bilateral relationship with India.

But I think, you know, it’s interesting to see – I mean, this is a story that refuses to go away and it – I think there are several important broader implications. You know, one which has not really been talked about is India’s relations with the diaspora community. India has the world’s largest diaspora community, over 18 million people and, you know, they’re generally seen to be as a source of strength for India’s foreign policy. You see the very warm welcome that Prime Minister Modi has received when he travels abroad from overseas Indian communities, but this has shown, you know, the dark side of that. That, you know, when you have overseas Indian communities engaged in activities that are challenging Indian’s sovereignty and status, that could potentially lead to a, you know, a – bilateral relations deteriorating, which is clearly what’s happened in the case of Canada. But you could foresee something similar happening in the case of the UK, Australia, the US. So, I think that is one, you know, consideration that we need to keep in mind.

I think it also – yeah, I think – I mean, there are perhaps limits on the level of engagement between the US – between the West and India. You know, I don’t think India was ever going to become a member of The Five Eyes or the AUKUS arrangements, but it does, essentially, you know, potentially raise questions about the level of intelligence co-operation that could exist between the US and India, for example. Because, you know, where – what we’ve seen is that, yeah, India is, essentially – you know, these allegations of it being a liberal democracy or an electoral autocracy, these issues have been, to some extent, sidelined in India’s engagements with the West and the US, in particular. But when we see these spillover effects, like what’s happened in the case of Canada, yeah, it is – obviously, it could have a potential impact on the long-term trajectory of the relationship.

Ben Bland

And obviously, we – often, from the outside, we think, oh, you know, what does this mean for how we engage with India? But Ambassador Saran, I mean, how far does India’s democracy, you know, with its good and bad, like all our democracies, in its, you know, own way, how does India’s democracy actually affect the worldview of India in, you know, India’s foreign policy? Do you see its, sort of, direct linkages between Indian democracy and Indian foreign policy?

Ambassador Shyam Saran

Well, I think India’s democracy is important for its own people. I think the external dimension of this is secondary, in my view. But let me make the point that, you know, when you have common political values, shared democratic values, these may reinforce what are already convergent interests, say, a security interest.

Now, you saw that during the Cold War, for example, despite the fact that India was perhaps, in today’s terms, much more of a liberal democracy than maybe considered today, and yet, we were on the two sides of the fence as far as most of the West was concerned. So, during that particular period, shared political values did not guarantee, in fact, a shared security interest.

I think the converse is true today, that, you know, there are very strong convergent interests, and I would tend to the cynical view that as long as those convergent interests are there and persist, maybe, you know, the aspect of shared political values will not play such an important role.

But I think for India itself, and what is the kind of projection that it wishes to make, you know, to the outside world, I think being a vibrant democracy, a plural democracy, is something very important. And even though there are setbacks today in terms of the how democracy is practised in India, I am very confident that the sheer plurality of India, the sheer diversity that India has, in fact, is maybe not immediately, but longer-term perspective, it is a guarantee that, you know, it will, in fact, remain a very, very vibrant democracy. It is difficult to see how India can manage many of the kind of tensions and pressures that are there within the country itself, were it not for the democratic dispensation.

Ben Bland

Yeah, thanks for that, and in terms of other, sort of, bi – I’m going to come back to the elections at the end, but in terms of other bilateral relationships, Kevin, I wanted to ask about the UK. I mean, there’s been, you know, negotiations ongoing on this FTA, but we have elections coming up in both countries, and what are the prospects for the UK-India FTA?

Kevin McCole

Yeah, I will answer that question. Take a little tiny step back, if I may, oh, back 18 years. I arrived on my posting in India November 2005, so it’s 18 years I’ve been doing UK-India relations, and I have to say it’s not – this is probably the best the relationship has been. It’s not without its bumps, but it’s probably the best it’s been, and one of the key reasons for that is the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and the 2030 roadmap that was signed May 2021. That covered healthcare, climate co-operation, defence and security, the people-to-people connects and the trade and investment relationship. And, you know, the FTA is a key element of that trade and investment relationship.

Now, negotiations are taking longer than the Politicians said they would. I’m not referring there to the deal by Diwali that the Former Prime Minister mentioned. That was just an alliteration that he couldn’t resist, but the polit – from – the negotiations were launched in January 2022. He did talk about a year in public, in private 18 months, which would’ve been this spring.

Now, why have there been delays? I think the turn in Prime Minister’s slowed things down, but I also think it’s partly because business didn’t want a quick deal that was narrow and shallow. Businesses did want something that had real substance, and if you’ve got the world’s fifth and sixth biggest economies negotiating an FTA, you can’t really do that quickly if you’re going to do it meaningfully. So, you know, the fact that negotiations were nearly two years in, don’t think many businesses are frustrated by that.

But we’re at a point, with elections coming up, I think, that if the deal isn’t concluded by, say, Republic Day, which is, sort of, 26th of January, I think we’re looking at picking up negotiations again in 2025. Indian general election this spring, if the UK general election is in the autumn next year, then you can imagine, and particularly if there’s a change in government here, you can see the governments getting back round the table in 2025. That type of delay, I think, will frustrate businesses. We’re okay at the moment, but kicking it down the road by another 15 months, that’s not a great place to be.

Ben Bland

And we’re not going to talk about the UK politics today, but on the Indian side, Louise, I might just come to you before we take questions, then, from the – you know, it’ll be the state elections at the moment, and general elections next year. I mean, is a Modi third term a foregone conclusion and, sort of, if so, I mean, what do you think third term Modi looks like? How might it be different from what we’ve seen up to now?

Professor Louise Tillin

Is it a foregone conclusion? I always wish one had a crystal ball, but, you know, it’s impossible to predict the outcomes of elections. I think, you know, the BJP are probably going into these elections on the front foot. That said, the results from the state elections that we expect this weekend will be important because they will give us insights into the health of the main national opposition party, the Congress Party, which is either the incumbent party or the main challenger in all four of the states that are up for election.

This is important because the Congress Party is the leading – the largest party in the main opposition alliance, the India Alliance, which was formed a few months ago and proclaimed that it would agree a seat sharing arrangement before the next – before the Lok Sabha elections. If it were to manage that, that could potentially be game-changing, because the B – any dominant party, like the BJP, but also the Congress Party in its heyday, in the – you know, from the 1950s through to the 1980s, benefits from the fragmentation of the opposition. India’s opposition is hugely fragmented, especially across region.

So, if there were a coherent national opposition alliance, then that could put a lot of pressure on the BJP and could make for quite an unpredictable election outcome. At the moment, I have to say the prospects of a coherent seat sharing agreement don’t look great, but I think if Congress do well, better than expected, in the upcoming elections, then perhaps that equation starts to change and their ability to bargain with other regional parties may start to change, as well.

What does a third term Modi Government look like, is an interesting question. Of course, this third term, were Modi to come back, may be Modi’s final term, and there’s a big question about the post-Modi succession. So, my expectation is that a third Modi term may, for that reason, be a slightly different kind of term because the BJP itself will have to look within itself and confront the potential liability of what has been a very centralised leadership, both of the party and of the country. So, you know, I think it could be an interesting next term politically.

In terms of the issues that we’re likely to see in a third term Modi Government, I think we’re likely to see, in some ways, more of the same, a, kind of, a bullish focus, obviously, on the economy, on infrastructure development. Some of these themes which are, kind of, kicking around may coalesce a little more around industrial strategy, what a green industrial strategy might look like. We talked – we alluded a little to India’s climate – you know, ambitions to be a climate change leader. You know, if those are actually to come to fruition, I think we’ll need to see – start to see more meat on the bone, so to speak, in a third Modi term.

I think, also, I think it’s worth just also remembering that these elections, and possibly the aftermath, will both be framed by, again, a quite strident form of Hindu nationalism. We’re expecting the opening of the Ram Mandir in Ayodhya on – which is by – considered by Hindus to be the birthplace of Lord Ram, but was also the site of the Babri Masjid, the Mughal era mosque that was pulled down by Hindu nationalist volunteers in the ear – in 1992. This is a really totemic moment and site for the BJP and for the Hindu nationalist project in India. So, I think that is likely to overshadow the elections and the, you know, the next – if the BJP were to come back for a third term.

It also – you know, that is also likely to be important for the reason that Ambassador Saran began that conversation. Dis – you know, in spite of India’s very healthy rates of economic growth, it has significant problems structurally in the economy, growing inequality, high levels of both unemployment and underemployment, one of the lowest rates of female labour part – force participation anywhere in the world. So, those are, you know, everyday bread and butter livelihoods issues which will not go away and, you know, partly at – in response to that, we see the recourse to this rather strident form of majoritarian identity politics.

Ben Bland

Thanks, Louise. Okay, open to take your questions. So, just raise a hand if you have a question and tell us who you are and any affiliation, if you have one. Yeah, why don’t we start with, yeah, up front?

Dr Yu Jie

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Yu Jie from Chatham House Asia-Pacific Programme. Firstly, let me congratulate my colleague, Chietigj’s debut as a member of this event today. It’s quite successfully – really enjoy your chat. Now, come back to the question on China-India, I mean, this is – or Delhi conversation. What I’ve noticed so far is that seems to be Beijing begin to relaunch its so-called charm offence, together with, like, for example, Japan this week and then, also, last week, the summit between Xi and Biden, and so on and so forth. Are we likely to see, firstly, some kind of rapprochement between Xi and Modi in the next year – in the election year, firstly? And secondly, if we are going to have a rapprochement, on which elements that India will perhaps to choose to offer to China in essence?

Ben Bland

And maybe Ambassador Saran, do you want to take that question first?

Ambassador Shyam Saran

Yeah, well, you know, I am not very optimistic about a possible rapprochement between Prime Minister Modi and Xi Jinping, at least not in the foreseeable, you know, future. Because I think the issues that divide the two countries today, the frame within which they are looking at each other, I think it may not be possible, really, to come to some kind of a consensus on how to take this relationship forward. So, I expect that things will remain much the same as they are today.

What can India offer to China? Well, we know that – let me go back to a certain consensus, which was reached between the two leaders in 2005, when I was Foreign Secretary. You know, the consensus was India is not a threat to China, China is not a threat to India. There is enough space in Asia, as well as the world, for both an emerging China, as well as an emerging India. That India is a great economic opportunity for China and, you know, China is a great economic opportunity for India. And that the two countries have very convergent interests in terms of really shaping the global, you know, order.

None of this has changed, by the way, in real terms. I mean, these remain as valued today as they were at that time. What has changed, as I said, is that China is now benchmarking itself with the United States of America. It does not see the same level of common interest with emerging countries like India and the others. I mean, this is very obvious, for example, in the climate change, you know, negotiation, where India, Brazil, South Africa and China used to very much co-ordinate their positions together in their negotiations. Today, that is no longer the case, again, because the frame has changed. So, I do not think that in the foreseeable future there would be much of a change in this respect.

Ben Bland

Thanks, and Chietigj, do you want to add something?

Dr Chietigj Bajpaee

Just a very quick point. So, first of all, we’ve gone over a year without the appointment of our Chinese Ambassador in New Delhi, so that, in some ways, reflects the state of the bilateral relationship. Also, interestingly, we haven’t mentioned the T word, which is Tibet, which is one of the roots of the Sino-Indian hostilities back in the 1950s. And the Dalai Lama is 88-years-old, he hasn’t travelled abroad, I think, since 2018, so it’s not going to be too long before we will see – we could see a potential tug of war between Beijing and the Tibetan Government in exile in Dharamsala, in which India could be caught in the crossfire. So, that could be another potential flashpoint in the Sino-Indian relationship.

Ben Bland

And we have a question from online from Andrew Tamworth about “India’s role at COP28.” I mean, is – on “climate change, can India’s be the world’s teacher, or is India just keen to build more coalfired powerplants, and can you do both at the same time?”

Dr Chietigj Bajpaee

Well, I think, yeah, India’s position on COP, in some ways, it’s going to build on its – and I think Ambassador Saran would be very – probably the appropriate person to ask it, but it’ll be building on what it achieved at the G20. So, we saw agreements reached on tripling renewable power capacity. We saw agreements on a Global Biofuels Alliance building on an International Solar Alliance, which was put in place earlier, you know, agreements on sustainable agriculture, on sustainability in a circular economy. So, I think that’s – those are going to be some of the key focus areas.

Obviously, again, echoing what we’ve been talking about, “the voice of the Global South,” India will be very much be talking about climate finance, technology transfer. I think those are going to be some of the key priority areas and potential areas of friction. It – yeah, I mean, I…

Ben Bland

But that’s talking. I mean, maybe, Ambassador, what’s India actually going to do for the Global South in global climate change negotiations? I mean, beyond, you know, its own benefit, does India have, sort of, ambitions, yeah, in terms of the global climate change debate beyond its own, sort of, narrow self-interest?

Ambassador Shyam Saran

No. Is that a question to me?

Ben Bland

Yeah.

Ambassador Shyam Saran

Yeah, okay. Well, you know, the main issue is, as far as India is concerned, and I suspect this is the sentiment amongst most of the developing countries, that, you know, the kind of commitments which have been made by the developed West, whether it is in terms of, you know, their own emissions and reducing them in terms of, you know, whatever commitments they have made for finance to developing countries, even the $100 billion which was supposed to be on offer has never been actually achieved. There has been hardly any technology transfer. So, I think India would be very much articulating the position of great disappointment, with respect to what those who are more capable in terms of finance and technology, were supposed to do and had promised to do and have not done. So, I don’t think that on that issue, mobilising sentiment or mobilising support from most of the countries of the Global South is going to be much of a problem.

I think as far as India itself is concerned, yes, there will be a pressure on India on the issue of coal. You know, I mean, you have just said Goa in India will do – start, you know, producing more power from coal. Well, that is likely to be the case because we have very few options. So, while we will be expanding our renewable energy, you know, power generation, it is unlikely that in the near-term India will be able to do without coal. And by the way, we do consider it rather unfair that a country like China, which has a massive, massive, you know, capacity of coal-based thermal power and which, in the last couple of years itself, has added something like 90, you know, gigawatts of coal-based thermal power, does not seem to, you know, generate any kind of concern. But India, which is at a much, much lower level of coal-based thermal power, seems to be in the crosshairs all the time. So, you know, I – it should not come to you as any surprise if India is going to react to that in a somewhat, you know, rather assertive manner.

Ben Bland

Yeah, thanks for that. We have a question here at the front.

Dian

Hi, I’m Dian, I’m a undergraduate student here, second year, and I just wanted to understand that if you ask a BJP voter today that why are they voting for BJP, they’d say that they would vote for Modi because the US President came and shook hands with him at G20. So, I wanted to understand this idea of resurgent India. Is it backed by substantive change in foreign policy, or is it just the rebranding of the foreign policy in terms of international [inaudible – 55:33] in terms of Diwali being celebrated at Trafalgar Square or something of that? Yeah.

Ben Bland

Who wants to have a go at that one, Louise, or…?

Professor Louise Tillin

Sure. I mean, I reflect on this issue partly from having been in India during the G20 Summit and in the, kind of, year running up to the G20 Summit, and just the – witnessing the extraordinary way that the Indian Government enabled the penetration of India’s role as President of the G20 to trickle down through almost every aspect of social and of economic life. Through to, you know, there being G20 branding on exam papers that students were sitting in universities, right? It was impossible for anyone not to know that India was President of the G20, and I think that’s a – there’s a, you know, there’s a really powerful example of how Modi, as world leader, has been branded for a domestic audience.

And as you say, I think for the average BJP voter, that is important. Modi makes Indians feel proud of being Indian, in a – in – you know, that doesn’t mean to say that Indians didn’t feel proud of being Indian before Modi, but they, through Modi, have a new means of identifying themselves as India and of understanding Indian pride. So, I think a lot of this does go down to branding, rath – and you know, we’ve heard on the panel, I think, of, actually, a lot of ways in which Indian foreign policy sees much greater continuity pre and post-Modi.

But this is certainly a regime – and, you know, there’s been – in the last ten years, the penetration of digital media in India has also, you know, deepened, hmmm, you know, hugely, and so, the technology, the media available to the Government to brand itself and to pene – to produce a, kind of, penetrative understanding of Modi as a world statesman, has also changed. So, I think, yes, for all of those reasons, you know, the – yes, this has been a successful branding exercise, as much as anything.

Ben Bland

Kevin, do you want to say something?

Kevin McCole

Yes, well, sort of, build a little bit on what Louise is saying there, and drawing through something you said earlier, that Modi’s third term is likely to be his final term. So, if India is the next superpower, is an element of that down to Mr Modi’s, sort of, personality and – rather than his position of power? So, how does India increase or sustain its foreign policy and economic influence post-Modi? So, there is a transition the BJP would have to do.

Also, I think in terms of increasing the number of brilliant Diplomats India has, and I’m looking at one of them sitting in the back row, there. You know, India’s foreign services is full of top quality people, but I think it has to expand if it’s going to exert its continued influence post Mr Modi. You can’t rely on one person to drive a nation’s foreign policy. It needs a peaceful army of people to do that.

Dr Chietigj Bajpaee

And just to mention, I’m not entirely convinced that this would be Modi’s last term, but I’m just putting that…

Professor Louise Tillin

Saying, yeah.

Dr Chietigj Bajpaee

…out there.

Kevin McCole

But it can be.

Dr Chietigj Bajpaee

If he gets ruled out, just want to caveat.

Ben Bland

We’ll talk to that next time, and there’s one more question right at the front here, and lady at the front.

Alice

Thank you very much. I’m Alice and I’m an Investor in Emerging Markets. I think contradiction was a term that’s mentioned a few times today and, you know, there are external contradictions in terms of multilateral relationships and India’s position in the world, and that there are also lots of internal contradictions. So, going back to the question of, you know, the event today, “Will India become the next global superpower?” do you think – what’s – what would stop India being a global superpower? Would it be external or internal factors? Thank you.

Ben Bland

Yeah, well, we probably have, like – you have 30 seconds each, probably, to give us the last word. So, Ambassador Saran, what would stop India being the next emerging superpower?

Ambassador Shyam Saran

Well, on balance, I would say how India handles its domestic, you know, challenges would be the key. As far as the external environment is concerned, that you can always try and mould to your interests, or at least try to. But it is much more challenging to deal with the, kind of, very, very difficult challenges, developmental challenges which India faces today and which also spawned a lot of, you know, social fault lines, as well.

Ben Bland

Thanks. Kevin?

Kevin McCole

I think India can decide for itself if it wants to be a superpower and if it does, what type of superpower that is. It won’t be like China projects itself. It won’t be like the US. So, I think India can redefine what a superpower is and decide for itself whether it wants to act in that way.

Dr Chietigj Bajpaee

Even I would perhaps challenge the very premise of this, you know, that – the title of this meeting, but I don’t think it will – it’s likely to be a superpower or a great power. It is an emerging major power, that’s what it is, and in terms of the key risks, I mean, we’ve discussed the Modi issue and the BJP having the two key risks. That – other risks that I would perhaps flag is climate risk. It’s a issue which is – not only India, but the broader South Asia region is very vulnerable, too. We saw the devastating impact of the floods in Pakistan last year, and all it would take is a gradual increase in temperature to affect agricultural production in India, which would make it a perhaps, a net food importer once again. And then, perhaps the other issue is that the demographic dividend that we like to talk about, becoming a demographic burden if it’s not able to – the Government is unable to invest in skills improvement, education and job creation. I think those are potential – you know, two potential risks.

Ben Bland

And anything left in the can for you, Louise…

Professor Louise Tillin

No.

Ben Bland

…so, as a final…?

Professor Louise Tillin

Not much, really. Thanks for coming to me last. You know, I mean, I think, how does India harness its economic potential while producing, you know, dividends for its – for all Indians? And how does India harness its great pluralism, both, you know, domestically, but also, as a bridge to the world?

Ben Bland

Thanks. That was a really good question to end off with, so thanks for that, and thanks everyone for coming today. We’ll have much more to come on India in the coming months with the elections coming up, so stay tuned to our website. You can also sign up to our Asia-Pacific Programme newsletter on the Chatham House website if you’re so minded, but for now, please join me in giving a round of applause to our great speakers today [applause].